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ABSTRACT 
Plea bargaining describes the act of negotiating and concluding agreements in the criminal 
procedure. Usually the prosecutor and the accused agree that the accused will plead guilty 
to the charge brought against him in exchange for some concession from the prosecution. 
The bargain is not limited to the presented subject. Agreements can contain the non-
prosecution or reduction of charges, specific terms of punishment, conditions of probation 
and much more. In many countries the vast majority of criminal cases are disposed by way 
of bargaining. Plea bargaining breaches with the concept of a conventional trial and 
consequently clashes with well-known fundamental principles of the criminal procedure. 
Moreover, bargaining before criminal trials strongly implicates the constitutionally secured 
rights of the accused as well as of the public interest. Although plea bargaining is broadly 
criticized for its implications on essential rules and principles, the use of the practice is 
widespread. There are clear benefits to the participant, such as to avoid a lengthy trial with 
an uncertain outcome. South Africa, as a legal system with roots in the common law, 
adopted the procedure in 2001 with the implementation of s 105A into the Criminal 
Procedure Act. The German legislature in 2009 decided to regulate what until then had 
been informal practice by inserting several rules into the German criminal procedure, 
amongst which s 257c contains the main provisions. The implementation of bargains into 
the German law has produced tensions particularly due to the inquisitorial basis of the 
criminal procedure that stands in civil law tradition. 
This thesis evaluates how South African and German provisions on plea bargaining differ, 
i.e., on which different backgrounds they are based on, how the bargain procedures are 
construed and to what extent statutory plea bargaining in both legal systems displaces 
informal traditional agreements. The comparison is enriching under the aspect that both 
countries implemented the bargain procedure but had to place them on fundamentally 
different grounds. 
Having presented the grounds that motivated the research (Chapter I.), the origins of plea 
bargaining in general as well as the legal development toward the present statutory 
provisions in both countries are examined (Chapter II.). The bargain procedures are 
compared in detail (Chapter IV.). A large part focuses on particular problem areas and how 
both legal systems cope with them (Chapter V.). The result of the research is summarized 
in a conclusion (Chapter VI.). 
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OPSOMMING 
Pleitonderhandeling kan beskryf word as die proses van onderhandel en die aangaan van 
ooreenkomste in die strafproses. Die vervolging en die verdediging sal gewoonlik 
ooreenkom dat die beskuldigde skuldig sal pleit in ruil vir een of meer toegewings deur die 
vervolging. Ooreenkomste kan insluit die nie-vervolging of vermindering van klagte, 
spesifieke aspekte van vonnis, voorwaardes van parool en talle meer. In ‘n hele aantal 
lande word die oorgrote meerderheid van sake afgehandel by wyse van 
pleitooreenkomste. Dit is egter duidelik dat pleitooreenkomste in konflik is met die konsep 
van ‘n gewone verhoor en is gevolglik ook in konflik met van die grondbeginsels van die 
strafprosesreg. Dit raak ook die grondwetlike regte van beskuldigdes en die belange van 
die samelewing. Ten spyte van hierdie kritiek en meer, is die praktyk van 
pleitonderhandeling wydverspreid. Daar blyk besliste voordeel te wees vir die 
deelnemende partye, byvoorbeeld die vermyding van lang verhore met onsekere 
beslissings. Suid-Afrika (met ‘n sterk gemeenregtelike tradisie) het die praktyk van 
pleitonderhandeling formeel en per statuut in 2001 aanvaar, met die aanvaarding en 
invoeging van artikel 105A in die Strafproseswet, 1977. Die wetgewer in Duitsland het in 
2009 besluit om die informele praktyk van pleitonderhandeling te formaliseer met die 
invoeging van sekere bepalings in die Duitse strafproseskode. Hierdie invoeging het 
sekere spanning veroorsaak in die Duitse strafproses, veral weens die inkwisitoriese 
tradisie in daardie jurisdiksie. 
Hierdie tesis evalueer die Suid-Afrikaanse en Duitse benaderings tot pleitonderhandelinge, 
hoe dit verskil, die verskillende regskulturele kontekste waarbinne dit plaasvind, en die 
mate waartoe pleitonderhandeling in beide sisteme informele ooreenkomste vervang het. 
Die vergelykende ondersoek bevind dat beide stelsels die pleitooreenkoms ingestel het, 
maar dit moes doen mvn fundamenteel verskillende gronde. 
Hoofstuk I (die motivering vir die studie), word gevolg deur ‘n historiese ondersoek 
(Hoofstuk II). Die verdere hoofstukke fokus op die regsvergelykende aspekte en die 
gevolgtrekkings word in Hoofstuk VI uiteengesit.  
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NOTE ON GENDER TERMS 
 
Throughout this thesis the pronouns as he, him and his are used purely for stylistic 
convenience and convention and are intended to refer to females as well as to males. 
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I. Motivation 
Plea agreements are a common instrument in criminal procedure. They enable the 
prosecutor and the accused or his defendant to negotiate and settle an agreement on plea 
and sentences. Plea bargaining in pure form places the criminal proceeding, fact-finding, 
legal consequences and even legal judgement at the parties’ disposal.1 In both Germany 
and South Africa, such agreements have become more and more important over the past 
several decades. Especially in large and difficult cases, e.g. ‘white collar crime’, plea 
agreements are seen by commentators as an effective means of avoiding long trials with 
uncertain outcomes. Statutory plea bargaining was introduced into South African law in 
2001 while in Germany it developed informally until it was implemented into the statutory 
law in 2009. There are many good reasons for incorporating consensual elements into the 
criminal justice system. Nevertheless, there is also a lack of clarity about the use of this 
instrument that can deeply affect the nature of a criminal trial and draw constitutionally 
guaranteed rights into question. Basic rules and principles of criminal procedure are 
affected and need to be assured. For example, openness in criminal proceedings is a 
legitimate public interest that must be considered.2 Furthermore, the presumption of 
innocence may be violated through the bargain procedure. In particular, cases may appear 
highly questionable if the prosecution relies entirely on the accused’s cooperation just to 
secure any conviction at all.3 Moreover, there generally is a need to ensure that legal 
proceedings are not permeated by the ‘smell of the marketplace’.4 Plea bargaining cannot 
be limited to the single function of easing the strain on resources, which would be a 
circumstance a democratic society could not afford.5 The legitimacy of the process has to 
be preserved, and the courts must maintain discretion in the process. Plea bargaining is a 
deliberate movement away from conventional trial procedure. Yet there is no prevailing 
opinion about the true nature of plea bargaining, i.e., whether or not it crosses the line and 
becomes a consensual procedure sui generis. 
All above-mentioned aspects already indicate the fundamental questions surrounding the 
issue: Does plea bargaining relegate the legitimacy of the criminal justice system to 
second priority in the name of greater expediency?6 To what extent can easing trials by 
way of bargaining be acceptable? What provisions in both German and South African law 
                                            
1
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 3. 
2
  Compare Bennun (2007) SACJ 17 at 45. 
3
  Bennun (2007) SACJ 17 at 45. 
4
  Compare Bennun (2007) SACJ 17 at 33. 
5
  Bennun (2007) SACJ 17 at 45. 
6
  Compare Bennun (2007) SACJ 17 at 45. 
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are meant to warrant established, unquestioned rules and principles of the criminal 
procedure and how are they interpreted? 
A comparison of South African and German law is particularly enlightening. South Africa’s 
law is basically accusatorial and characterised by common-law principles.7 Thus South 
Africa is a classic example of a country that adopted plea bargaining after the Anglo-
American model. German bargain procedure on the other hand was not directly influenced 
by foreign law. Rather, its consensual elements developed out of a pre-existing legal 
framework, the essence of which is inquisitorial.8 This in particular conflicts with the 
implementation of bargain procedure as a party’s disposal of the scope of the trial is 
foreign to continental criminal law. It is of great benefit to examine how Germany 
addressed these tensions and to compare them to the South African regulations, 
particularly because the German criminal justice system has served as a model for a 
number of other civil-law countries around the world.9 Thus the presented comparison 
between plea bargaining in South Africa and Germany is at its core a comparison of plea 
bargaining’s introduction into the common-law tradition and its introduction into the civil-
law tradition. 
II. General Introduction 
There are different approaches to the phenomenon of plea bargaining that are not 
necessarily based solely on the differing legal systems of each country. Bargaining before 
criminal courts can be defined and described by general features and characteristics. An 
analysis of the motives for and benefits and general perception of agreements in the 
criminal trial will help to understand the later discussed problems and concerns 
surrounding the issue. As will be presented, the bargain procedure possibly does not 
conform to basic principles and rules of criminal procedure, for both traditional and 
constitutional reasons. 
1. Definitions 
Defining ‘plea bargaining’ concisely often proves difficult because term can be used in 
many different situations and contexts.10 Thus, there are diverging opinions, and heaps of 
                                            
7
  Explanation of the term ‘accusatorial‘ will follow in Chapter II.6.b. 
8
  Explanation of the term ‘inquisitorial‘ will follow in Chapter II.6.a. 
9
  Compare Turner/Chodosh, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, p. 74. 
10
  Trichardt/Krull (1987) THRHR 428 at 430 with further references. 
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confusion, over the question of what constitutes plea bargaining.11 As a simple illustration, 
consider that plea bargaining already is a combination of two terms, the latter of which, 
‘bargaining,’ seems foreign to the very nature of every criminal trial. 
a. Dictionary 
One way to define plea bargaining is to consider common definitions. The Oxford 
Dictionary of English defines plea bargaining as ‘an arrangement between prosecutor and 
defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser charge in exchange for a more 
lenient sentence or an agreement to drop other charges’.12 More generally, the noun 
‘bargain’ describes ‘an agreement between two or more people or groups as to what each 
will do for the other.’13 The verb means to ‘negotiate the terms and conditions of a 
transaction’.14 Interestingly, ‘bargain’ is probably of Germanic origin and related to the 
German word for ‘to borrow’, i.e. ‘borgen’.15  
Instead of the terms ‘plea bargain’ and ‘plea bargaining’ one can also use the terms ‘plea 
agreements’ and ‘plea negotiations’. A reason for the use of the latter terms might be seen 
in the fact that the words ‘bargain ‘ and ‘bargaining’ tend to imply that a party is getting a 
benefit or making a good ‘deal,’ which is considered inappropriate in the context of criminal 
trials.16 Bekker notes that the term ‘bargain’ was a frequent source of misunderstanding 
and irritation and regards the word as an unhappy choice.17 In his opinion ‘bargain’ is 
misleading as it does not precisely describe what occurs at the court.18 The term suggests 
the idea of a ‘sale’ at the courthouse.19 However the term ‘bargain’ generated public belief 
that the accused are getting ‘a break’ or ‘less than he they deserve’ or ‘a deal’, which was 
not always true.20 ‘Bargain’ is considered by many to be provocative and pejorative rather 
than descriptive.21 Nevertheless the term ‘plea bargaining’ became commonly used. The 
use of the term ‘plea Bargaining’ is U.S.-American lingo.22 Bekker suggests that one could 
also speak of ‘settlement’, or a simple ‘bargain’, ‘contract’ or ‘agreement’.23 Bargaining, 
                                            
11
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 172. 
12
  Oxford Dictionary of English, 3ed (2010), ‘plea bargaining‘. 
13
  Oxford Dictionary of English, 3ed (2010), ‘bargain‘, noun, No 1. 
14
  Oxford Dictionary of English, 3ed (2010), ‘bargain‘, verb. 
15
  Oxford Dictionary of English, 3ed (2010), ‘bargain‘, origin. 
16
  Trichardt/Krull (1987) THRHR 428 at 430 with further references. 
17
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 173. 
18
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 173. 
19
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 173. 
20
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 173 with further references. 
21
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 173. 
22
  Clarke (1999) CILSA 141 at 142. 
23
  Compare Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 173. 
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especially in German provisions concerning pre-trial agreements, is oftentimes named 
‘discussion’.24 The term generally means ‘the action or process of talking about something 
in order to reach a decision or to exchange ideas’.25 The term ‘discussions’ is used to 
indicate and emphasize that it is not a ‘bargain’. It can be summed up that it oftentimes 
has been proposed to generally name plea bargaining ‘plea discussions’ and ‘plea 
agreements’, because the use of terms as ‘plea bargaining’ and ‘plea negotiations’ tend to 
imply that the procedure is not proper or even has an evil characteristic.26 Nevertheless 
the use of the term ‘plea bargaining’ is very common. 
b. Other jurisdictions 
U.S. law defines plea bargaining as follows:27 ‘Plea bargaining consists of the exchange of 
official concessions for a defendant’s act of self conviction. Those concessions may relate 
to the sentence imposed by the court or recommended by the prosecutor, the offence 
charged, or a variety of other circumstances; they may be explicit or implicit and they may 
proceed from any number of officials.’28 Another description of the nature of plea 
bargaining reads as follows: ‘plea bargaining is a form of negotiation by which the 
prosecutor and defence counsel enter into an agreement resolving one or more criminal 
charges against the defendant without a trial.’29 
The Canadian Law Commission, a commission that investigated the practice of plea 
bargaining in 1989 and recommended to establish statutory provisions, defined plea 
bargaining as ‘any agreement by the accused to plead guilty in return for the promise of 
some benefit’.30 The Commission later used the more neutral terms of ‘plea negotiations’ 
and ‘plea discussions,’ as it wanted to describe the process of reaching a satisfactory 
agreement rather than making a bargain.31 The term ‘plea agreement’ was consequently 
defined as ‘any agreement by the accused to plead guilty in return for the prosecutor’s 
agreeing to take or refrain from taking a particular course of action’.32 
                                            
24
  Compare ss 160b, 202 of the StPO. 
25
  Oxford Dictionary of English, 3ed (2010), ‘discussion‘. 
26
  Trichardt/Krull (1987) THRHR 428 at 430 in footnote 21 with further references. 
27
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 208. 
28
  Alschuler (1979) 79 Colum. L. Rev 1; Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 208; compare also South African Law 
Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) para 2.3. 
29
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 1 (§1:01). 
30
  South African Law Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) para 2.4; Law Reform Commission of 
Canada ‘Criminal Procedure: Control of the Process Working Paper 15 (1975) at 45. 
31
  South African Law Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) para 2.4. 
32
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 173; South African Law Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) para 
2.5. 
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c. Definitions Case law 
In North Western Dense Concrete CC and another v Director of Public Prosecutions 
(Western Cape), Uijs AJ defined plea bargain as ‘being the practice of relinquishing the 
right to go to trial in exchange for reduction in charge and/or sentence.’33 In S v Armugga & 
others’s case, Msimang J stated the following: ‘In the present context plea bargaining can 
be defined as the procedure whereby the accused person relinquishes his right to go to 
trial in exchange for a reduction in sentence. As the term itself connotes, the system 
involves bargaining on both sides, the accused bargaining away his right to go to trial, in 
exchange for a reduced sentence and the prosecutor bargaining away the possibility of a 
conviction, in exchange for a punishment which he or she feels would be retributively just 
and cost the least in terms of the allocation of resources. In the process of bargaining, 
numerous assumptions are made and mistakes are bound to happen. Provided that a 
party is found to have acted freely and voluntarily, in his or her sound and sober senses 
and without having been unduly influenced when concluding a plea bargaining agreement, 
the fact that the assumptions turn out to be false, does not entitle such a party to resile 
from the agreement.’ 34 
d. German terminology 
As the German language and German society are inclined to adopt English terms rather 
quickly and to use such Anglicisms to describe new developments, agreements negotiated 
in a criminal proceeding were often called ‘deals’ in German in the past. This ‘denglish’ (for 
Deutsch and English) term smacks of something irregular, not contemplated by the 
principles of criminal procedure,35 which indicates that these agreements have been and 
are commonly considered to be problematic. This may have been a motivation for the 
drafters of the statutory provisions to name plea bargaining in German ‘Verständigung’ 
(understanding or convergence of minds). This term was preferred over ‘Absprache’ 
(arrangement) or ‘Vereinbarung’ (agreement). Although all these terms stand for 
‘agreement’, the latter do underscore a quasi-contractual and binding character. 
‘Verständigung’ however only gives us the impression of a simple communication that has 
taken place. 
Another important aspect is that German criminal procedure does not incorporate a formal 
                                            
33
  North Western Dense Concrete CC and another v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) 1999 
(2) SACR 669 (C) at 670c. 
34
  S v Armugga & others 2005 (2) SACR 259 (N) at 265a-c. 
35
  Compare Meyer-Goßner, StPO, s 257c, para 31. 
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plea to a charge.36 As there is no ‘plea,’ strictly speaking, one cannot use the term ‘plea 
bargaining’ when discussing the subject with regard to the German provisions and law. 
One rather ought to speak of ‘agreements’, ‘negotiated agreements’, ‘bargain’ etc. 
Nevertheless in order to standardise the use of the term ‘plea bargaining,’ all such 
discussions, negotiations and agreements under German law will be described with this 
term. 
2. Reasons for plea bargaining 
There are plenty of reasons why the plea bargaining system has reached its present 
proportions.37 While much of the discussion surrounding plea bargaining deals with its 
benefits (which will also be examined later),38 first studying its general origins, the reasons 
why plea bargaining was established in practice, will aid understanding down the road. 
Therefore it is necessary to examine the factual, historic and socio-scientific background of 
plea bargaining. 
a. Factual case pressure 
One could assume that the guilty plea system has grown largely as a product of 
circumstances and as a result of general tendencies towards consensual elements in the 
criminal procedure rather than due to a choice.39 On the example of the United States 
Bekker explains that the volume of crime had increased over decades and that the criminal 
law focused on areas of human activity that were formerly beyond its scope.40 
Simultaneously, the length of the average criminal trial had increased significantly. All 
these developments led to a major administrative crisis in American criminal courts in the 
1990’s.41 The guilty plea system was seen as a solution that would enable the courts to 
process their case loads in light of seriously inadequate resources.42 Nowadays plea 
bargaining is the predominant method of resolving criminal cases in the United States.43 
As the above examples reveal, the most widely cited rationale for plea bargaining is 
                                            
36
  Turner/Chodosh, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, p. 74; which will be further explained later in this 
thesis. 
37
  Compare Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 178. 
38
  See Chapter II.4. 
39
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 178. 
40
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 178. 
41
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 178. 
42
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 178; F Allen ‘The borderland of criminal justice’ 3 (1964). 
43
  Turner/Chodosh, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, p. 7; La Fave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal Procedure, 
Vol. 5, p. 551 (§ 21.1(a)). 
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administrative necessity or case load pressure.44 Plea bargaining is seen as a means to 
spare the state the time and expense intrinsic to lengthy criminal trials.45 By way of 
extensive use of plea bargaining, the courts can handle more cases in the same time 
span. 
b. Historic causes 
In addition to the case load argument, there are several further reasons for the advent of 
plea bargaining. Historically, the rise of professional police and prosecutors who 
developed and selected their cases more carefully, so that there were relatively few 
genuine disputes over guilt or innocence, represents one of the first steps towards plea 
bargaining.46 But there were also contributing factors on the opposite side, including the 
specialisation and professionalism of legal representatives, broadening of the right to and 
spread of counsel and the objective of attorneys to be of assistance to their clients.47 Many 
more accused had legal representation and that representation wanted to assist their 
clients at a pre-trial stage as well as throughout trial.48 The due process revolution is 
another contributing factor, in that it made additional demands on the prosecutor’s office in 
pre-trial and post-conviction proceedings and strengthened the defendant’s bargaining 
position by affording him additional rights.49 Another reason for the rise of plea bargaining 
might be the expansion of substantive criminal law and new criminal legislation which did 
not always have the full weight of the society behind it.50 Changes in sentencing practices 
increased the certainty and amount of penalty, which built a basis for bargaining.51 Also 
the prosecution and judge might aim to reach a sentence through the bargain that to their 
minds would be more appropriate than that otherwise permissible under strict sentencing 
statutes.52 The development might have caused participants to seek ‘substantive justice in 
the face of legal inflexibility’.53  
Even though there may exist plenty of arguments, to the majority of scholars the 
                                            
44
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 179 with further citations. 
45
  Geldenhuys/Joubert/Swanepoel/Terblanche/van der Merwe, Criminal Procedure Handbook, p. 242 
(Chapter 14, 3). 
46
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 178; La Fave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 5, p. 524 (§ 
21.1(b)). 
47
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 178; La Fave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 5, p. 524 (§ 
21.1(b)). 
48
  La Fave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 5, p. 524 (§ 21.1(b)). 
49
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 179. 
50
  La Fave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 5, p. 525 (§ 21.1(b)).; Mather, 13 Law & Soc.Rev. 
281, 283 (1979); Alschuler, 13 Law & Soc.Rev. 211, 242 (1979). 
51
  La Fave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 5, p. 525 (§ 21.1(b)). 
52
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 179. 
53
  La Fave/Israel/King/Kerr, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 5, p. 525 (§ 21.1(b)). 
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administrative necessity of plea bargaining i.e. the case load pressure argument, remains 
the striking reason.54 The argument that a great overall development in criminal justice and 
growing case numbers caused the advent of plea bargaining is partly opposed. De Villers 
for instance regards it as false that the implementation of s 105A was inevitable.55 Instead 
he argues that the inefficient criminal justice system was the main contributor to the rise of 
plea bargaining.56 He holds that, through an improvement of the police service and the 
prosecution, there is a choice whether to make use of plea and sentence agreements, or 
at least whether to limit the extent to which such agreements are concluded.57 
c. Socio-scientific approach 
Empirical studies however might cast doubt on the above mentioned argument that the 
major reason for plea bargaining is case load pressure (‘case pressure theory’58).59 
Studies have shown that there is no significant correlation between case load and plea 
bargaining.60 Other studies found that case load pressure generally determined the need 
to plea bargain, although there was no indication which specific cases will be dealt with by 
way of plea bargain or what stipulations the bargain would contain.61 Bekker sums up that, 
however case load determines in general the kind of cases that are more likely to be plea 
bargained and gives the example that the greater the pressure of cases, less attention is 
given to petty and less serious crimes.62 He expects prosecutors to negotiate more easily 
when a case is either weak or difficult, thus requiring a long trial.63  
Besides the case pressure theory, there are two theories that try to explain the spread of 
plea bargaining. The common basis of both theories is the idea that there is general 
tendency among the participants of a trial towards cooperation.  
The organisational theory comes to this conclusion through an analysis of the courtroom 
setting. Scholars supporting this theory assume a mutual interest of all parties involved in 
the criminal proceeding in order to avoid conflict, thereby reducing uncertainty and 
maintaining group cohesion.64 Such scholars explain that the mutuality of social dynamics, 
                                            
54
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 179. 
55
  De Villers (2004) De Jure 244 at 252. 
56
  De Villers (2004) De Jure 244 at 252. 
57
  De Villers (2004) De Jure 244 at 252. 
58
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 179. 
59
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 179. 
60
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 179; Worden (1973) Judicature 335 at 339. 
61
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 179 with further citations. 
62
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 179 with further citations. 
63
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 179 with further citations. 
64
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 180 with further citations. 
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i.e. the structure of roles and relationships among the individuals that participate in the 
process, motivates the parties to enter into plea and sentence negotiations.65  
Socialisation or adaption theory, as originated by Milton Heumann, considers the 
participants’ conduct an outcome of socialisation, emphasizing that applicants are more 
influenced by learning than by teaching and that they gain knowledge of the reality of the 
criminal procedure that differs from what they expected and were being taught.66 Against 
the background that most of the clients are factually guilty and thus there are few if any 
legal matters that could be of budding use, adaption theory assumes that attorneys choose 
to plea bargain as a last option of defence.67 Indeed, one should not undervalue the 
impact of practical experience on the court’s practice. However to argue that plea 
bargaining initially was motivated by the spread of the practice of bargaining would be a 
circular argument. The present establishment of bargains cannot be seen as an initial 
reason for the practice. Rather it is an explanation for its ongoing spread. 
Another approach to the phenomenon of plea bargaining is to view society through its 
relationship to the State. One could argue that the development of plea bargaining reflects 
the development of a new relationship between state and citizen.68 Vertical power and 
pressure between the state and the subordinated citizen is replaced by equal 
partnership.69 Administrative law adapted to the changed relationship of the interacting 
participants earlier and may have served as an example.70 The state would rather discuss 
with the citizen than expose him to sanctions.71 In the eyes of Rauxloh it all started with 
white collar and environmental crime ‘where the new extended legislation disregards the 
principle of ultima ratio.'72 Areas that were previously friendly to negotiation are now 
subjected to criminal procedure which implies the principle of compulsory prosecution.73 
Consequently this encourages the use of plea bargaining. However this also implies that 
the procedure of plea bargaining has spread to all areas of society.74 Bussmann reports 
the tendency resulting therefrom, that courts sentence leniently in large-scale proceedings 
                                            
65
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 180 with further references in footnote 86. 
66
  Compare Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 180; Heumann, Plea bargaining, p. 2-6. 
67
  Compare Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 180; Heumann, Plea bargaining, p. 91. 
68
  Rauxloh, Formalisation of Plea Bargaining in Germany, p. 5; Hermann (1992) 53 University of 
Pittsburgh Review 775 at 776. 
69
  Rauxloh, Formalisation of Plea Bargaining in Germany, p. 5. 
70
  Rauxloh, Formalisation of Plea Bargaining in Germany, p. 5. 
71
  Rauxloh, Formalisation of Plea Bargaining in Germany, p. 5. 
72
  Rauxloh, Formalisation of Plea Bargaining in Germany, p. 5; Rönnau, Die Absprache im Strafprozess, 
p. 45. 
73
  Rauxloh, Formalisation of Plea Bargaining in Germany, p. 5, 6 with further references. 
74
  Compare Gerlach, Absprachen im Strafverfahren, p. 23. 
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due to class considerations.75 Offenders of white collar crimes more often belong to the 
same class of society as prosecutors and judges and like them are more respected 
members of society76 These cases are most likely to be plea bargained.77 
d. Imitation 
With regard to German law, one more factor, amongst many others, could have played a 
role: imitation. In comparison with common law legislations German law developed 
agreement procedures relatively late and still today hesitates to explicitly call plea 
bargaining by its name. This indicates that German legal practice, out of which the 
German agreement procedure arose, may have been influenced by the extensive use of 
plea bargaining in other jurisdictions like the U.S.A.. This standpoint is similar to adaption 
theory except that it examines adaption on a larger scale, i.e., among different legal 
systems, and does not only analyse the social dynamics of court room members. Surely 
also South African law is greatly influenced by the use of bargains in the U.S.-American 
legal system.78 
3. Empiric view 
Inquiries show that plea bargaining is a widely spread phenomenon.79 Exact numbers are 
hard to find though. 
a. South Africa 
Statistics on plea bargaining in South Africa are rare. The South African Law Commission 
in a comparative overview referred to the U.S.A., where 85 - 95 % of all cases were 
disposed of through guilty pleas, mostly as a result of negotiations.80 The Commission 
confirmed that there is no statistical study relating to the prevalence of plea bargaining and 
the degree to which the procedure is used to avoid trials.81 It can be assumed that the 
application of plea bargaining in South Africa has not yet reached the proportions of U.S. 
legal practice. Already in 1999’s North Western Dense Concrete case however it was 
                                            
75
  Rauxloh, Formalisation of Plea Bargaining in Germany, p. 6; Bussmann, Die Entdeckung der 
Informalität, p. 29. 
76
  Rauxloh, Formalisation of Plea Bargaining in Germany, p. 6. 
77
  Compare Chapter V.13.b. 
78
  Compare only Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168. 
79
  SK-Velten, StPO, Introduction to ss 257b-257c seqq., para 8; Altenhain/Hagemeier/Haimerl (2007) 
NStZ 71 at 79. 
80
  South African Law Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) para 2.7 with further references. 
81
  South African Law Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) para 3.13. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
11 
 
stated that it is commonly known that the process of negotiating a plea ‘takes place 
probably daily, at every level of the criminal justice system’.82 In 2010/2011 the South 
African prosecution concluded a total of 604 plea and sentence agreements successfully, 
comprising of 2,034 counts.83 The annual report states that although the number of 
agreements does not appear to be significant – what is true against a total number of 
cases finalised in 2010/2011 of 460,891 – that a great time savings had been achieved.84 
The fact that in 184 of the bargained cases (equivalent to 36%) the sentence imposed 
included direct imprisonment further evidences this reality.85 In 2005/2006 the prosecution 
succeeded in 2,164 cases in reaching an agreement.86 Steyn held that with all the benefits 
it was a disconcertingly low number.87 The statistics however might not be representative 
as they do not reveal the circumstances of each agreement. For instance it can be 
assumed that the counted agreements were only those formally concluded and reported. 
Out of habit, many prosecutors may still not use the formal bargain procedure as 
contained in s 105A.88 Another factor, which will be explained later, is that s 105A does not 
provide for all kinds of agreements.89 Thus the actual number of cases that are plea 
bargained remains a mystery. 
b. Germany 
Where formerly plea bargain procedure seemed to dominate in white collar crime trials,90 it 
is now established in trials for crimes such as homicide and other crimes of heavy guilt. 
Indeed, the agreement practice has now spread over nearly all fields of criminal law. Even 
German jury courts, i.e. special chambers at the Regional Courts that deal with heavier 
offences such as murder, are dominated by the practice of agreements.91  
It is difficult to ascertain the number of bargained cases. In 1986/1987 Schünemann 
examined and reported that 20-30 % of all proceedings are concluded with an 
                                            
82
  North Western Dense Concrete CC and another v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) 1999 
(2) SACR 669 (C) at 674e. 
83
  National Prosecuting Authority Annual Report 2010/2011 (www.npa.gov.za) p. 21. 
84
  The numbers indicated by the National Prosecuting Authority are asthonishing low; the percentage of 
bargains based on 2,034 bargained counts in comparison to a total case number of 460,981 would only 
be less then 1 %, i.e. 0.44 % 
85
  National Prosecuting Authority Annual Report 2010/2011 (www.npa.gov.za) p. 21. 
86
  National Prosecuting Authority Annual Report 2005-2006 (www.npa.gov.za) p. 27. 
87
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 215. 
88
  Compare Advocate Schutte’s statement in Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 216. 
89
  E.g. not for pre-trial agreements or agreements that do not contain a negotiated sentence. 
90
  SK-Velten, StPO, Introduction to ss 257b-257c seqq., para 10. 
91
  SK-Velten, StPO, Introduction to ss 257b-257c seqq., para 10. 
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agreement.92 In between 1985 and 1990 Siolek regarded 50 % as concluded by means of 
bargains.93 More narrowly, 61.5 % of white collar crimes are plea bargained according to a 
2007 analysis.94 Schöch states that the overall rate is above 50 % and in white collar crime 
up to 80-90%.95 An actual inquiry of Heller concludes that 25 % of all proceedings are 
solved by way of plea bargaining.96 In white collar crimes the number lies between 76-
100%.97 It can thus be assumed that the percentage of all plea bargaining cases is around 
50 %, with some peak rates in white collar crime.98 Interestingly, these agreements still 
likely take place mostly outside the courtroom and the main proceedings, and as a result 
they are conducted in camera.99 Thus it has to be taken into account that most of the 
mentioned inquiries only focus on the main proceedings. A lot of bargaining – as will be 
explained later – takes place before a trial is initiated by a charge. 
4. Benefits and interests 
Plea bargaining offers various benefits to the parties involved. Oftentimes where the 
parties, i.e., the accused and the prosecutor, view each other adversarially, they will have 
a mutual interest to enter into an agreement. Identifying these parties’ interests will help to 
understand and further approach the system of plea bargaining. 
a. Prosecutor’s position 
The usual objective of a prosecutor is to obtain a plea as close to the outcome of a trial as 
possible.100 However, this aim is affected by various circumstances and other interests. 
One major reason which may motivate the prosecutor to bargain is the strength of his 
case. As the prosecution must prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, prosecutors often 
tend towards bargaining in cases where suspicion cannot be proved easily or at all.101  
The use of plea bargaining in such cases is questionable however. For instance, the 
prosecutor can increase its bargaining power by systematically charging the accused with 
                                            
92
  Schünemann, Gutachten B, p. 18. 
93
  Siolek (1993) DRiZ 422 at 423; Siolek, Verständigung in der Hauptverhandlung, p. 31 seqq. 
94
  Altenhain/Hagemeier/Haimerl/Stammen, Die Praxis der Absprachen in Wirtschaftsstafsachen, p. 54 in 
footnote 153. 
95
  Schöch, Urteilsabsprachen in der Strafrechtspraxis. 
96
  Heller, Das Gesetz zur Regleung der Verständigung, p. 297/298. 
97
  Heller, Das Gesetz zur Regleung der Verständigung, p. 297. 
98
  Frommann also assumes 50% in Frommann (2009) HanseLR 197 at 200 and refers to sources in 
footnote 17. 
99
  SK-Velten, StPO, Introduction to ss 257b-257c seqq., para 10. 
100
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 5 (§2:02). 
101
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 5 (§2:02). 
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multiple and more serious offences.102 This contradicts the notion that a prosecutor has a 
duty not to convict but to seek justice.103 Thus, the benefits for the state implicate basic 
principles of criminal procedure. State, prosecution and the administration of justice have a 
common interest in reducing through the process of plea bargaining the number of 
prisoners awaiting trial.104 For instance South Africa’s prisons are overcrowded, and 
figures that show that the number of prisoners is around 178,000 inmates, with each 
inmate costing around R 117 per day.105 Many of these prisoners are awaiting trial.106At 
the same time conventional trials are expensive, time consuming and possibly traumatic 
for certain participants.107 Steyn thus regards it as obvious that the state can financially 
benefit from plea bargaining, taking into account the crime rates and the fiscal realities of 
South Africa.108 Generally plea bargaining allows the prosecution to prioritize those cases 
that will be prosecuted by bargaining the others.109 Consequently, the prosecutor might 
use the bargaining procedure as a means of steering the outcome and – as the judge 
might see it as well – lessen the workload. A guilty plea avoids the necessity of a public 
trial and frees time which can be used to focus on more serious and complex cases.110 
The prosecution might thus head towards a negotiated outcome in order to ease the strain 
on resources.111 Prosecutors might also benefit from more flexibility in cases where there 
are multiple accused.112 The prosecutor might have an incentive to enter into negotiations 
in exchange for the accused’s cooperation, for instance the assistance in an on-going.113 
Reaching a plea bargain with one accused opens the possibility of using that accused 
against the others in cases where such testimony should be required.114 The prosecution 
might also take into account the feelings of the victim and the public sentiment.115 The 
view of the public and the victim will influence the decision of whether to enter into 
                                            
102
  Combs, Guilty pleas in International Criminal Law, p. 127; see also Du Toit & Snyman (2001) TRW at 
144. 
103
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 14 (§3:02). 
104
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212. 
105
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 211, 212; BMN Balfour ‘Budget vote address in the National Assembly by Mr 
BMN (Ngconde) Balfour, MP, Minister of Correctional Services’, 15 June 2004, available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04061511451001.htm, accessed on 13 July 2007. 
106
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212; National Prosecution Authority Annual Report 2005/2006 at 27. 
107
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212. 
108
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212. 
109
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 7 (§2:02). 
110
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212. 
111
  Bennun (2007) SACJ 17 at 31. 
112
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212. 
113
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 7 (§2:02). 
114
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212. 
115
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 6 (§2:02). 
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negotiations.116 The nature of the crime also plays a role. The graver the offence, the less 
likely the prosecutor will enter into an agreement.117 But, on the contrary, a prosecutor 
might make use of plea bargaining in order to secure a conviction in cases of more serious 
offences with more burdensome evidentiary standards. Several final considerations 
potentially influencing the prosecution’s decision are the personal background of the 
defendant, i.e., the employment, family circumstances, prior criminal record, health, social 
status and he is on bail or in prison pending trial,118 in addition to any media attention or 
political considerations that might surround the case.119 
b. Accused’s position 
The first thought of the accused might be similar to that of the prosecution: how strong is 
my case, i.e., how are my chances for a successful defence? If the accused feels that he 
has a good chance to prove his innocence, his motivation to enter into a plea agreement 
diminishes.120 The most far reaching aim of the accused is to have the charges brought 
against him dismissed.121 If this cannot be achieved, the objective is to have the number of 
charges brought against him reduced, to plead to a reduced and less serious charge, to 
avoid imprisonment or shorten the time of imprisonment or to gain treatment or 
rehabilitation.122 There may even exist cases in which the accused − even if innocent123 − 
enters into the agreement to receive a lenient sentence. A German inquiry showed that 48 
% of all defence counsel surveyed had experienced a scenario where an accused 
confessed due to the threat of a serious sentence and yet the counsellor was not 
convinced of the charges brought against the defendant.124 The accused’s motivation to 
bargain increases even more if he fears to face a custodial sentence. Moreover there are 
motivations concerning the trial procedure itself. An accused might favour s 105A 
procedures as an attractive alternative if he wishes to have the case disposed of as quickly 
as possible and considers that a sufficient reason to forgo a full hearing.125 In this manner, 
                                            
116
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 6 (§2:02). 
117
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 6 (§2:02). 
118
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 6 (§2:02). 
119
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 6 (§2:02). 
120
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 8 (§2:03). 
121
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 7 (§2:03). 
122
  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 8 (§2:03). 
123
  De Villers (2004) De Jure 244 at 251; in U.S.-terminology this is known as an ‘Alford plea’; Herman, 
Plea Bargaining, p. 8 (§2:03). 
124
  Altenhain/Hagemeier/Haimerl (2007) NStZ 71 at 79; even more suprisingly the inquiry solemly did 
examine white collar crime cases. 
125
  Bennun (2007) SACJ 17 at 31. 
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a defendant could avoid a public trial with all its traumatic consequences.126 Furthermore 
the bargain also removes the unavoidable risk and uncertainties of a conventional trial.127 
Plea bargaining might be seen as a second chance in life.128 Another aspect is that s 105A 
procedures offer the accused greater control of the proceedings.129 Only the accused can 
decide whether to offer a guilty plea on a less serious or offensive charge.130 Also the 
accused exert control and influence over the process by speeding up the trial process and 
sentencing.131 He even may consider the admission of guilt as a first step towards 
rehabilitation132 if the decision to plead guilty results simply out of remorse or the sense of 
having to take responsibility for one’s actions.133 Finally there is also a financial aspect to 
consider: an accused who does not qualify for expensive legal aid may benefit financially 
from plea bargaining due to reduced legal fees corresponding to a shortened trial.134 
German inquiries show that 57.5 % of all persons asked consider the accused to have 
gained the most from plea bargaining.135 Additionally, 47.5 % of all legal representatives 
report that, where the accused is not willing to consent to an agreement, courts announce 
a sentence altered up to a third above the sentence proposed in the terms of an 
agreement.136 Thus, there is a very strong argument that the accused, by virtue of playing 
a more central role in the overall criminal process, benefits the most from plea bargaining. 
c. Third party’s position 
Aside from the prosecution and the accused, there are other profiteers of the institution of 
plea bargain procedure. 
The presiding judge, for one, may be motivated to accept an agreement in order to avoid a 
lengthy trial and to thereby lessen his workload.137 Especially in Germany, where drafting a 
judgment affords the judge intensive work, plea bargaining saves a great amount of time 
as the judge is entitled to write a brief summary of the bargain procedure in the judgment 
and to refer to the confession without having to decide each particular fact and piece of 
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  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212. 
127
  Trichardt/Krull (1987) THRHR 428 at 432. 
128
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212. 
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  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212. 
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  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212. 
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  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212; Trichardt/Krull (1987) THRHR 428 at 433. 
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  Trichardt/Krull (1987) THRHR 428 at 432; Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212. 
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  Herman, Plea Bargaining, p. 9 (§2:03). 
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  Compare Trichardt/Krull (1987) THRHR 428 at 432. 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, Introduction to ss 257b-257c seqq., para 10; Altenhain/Hagemeier/Haimerl (2007) 
NStZ 71 at 72. 
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evidence in the case. 
The defence counsel benefits in the sense that he can take on more cases as the trials are 
shortened and thus is able to earn more money.138 Even if the bargain does not lead to an 
agreement the legal representative of the accused can gain insight on the prosecutor’s 
view of the case.139 He may also benefit from learning the court’s opinion about his 
contributions to the trial.140 The defence counsel could also generate a reputation for 
taking an interest in, and perhaps successfully sparing, the court’s time.141 Also 
prosecutors tend to have an interest in, as Alschuler describes it, ‘maintaining comfortable 
relationships with defence attorneys and going home early.’142 Defence attorneys can 
benefit as they are not the only party that wants to ensure a good atmosphere. 
The victim may also benefit from the plea bargaining procedure.143 The victim does not 
have to testify and thus is not exposed before the court.144 Nevertheless, the victim will 
rarely have an actual interest in the initation of a bargain as the advantage of not having to 
testify regulary stands opposed to the disadvantage that the accused benefits from a 
leniency of his sentence. 
There are even benefits to society as a result of plea bargaining.145 As the procedure 
shortens trials, the public saves on the costs of trials and there is more capacity for serious 
cases.146 Plea bargaining also supports law enforcement officials as it may motivate one 
accused to testify against other offenders.147 In such cases, the testifying accused is 
usually offered a more lenient sentence in exchange for cooperation.148 
5. Stages and content of agreements 
There are different stages of the criminal process in which plea bargaining can take place 
and different kinds of subjects plea bargaining can take into account. Despite the fact that 
the main focus lies on plea bargaining during the main proceeding with the aim to achieve 
a lenient sentencing, one should not lose sight of the surrounding areas of practice. A brief 
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  Trichardt/Krull (1987) THRHR 428 at 433. 
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141
  Trichardt/Krull (1987) THRHR 428 at 433. 
142
  Bennun (2007) SACJ 17 at 18; Alschuler (2005) 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1412 at 1412. 
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overview follows below. 
a. Pre-trial and agreements related to the main proceedings 
The distinction between pretrial agreements and agreements related to the main 
proceedings might appear confusing to the South African reader. Does not the accused 
relinquish his right to a trial by entering into the agreement? In German law, agreements 
only accompany a trial which is overall conducted in the conventional manner, even if they 
significantly shorten the process. Thus an agreement does not prevent a trial. South 
African bargains make a trial obsolete, however, and thus are partly called ‘pre-trial 
agreements’ as a general description. This was often the case in the period preceding the 
statutory amendment in 2001.149 As will be presented later, bargaining under the present 
South African law can also be divided into trial-related agreements, i.e., procedure in terms 
of s 105A, and ‘authentic’ pre-trial agreements. The latter procedure might not be explicitly 
ruled outlined in the Criminal Procedure Act which will be examined later.150 Both stages 
overlap if early negotiations at a pre-trial stage later lead to an s 105A agreement. 
In German law, pre-trial negotiations became statutory as part of the new law on 
agreements in 2009.151 Section 160b StPO (Strafprozessordnung) states that ‘the public 
prosecution office may discuss the status of the proceedings with the participants, insofar 
as this appears suitable to expedite the proceedings’ and that ‘the essential content of this 
discussion shall be documented’. Of note here is that the legislators decided to speak of a 
‘discussion of the status of proceedings’ rather than to name it directly ‘agreements’. What 
this reveals will be further emphasized later.152 In any event, the purpose of pre-trial 
negotiations is either to prepare for a s 257c-agreement that comes into existence during 
the main proceedings or to achieve – from the defendant’s point of view – a dispensation 
of prosecution.153 
b. Plea, sentence and other agreements 
The South African terminology usually uses the term ‘plea and sentence agreement,’ 
which already reveals what content might be obligatory in such an agreement. The ‘plea’ 
gives ‘plea bargaining’ its name. The negotiations for a plea are what plea bargaining is 
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essentially all about.154 The usual agreement aims to achieve a guilty plea to the initial 
charge or charges filed.  
From a German perspective the term ‘plea bargaining’ has to be handled with care, as 
German law does not provide for formal pleas.155 Instead, negotiating ‘the plea’ in the 
German context should be understood as a negotiation surrounding the question of 
whether the accused will make a confession. The confession could be seen as the 
complement to the plea in South African criminal procedure. 
In a ‘sentence agreement’ the accused accepts to plead guilty to the charge in exchange 
for the prosecutor’s proposal of a lenient sentence or for the recommendation of a 
specified sentence.156 Either the prosecutor agrees to recommend a particular sentence to 
the court or the court itself agrees to impose a particular sentence.157 The bargain 
oftentimes includes a mixture of an agreement on both the charge and the sentence in 
exchange for the guilty plea.158 In German law, in the strict sense of the provision, there 
cannot exist an agreement on the sentence. The court is by the terms of s 257 (3) 2 StPO 
only entitled to indicate a possible sentence range.159 Furthermore, an agreement on the 
sentence is not an obligatory part of a s 257c agreement, as it is under South African 
law.160 
In addition to the plea or confession and the sentence, agreements can contain various 
other negotiated terms. What Bekker calls a ‘charge bargain’ is a the situation in which a 
defendant pleads guilty to a charge in exchange for the prosecutor’s dismissal of other 
charges filed, in return for a prosecutor’s promise not to file new charges, or in return for 
either a prosecutor’s dismissal of the more serious charge or his promise not to file the 
more serious charge.161 Thus the benefit lies in a reduction of the charges so that they are 
less serious, less numerous or both.162 To sum it up, ‘charge bargain’ can describe either a 
plea on the original charge in exchange for a promise from the prosecutor concerning the 
sentence or it can describe a plea to a less serious charge.163 Thus, as distinct from the 
common plea bargain situation where a plea of guilty to the original charge in typically 
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lessens the sentence, charge bargains deal with negotiations concerning the charge itself.  
The filed charges are just one more example amongst various others of a possible subject 
to be bargained. Almost every procedural measure or concession of the parties is 
negotiable (for instance, the accused or even the prosecutor may offer to waive their right 
to summon certain witnesses). 
6. Accusatorial and inquisitorial procedure 
Plea bargaining emerges from a new approach to criminal procedure. The roots of 
bargaining before criminal courts have to be traced back to the different procedural 
traditions in order to understand the true impact that the rise of plea bargaining has had on 
the actual criminal systems of both Germany and South Africa. Besides the already 
mentioned conflict with fundamental principles of the constitutions and fundamental 
principles of criminal procedure, criticisms relating to mandatory prosecution and other 
inquisitorial trial features arise from the particular legal framework of the German 
system.164 The previously discussed inquisitorial tradition is a central value of the German 
criminal procedure.165 As plea bargaining affects this value and might even approach 
accusatorial law traditions, the accusatorial and inquisitorial procedure shall be reviewed in 
more detail. 
a. Inquisitorial system 
The inquisitorial system could also be named 'continental' as it originates from continental 
Europe.166 From the 13th to the early 19th century in Europe criminal justice was 
inquisitorial.167 ‘Inquisitorial’ means that the trial is conducted under the guidance of the 
state, i.e. the state leads the ‘inquisition’ or what also could be called the investigation. The 
prototype and forerunner of inquisitorial criminal procedure was the decree of Pope 
Innocentius III. in 1198, which enshrined compulsory interrogation of the accused, 
eliminated the right to silence and the privilege against self-incriminating testimony and 
advanced the legitimisation and institutionalisation of torture.168 These principles formed 
the basis and influenced the advent of the well-known Constitutio Criminalis Carolina 
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instituted by Charles V. in 1532.169 
In contrast to the accusatorial system the judge − as an inquisitorial judge − plays a more 
active role during, and even before, the trial.170 The judge here is the master of the 
proceedings (dominus litis).171 The trial is not seen as a contest of two opposing parties; 
instead, it is the judge's duty to take evidence and to question and examine the 
accused.172 The inquisitorial principle (Amtsermittlungsgrundsatz) is embodied in s 244 (2) 
of the StPO, which states that ‘in order to establish the truth, the court shall, proprio motu, 
extend the taking of evidence to all facts and means of proof relevant to the decision.’ 
Thus, one of the striking characteristics of this system is that the judge is entitled to a full 
‘inquiry’ of the witnesses and all other evidence.173 Consequently, in an entirely 
inquisitorial system there exists no plea bargaining.174 However, the modern procedure 
cannot be equated with the ancient Continental inquisitorial procedure.175 Over time the 
position of the accused has been transformed from the central object of the inquiry to a 
procedural subject with own rights.176 
b. Accusatorial system 
The inquisitorial mode stands opposed to the accusatorial system, which can also be 
called adversarial.177 The theory behind the accusatorial system is that the parties 
determine what shall be made subject to the trial.178 The accusatorial is marked by two 
significant features: the passive role of the judge on the one hand and the active role of the 
opposing parties in presenting evidence on the other hand.179 The adversarial tradition 
lays the responsibility for proof of guilt upon the parties and not the judge.180 The primary 
investigative force is the police, who pass the collected evidence to the prosecution in a 
file. The prosecution then act as the dominus litis, or in other words it is the prosecution 
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that decides whether, and which offences, to charge.181  
The adversarial model developed out of the English common law system.182 Its purpose is, 
amongst others, to give the parties the opportunity to participate in and to control the 
criminal procedure and by such means to strengthen the constitutional rights of the 
accused.183 Some scholars’ view on the origins of the common law is that Americans − of 
interest here because plea bargaining originated in the U.S. − ‘were attracted to the 
English common law trial system because it de-emphasized the use of statutes, rigorous 
rules, and emphasized passive neutrality of the judge as a state representative’.184 The 
pure adversarial system does not exist anymore however, as other alternative dispute 
solutions such as mediation, negotiation and arbitration (in civil cases) and plea bargaining 
(in criminal cases) have arisen.185  
As a rule, the accusatorial judge cannot proceed upon his own initiative.186 On the 
contrary, the judge is only entitled to react to the propositions of the parties.187 
Nevertheless the judge will oftentimes steer the trial toward areas which have not been 
properly enlightened or brought before him by the parties.188 This is necessary to prevent 
the trial from becoming ineffective due to the incompetence of or manipulation by one or 
both parties.189 As a consequence, the judge in an accusatorial system remains entitled to 
recall witnesses that already have been heard or even call new witnesses190 which have 
not been called by one of the parties.191 There are also certain rules which necessitate that 
the court assist an illiterate and unrepresented accused throughout the trial.192 
Nevertheless, judicial examinations shall be handled restrictively in an accusatorial 
system.193 Literally, the court is obliged to 'hold his tongue until the last possible moment 
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and up to this moment should be wise as he is paid to look'.194 Or with other words, ‘the 
judge is in the role of detached umpire, who should not enter the arena of the fight 
between the prosecution and the defence for fear of his becoming partial or losing 
perspective as a result of all the dust caused by fray.’195 
c. Bargaining as a hybrid model 
Neither of these presented models still exists in its pure form. Nevertheless South African 
law is informed by accusatorial common law tradition and German law is shaped by 
inquisitorial thinking. Plea bargaining surely is not inquisitorial, but then again not purely 
adversarial either. The incorporation of attributes of the inquisitorial system into 
negotiations either by statutory law or exercise of judicial discretion has caused plea 
bargaining to lose its purely adversarial character.196 Clarke marks the legal development 
with a headline that reads as follows: ‘the death of purely-accusatorial and purely 
inquisitorial criminal justice systems.’197 Consequently, one could mark this process, i.e., 
statutory bargaining before criminal courts as accompanied by provisions that warrant the 
accused certain rights, as a hybrid model between the adversarial and inquisitorial 
traditions. The character of the present systems of plea bargaining in South Africa and 
Germany will be examined later.198 
7. Constitutional considerations 
The constitutionality of plea bargaining does not seem to be a major issue in the 
controversy in South Africa. Yet the implications of plea bargaining on constitutionally 
secured rights and principles are strong. As to constitutionality, the South African Law 
Commission199, when proposing changes to the criminal procedure, had only proposed to 
limit the procedure of plea bargaining to certain courts.200 As Bennun states, it is not to the 
credit of the Commission that it did not raise other questions and concerns.201 He further 
points out that the Law Commission did not alert Parliament to the potential dangers of 
plea bargaining as reflected upon by many scholars, based on both empirical research and 
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scholarly scrutiny.202 There were no warnings sent that the procedure, which offers 
potential benefits, can also be a hazard to the legitimacy of criminal justice unless certain 
rights are protected and care is used when drafting the provisions.203 Bennun emphasises 
that ‘in South Africa, the old way of doing things needed to be reviewed in the light of 
constitutional and legislative changes.’204 He hints that the role, power of discretion and 
independence of the prosecution service are now regulated by the Constitution and 
subsequent legislation and also that ‘the rights of arrested persons and the concept of a 
‘fair’ criminal trial are defined in the Bill of Rights.’205 In Germany however these 
constitutional aspects and concerns have long been recognized. The principle of judicial 
inquiry in the inquisitorial tradition was seen by scholars as conflicting with the notion of a 
consensual procedure.206 Consequently some scholars even held that inquisitorial systems 
like Germany’s generally would resist the adoption of plea bargaining.207 
a. Constitutional provisions 
Constitutional provisions govern the system of criminal procedure.208 Due to the principle 
of the supremacy of the Constitution, those provisions are the most important sources of 
criminal procedure rules and thus have to be obeyed.209 
Under South African law such fundamental rights and principles can be found in s 35 of 
the Bill of Rights, while in German law the rights are referred to in Article 20 (3) of the 
Grundgesetz (GG)210 and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The ECHR as a multilateral agreement is not equal to the Grundgesetz.211 Nevertheless, 
national courts have to take into account the ECHR in the interpretation of the statutory 
provisions such as the Strafprozessordnung (StPO).212 Some of the fundamental principles 
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of criminal procedure are defined in the StPO,213 while others can only be found by 
reference to the general constitutional provision of Article 20 (3) GG. The latter one very 
briefly states that ‘the legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive 
and the judiciary by law and justice.’ How these institutions can be protected in legal 
practice has to be determined and interpreted. Consequently, considering plea bargaining 
in Germany, the provisions of Article 6 ECHR play a fundamental role as they provide for 
the right to a fair trial and explicitly name the rights of everyone charged with a criminal 
offence. Other than the provisions of the Grundgesetz, Article 6 ECHR is most similar to s 
35 of the Bill of Rights, as the rights of the accused are stated clearly and do not have to 
be interpreted out of a general provision. 
b. Affected rights and principles 
Plea bargaining affects a grand variety of constitutional rights and principles. Overall the 
principle of a fair trial mainly entails conflicts with plea bargaining. 
The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in 1987 confirmed that the 
principle of a fair trial and the rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) do not forbid plea 
bargaining,214 although it was said that use of the practice is not at the participant’s 
disposal.215 The Constitutional Court emphasized that an essential part of the rule of law is 
the idea of justice.216 The state’s claim for punishment has to be pursued.217 This implies 
that prerequisites for an application of the procedure had to be developed, which the 
Constitutional Court later did in its decision and which was further elaborated upon in 
BGHSt 43, 195 and BGHSt 50, 40.218 BGH confirmed that plea bargaining is in general 
admissible and that it complies with German Criminal Procedure.219 The court held that the 
principle of a fair trial and the principle of guilt form a guideline which the plea bargaining 
procedure has to follow.220 The accused has a right to proceedings that are fair and that 
comply with the Rule of Law as contained in Article 2 (1) and 20 (3) of the German 
Constitution.221 Although Article 6 of the ECHR in its subsection 3 explicitly names certain 
components of the right to a fair trial, it is applicable as a universal principle. For instance, 
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before plea bargaining became statutory, a German court was only bound to a plea 
agreement on the basis of the principle of a fair trial. As this example shows, the idea of a 
fair trial serves an important function when new instruments are developed in practice. The 
application of criminal procedure must always comply with procedural fairness. Thus the 
principle of a ‘fair trial’ serves as an umbrella term for various more detailed principles and 
rights and where the latter do not exist as a general guideline. 
As noted before, constitutional concerns were not prominently raised in South Africa. 
These concerns are left to U.S. scholars that extensively discussed the constitutionality of 
plea bargaining with regard to their constitution and common law system.222 Absent 
evidence to the contrary, it should be assumed that both in Germany and in South Africa 
the potential for conflict is comparable. Apparently South African scholars, when 
discussing the admissibility and application of plea bargaining with compelling logic, do 
gaviate towards the constitutionality of the topic, although they rarely refer directly to 
constitutional provisions. However, in South African law the abovementioned right to a fair 
trial is enshrined in s 35 (3) of the Bill of Rights. This subsection, together with the other 
subsections (1) and (2), contains similar fundamental constitutional rights as those in 
Article 6 of the ECHR, of which the following are potentially affected: the presumption of 
innocence, the right to remain silent, the right not to testify during proceedings, the right 
not to give self-incriminating evidence, the right not to be compelled to make any 
confession or admission that could be used as evidence (nemo tenetur se ipsum 
accusare), the right to a public trial, the principle of legality, etc. Moreover, attendance 
duties, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, adversary hearings and procedural safeguards 
might also be undercut.223 
c. Conflicting inquisitional principles 
There are two principles conflicting with plea bargaining that are of particular significance 
to the German criminal system:224 the inquisitorial principle (Amtsermittlungsgrundsatz) as 
contemplated in s 244 (2) and the principle of mandatory prosecution (Legalitätsprinzip) in 
the terms of s 152 (2). As mentioned before, the inquisitorial system of German law 
generally seems to oppose plea bargaining. Consequently, it is a challenge to develop a 
bargain procedure that complies with these principles. Whether the German legislator has 
achieved this goal will be discussed later. 
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8. Concluding remark 
It can be summed up that over the past few decades plea bargaining has become a reality 
in South African as well as in German legal practice. There exist diverse needs that have 
pushed legal practice into the seemingly unusual procedure of bargaining before a criminal 
court or at a pre-trial stage. However, in both countries critics have not yet been silenced, 
and there is still an ongoing controversy surrounding this institution. 
III. Legal development 
There is no definite point in time to which one can trace the history of plea bargaining.225 
Throughout the history of law the punishment to be imposed upon wrongdoers has been 
subject to negotiation.226 The origins of the practice of plea bargaining are lost in 
unrecorded history.227 One can only state that plea negotiations must have originated from 
practical considerations.228 In addition, the phenomenon of plea bargaining in South Africa 
and Germany and its legal development in each country cannot be properly analysed 
without considering its international context, as the rise of plea bargaining is an 
international phenomenon that first appeared neither in South Africa nor in Germany.  
Over the last three decades plea bargaining has been introduced into justice systems 
around the world and even in those which had long opposed the practice.229 First utilized 
in the United States of America, plea bargaining has now reached nations such as Russia, 
India, Taiwan, Australia and Argentina and is even considered by nations as China and 
Indonesia.230 Interestingly plea bargaining even in the United States of America, where it 
originated and is most entrenched, remains controversial.231 The spread of the procedure 
however indicates that plea bargaining will continue to play a significant role into the 
foreseeable future.232 The law of two countries that adopted the procedure, such as South 
Africa and Germany, cannot be compared without a brief regard to the general origin of 
plea bargaining. 
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1. United States of America 
It should be helpful here to review more closely the legal development and current state of 
affairs in the United States of American, where plea bargaining began and has persisted 
for more than a century and a half233 and where it is still a significant part of the criminal 
justice system and practiced extensively nowadays.234 For these reasons, plea bargaining 
in the U.S. is established more firmly than elsewhere.235 
a. Historical roots 
The system of plea and sentence negotiations has been long recognized and accepted in 
the United States of America and also in the United Kingdom.236 The legal history of plea 
bargaining can be traced back to colonial times.237 Since that time the ‘procedure of a 
guilty plea’, i.e. a defendant’s declaration that he is guilty in terms of the charge, has 
operated to waive his right to a trial and allow immediate punishment.238 Some scholars, 
such as Albert Alschuler, argue that guilty pleas were rare and treated with suspicion until 
the nineteenth century.239 At least plea bargaining, which can also be described as the 
guilty plea as a result of negotiations, was in fact unknown in the Unites States until that 
time.240 Before, trials were generally less formal concerning matters of evidence and the 
procedure as a whole and the accused were often not legally represented by a lawyer.241 
As a consequence, there was little reason for the development of a plea bargaining 
procedure. Scholars presume that the rise of formality provided the impetus for the 
establishment of plea bargaining.242 In the further course, plea bargaining developed from 
an unknown instrument into a method that dominated the criminal trials in the mid-
nineteenth and early twentieth century.243 However, this legal development was not 
accompanied by corresponding legislation.244 Scholars consider the increasing caseload 
that was caused by a growing population and crime rates to be the reason for the rise of 
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plea bargaining,245 as plea bargaining offered a quick and simple solution to this 
problem.246 Furthermore, the criminal justice system was challenged by a greater 
complexity of jury trials and professionalization in general.247 Under this pressure, plea 
bargaining might have appeared as a primary solution to the mentioned problems.248 Even 
the steady criticism plea bargaining faced throughout its development did not slow its 
growth towards the dominant mode of conviction in the United States.249 Under American 
Law an approximate number of 80 – 90% of all criminal cases is resolved by plea 
agreements.250 
b. Statutory Law 
Although plea bargaining had already developed and took place routinely in criminal 
proceedings, it was not until 1970 that the Supreme Court in Brady v. United States251 first 
held that plea bargaining conforms to the voluntariness of guilty pleas.252 Judge Tuttle held 
that a ‘plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the 
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper 
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps 
by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the 
prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).’253 In 1971 a subsequent court decision, by name 
Santobello v. New York, marked plea bargaining as ‘not only an essential part of the 
process but a highly desirable part for many reasons’.254 
Plea bargaining is codified in U.S. law. Rule 11 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure recognizes and provides for plea agreements.255 As an essential element of the 
system, plea negotiations are encouraged.256 The legitimacy of the procedure is ensured 
by means of disclosing the plea negotiations and agreements in open court and having the 
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agreement reviewed by the presiding judge.257 Interestingly, in the state of Alaska plea 
bargaining was prohibited in 1975.258 Later however the procedure was accepted.259 
2. South Africa 
Statutory plea bargaining was introduced into South African Law in 2001.260 Before the 
statutory amendment, the operation of traditional261 plea bargaining only occurred 
informally in criminal proceedings.262 
a. Introductory remarks 
Prior to the enactment of s 105A plea bargaining was subject to analysis and also 
criticism.263 The South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) confirmed that plea 
negotiations and agreements do take place and shall be deemed to be legal and are 
considered legal.264  
A personal experience may illustrate the situation at the very outset. Bennun reminds 
himself shamefully of plea bargaining in the 1960’s.265 He describes the way in which poor 
and mainly black accused were treated and dealt with.266 The situation was made worse 
through the existing language barrier and the absence of capable and motivated court 
interpreters.267 Bennun holds that ‘the system encouraged inadequate work done 
impatiently.’ This was especially true in murder cases, where most were handled by 
unaided junior counselors, who were unpaid and pro deo acting young barristers at the 
beginning of their careers at the Bar and who were scheduled to defend accused charged 
with the death sentence.268 This brief memory of Bennun points towards the whole 
relevance of the legal development towards the present provisions on plea bargaining. 
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b. Pre-statutory plea bargaining 
Plea bargaining generally already had been a long established practice in common law 
criminal justice systems, used as an instrument of both the prosecutor and the 
defendant.269 South African law can be regarded as a common law system, as it has its 
roots reaching back to both Roman-Dutch and English law.270 Plea bargaining was not 
regulated in the statutory provisions of the South African Criminal Procedure Act prior to 
2001. The term ‘plea bargaining’ was used seldom.271 As Bekker reported in 1996, the 
opinion about the existence and application of plea bargaining differed greatly at that 
time.272 Partly it was held that aspects of U.S.-influenced plea bargaining emerged in many 
instances of pre-trial considerations between the opposing parties, i.e. the prosecutor and 
the accused.273 Nevertheless one could not say that there was a system of plea 
bargaining. Due to the lack of empirical research it was (and still is) hard to tell to what 
extent the bargain procedures takes place.274 Trichardt and Krull summed up the present 
state in 1987 as follows: ‘Thus, if it seems that plea bargaining has taken place in a case 
like S v Ngubane,275 then the prosecutor and defence can bargain for the court, because it 
is bound by the agreement reached between the prosecutor and the defence. It is 
apparent that aspects of plea bargaining do emerge in many instances of informal pre-trial 
deliberation between prosecution and defence in South Africa, but it cannot be said that a 
plea bargaining system exists.’276 Authors such as Kriegler held that although there were 
no statutory provisions on plea bargaining installed, it could not be denied that the practice 
had been applied for many years.277 He argued that no matter if regulated or not the 
procedure would continue to exist.278 A good way to sum it up is that plea bargaining 
historically lacked formal recognition and that its function as a pre-trial procedure with a 
specific purpose in the criminal process was disregarded.279 
Uijs AJ in North Western Dense Concrete CC and another v Director of Public 
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Prosecutions (Western Cape) gave an insight into the bargain procedure that reaches 
further back than most reviews. He presents the situation prior to the introduction of the 
present Criminal Code in 1977, i. e.namely under the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955. 
The situation was as follows: generally there was an evidence-taking of the relevant 
witnesses in the magistrates’ court which was put to record.280 These records, together 
with other records of evidence, were then forwarded to the advocates, who were involved 
as defence counsels as well as to the presiding judges.281 Thus, everyone who was 
involved in the cases, including the judges, had a preview of what evidence was relevant 
to the case and was therefore likely to place before the court.282 Often it happened that 
candid and open discussions took place in the presiding Judge’s Chambers.283 Uijs AJ 
reports that: 'These discussions often led to the process of justice being considerably 
expedited, as agreement could be reached on an appropriate plea and even, on occasion, 
on an appropriate sentence. No one in those days regarded such discussions as being at 
all “improper” - despite the fact that, if one must be perfectly candid, one must admit that 
such discussions often involved the furnishing of advice to the prosecutor and/or defence 
counsel by the presiding Judge, particularly when that Judge was one of those who 
adopted a more “robust” attitude. Indeed, counsel often welcomed advice from the 
presiding Judge, as such advice could often free the logjam created when negotiations 
had reached an impasse.'284 The benefit of the ancient procedure was that the Superior 
Courts before whom summary trials were conducted received a kind of preview of the 
evidence.285 However, the accused did not have the opportunity of such insight and thus 
was in a 'disadvantaged' position.286 However, the presented excursus may serve only to 
show that plea bargaining had already taken place under fundamentally different 
procedural circumstance. 
What should be clarified once again at this point is the slightly confusing use of 
terminology. Pre-statutory bargains are also named ‘traditional’ or ‘informal’ due to the 
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former’s lack of formal provisions regulating the procedure. Consequently, in the present 
context ‘informal’ can be used to describe negotiations and agreements that took place 
prior to the statutory amendments. Another more common interpretation of the term 
describes informal agreements as agreements that may still exist at present aside from 
formal statutory bargaining, i.e. plea bargaining that does not comply with formal 
requirements. The relevance of informal plea bargaining will be examined later. 
c. North Western Dense Concrete Case 
The case of North Western Dense Concrete CC and Another v DPP (Western Cape), 
decided in 1999, had a vast impact concerning the judicial recognition of plea 
bargaining.287 Before the judgment in North Western Dense Concrete CC there were 
nearly no reported judgments on the procedure of plea bargaining.288 After its decision, the 
case motivated the finalisation of s 105A,289 as it had already significantly motivated the 
South African Law Commission to finally draft a proposal for statutory provisions in 2001 
after reflecting on the subject since 1989. In North Western Dense Concrete CC Uijs AJ 
exposed the realities of plea bargaining, although the court also held that s 112 of the CPA 
was ‘virtually tailormade’ for such agreements.290 
In North Western Dense Concrete CC the first applicant, a close corporation, and the 
second applicant, a member of the closed corporation, were charged in the Regional Court 
together with Mostert, who was the production manager of the close corporation.291 The 
applicants were charged with culpable homicide.292 While Mostert was not charged with 
anything else, the other applicants were arraigned on additional charges that were not 
relevant for the purpose of the judgment.293 In substance they were charged with causing 
the death of an employee by failing to ensure that certain safety precautions were in place 
at his workplace at the close corporation. The employee had been killed when an electrical 
short-circuit occurred and hit him while he worked in the firm.294 Mostert was finally 
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convicted based on a written ‘plea explanation,’ which he had given in terms of 112 (1) 
(b).295 It appeared to the court that this was the direct result of plea bargaining.296 The 
course of the trial took place as follows: the legal representative of the applicants had 
requested to the prosecutor that Mostert would plead guilty to culpable homicide if the 
respondent agreed to withdraw all the charges against them.297 Thus, in exchange for 
Mostert's plea of guilty to the charge of culpable homicide, the state agreed to the 
proposed conditions and withdrew all the charges.298 The prosecutor was orally invited by 
a senior advocate in the office of the respondent to close the deal.299 The suggestion was 
then made that the state would accept the invitation in return for Mostert’s plea on a 
specified basis, which the State then would accept.300 If the state were to refuse the offer, 
the advocate announced, then all the accused would plead not guilty and as a 
consequence the trial would have to proceed.301 This would have mean that the state 
would have to prove the evidence against each particular accused.302 The public 
prosecution found the deal acceptable303 and orally consented to it.304 The charges were 
then withdrawn and Mostert pleaded guilty to the charge of culpable homicide, whereupon 
he was convicted and finally in due course sentenced.305 Subsequently, an application was 
made by an undisclosed third party, later the respondent, to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions for a certificate nolle proseque in terms of s 7.306 The prosecution reinstituted 
the charges against the applicants, who had applied to the High Court for an order 
interdicting the respondent from proceeding with the prosecution.307 This led to the court 
decision in North Western Dense Concrete CC, in which Uijs AJ had to decide: whether to 
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grant relief; whether plea bargaining was an integral part of the law of criminal procedure; 
and, if it was, whether it could and/or should interfere with the decision to reinstitute the 
charges against the applicants.308  
First the court considered whether plea bargaining should be afforded recognition as an 
essential part of criminal procedure, as this would cause certain results.309 Uijs AJ used 
the decision to explain the whole phenomenon of plea bargaining.310 This is because in 
1999 many judicial officers had little or no knowledge of plea bargaining and thus Uijs AJ 
regarded an explanation as contributing not only to the understanding of his own judgment 
but also to the recognition of plea bargaining in general.311 Describing the current state of 
plea bargaining in 1999 in his judgment,312 he pointed out how relatively little judicial 
attention plea bargaining was given.313 Uijs AJ also broadly pointed out how academics 
regarded the procedure at that time.314 Finally he came to the conclusion that ‘plea 
bargaining is an integral part of the process of criminal justice’ and that ‘too many articles 
in legal journals spelling out this fact have been written to ignore the finding of the learned 
authors thereof’.315 He concluded that, ‘with great respect to those who find plea 
bargaining offensive, to pretend that the procedure does not take place is not only to be 
unrealistic, it is to ignore the provisions of our statute law governing criminal procedure.’316 
Uijs AJ further stated that ‘the provision of the Criminal Code implicitly allows for 
recognition of the procedure’.317 He held that plea bargaining could ‘adequately be 
governed by the existing provisions of the Statute, common and constitutional law of South 
Africa’.318 Accordingly, the court disagreed with the SALRC finding that statutory law would 
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be necessary to regulate such agreements.319 
d. South African Law Reform Commission 
Already in 1989 the Minister of Justice had advised the South African Law Reform 
Commission (SALRC) to investigate the possibility of simplifying criminal procedure. 
Particular reference was made to a number of questions, two of which were: ‘whether the 
existing provisions relating to the procedure of pleading are unnecessarily cumbersome 
and/or whether they give rise to abuse; (and) whether any other provisions relating to 
criminal procedure and the law of evidence should be amended in order to obviate 
unnecessary delays and abuse.’320 An interim report of 1996 recommended the 
introduction of statutory provisions in order to formally recognize the process of plea 
negotiations.321 Subsequent to this report the Select Committee on Justice (Senate) 
considered a Bill322 and adopted a resolution that documented its attention to the 
subject.323 The Committee recommended that the Minister of Justice be made aware of 
the possibility of enacting a provisions regulating the procedure of plea bargaining.324 This 
was stated in view of the beginning of the 1997 session of Parliament.325 However, the 
report did not have a huge impact on the Department of Justice.326 Although it caused an 
inquiry, the Commission finally only received a request which instructed the Commission to 
reconsider the issue of plea negotiations as part of its general investigation on the 
simplification of criminal procedure.327 This reconsideration was fulfilled in 1999 in a 
meeting.328 In the meantime the National Director of Public Prosecution had stated that he 
supports the idea of an introduction of plea bargaining into the statutory law.329 
Furthermore the two scholars Bekker and Clarke had published articles on the subject in 
1996 and 1999.330 Professor Bekker had written a study on plea bargaining in the United 
States and South Africa and Catherine Clarke had published a study on plea negotiations 
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in South African Criminal courts.331 As these studies showed that in fact plea and sentence 
negotiations are widespread in the South African criminal practice, they gave further 
emphasis to the investigations of the Commission. Finally the North Western Dense 
Concrete CC and Another v DPP (Western Cape) case of 1999 accelerated the 
development.332 In 2001 with the Fourth Interim Report, the Commission finally 
recommended to formally recognize plea bargaining.333 The proposed principles and 
procedures widely conform to the statutory provisions that are known today.334 
e. Statutory plea bargaining 
With the enactment of s 105A, the uncertainty that had surrounded the legality of plea 
bargaining had been resolved.335 The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 of South Africa 
now contained in s 105A a statutory provision for plea bargaining. It was inserted by s. 2 of 
Act 62 of 2001.336 S 105A (1) enables a prosecutor and an accused who is legally 
represented to negotiate and enter into an agreement. The intention of the legislator was 
to confirm the legality of plea bargaining and to regulate the procedure by legislation.337 It 
should be noted here that the preceding report of the South African Law Reform 
Commission was limited to sentence agreements. The Commission held that the Criminal 
Procedure Act sufficiently provided for other plea agreements and thus legislation was not 
required.338 There had been no evidence for an abuse of the provisions that were used for 
plea agreements prior to the advent of s 105A.339 Although one could find doubt by 
assuming that there may have been a lack of record of the abuse since the practice was 
not regulated, this anyhow reveals that the legislator concentrated on the regulation of 
sentence agreements.340 Most of the Commission’s findings and ideas played a significant 
role in the drafting of the s 105A and most of them were incorporated into the provision.341 
Furthermore, it is remarkable that the negotiation procedure in s 105A is as non-
prescriptive as possible.342 The negotiation procedure is however illustrated in little more 
detail by the Directives issued by the NDPP which accompany the provision of s 105A. 
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f. Directives issued by the NDPP 
The prosecutor must not only comply with the provisions of s 105A but must also take into 
account the Directives issued by the NDPP.343 S 105A (11) (a) reads as follows: ‘The 
National Director of Public Prosecutions, in consultation with the Minister, shall issue 
Directives regarding all matters which are reasonably necessary or expedient to be 
prescribed on order to achieve the objects of this section and any Directive so issued shall 
be observed in the application of this section’. The Directives were issued on 14 March 
2002,344 not long at all after s 105A came into operation on 14 December 2001.345 S 105A 
states that the Directive ‘shall be observed in the application of this section‘. This indicates 
that nonobservance could lead to the invalidity of the agreement.346 The agreement could 
be found null and void even though all other requirements of s 105A have been met and 
despite the fact that the judge, convinced of the guilt and that the sentence is fair and just, 
had convicted and sentenced the accused subsequent to and on the basis of the 
agreement.347 Du Toit et al consider that, ‘much will depend on the facts of the case, as 
well as the nature, purpose and wording of the specific Directive as read in the context of 
the objects of s 105A.’ Rodgers however emphasises that s 105A ‘does not compel the 
court to ensure compliance with the Directives’ and that ‘non-compliance would need to be 
raised by the negotiating parties and this is, admittedly, implausible’.348 
3. Germany 
German legal practice developed plea bargaining over a time span of approximately 30 
years, culminating in the statutory amendment of provisions on plea bargaining in 2009. 
Prior to that event, case law formed the guidelines of the agreement procedure. These 
guidelines were widely adopted by the regulations that later became law. 
a. Introductory remarks 
Langbein in 1979 held that Germany was still a ‘land without plea bargaining‘.349 In the 
following decades however plea bargaining rapidly spread, although through the 1980s 
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mostly unnoticed.350 In white collar crime, agreements were settled out for years 
regardless of whether participants were aware that the BGH would not accept the 
practice.351 A study from 1986 stated that plea bargaining aside from white collar crimes 
mostly takes place in drug cases.352 The first broad recognition of the phenomenon in the 
1980’s caused several later decisions of the German Federal Supreme Court 
(Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) as well as of the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG), which confirmed that the procedure would not 
contravene fundamental constitutional and criminal procedure principles.353 Finally in 2009 
a new law on agreements regulated the practice of plea bargaining. 
b. Rise of the practice 
The advent of s 257c of the StPO in 2009 followed a long practice of informal agreements 
and three crucial decisions, amongst which two are decisions of the BGH regulating the 
admissibility of bargains. Historically, the judge, prosecutor and the legal representative of 
the accused used to negotiate in camera, outside the court room. Until the mid 1970s, 
Germany seemed to get along without agreements in the criminal proceedings.354 There 
are several explanations. One reason for the relatively late development of plea bargaining 
surely is the rapidity of German criminal procedure in comparison to common law 
countries.355 The system has been efficient enough to allow a trial of every case of 
imprisonable crime.356 Germany’s relatively low crime rate may serve as an explanation.357 
Today it is said that there is no doubt that the flood of trials that are huge and complex 
makes procedural changes necessary.358 Plea bargaining enormously reduces and eases 
both the judge's and prosecutor's workload.359 From their point of view the practice of 
agreements shows no disadvantages.360 The presented circumstances were and still are a 
fertile breeding ground for plea bargaining to grow. The implementation of s 153a of the 
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StPO in 1974, allowing the dispensation of the prosecution in exchange for the fulfilment of 
conditions, caused a rapid spread of consensual procedure.361 The first sentence of S 
153a (1) states that 'in a case involving a misdemeanour, the public prosecution office 
may, with the consent of the accused and of the court competent to order the opening of 
the main proceedings, dispense with preferment of public charges and concurrently 
impose conditions and instructions upon the accused if these are of such a nature as to 
eliminate the public interest in criminal prosecution and if the degree of guilt does not 
present an obstacle'. Thus with the amendment of this provision, ‘agreements’ on the 
decision whether to prosecute became possible at the stage of preliminary proceedings. 
The dispensation of charges in terms of s 153a (2) is even possible if public charges have 
already been preferred. In terms of the provision the court, with the approval of the public 
prosecution office and of the indicted accused, may provisionally terminate the 
proceedings up until the end of the main hearing in which the findings of fact can last be 
examined and may concurrently impose the conditions and instructions referred to above. 
A few years later, in 1982 an anonymous law article in StV 82, 545, published under the 
synonym of ‘Detlef Deal’ first prominently addressed the practice of informal agreements 
with reference to the main proceedings, i.e. plea bargaining. This brought widespread 
attention to the issue and led to the early court decisions presented in the following. 
c. BVerfG (BVerfG of 27. 1. 1987) 
The first court decision that explicitly dealt with plea bargaining came from the Federal 
Constitutional Court in 1987, stating that a ‘trade with justice’ cannot exist but finding the 
present case not to be of such nature.362 The Court stated that agreements are not 
generally inadmissible.363 Furthermore, it was emphasized that the rule of law as 
contemplated in Art. 20 (3) GG requires that the sentence correspond to the guilt, that the 
sentence be just and that the absence of arbitrariness be warranted.364 Therefore the 
accused generally has to play an active role and must be free from psychological 
pressure.365 The Court further stated that the courts’ obligation to establish the truth in 
terms of s 244 (2) StPO remains in force.366 That final declaration meant that courts have 
an obligation to take further evidence, even in light of the accused’s confession, if the 
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presiding judge had doubt.367 In the following years, courts did not establish a common 
clear line right away.368 Practice nevertheless made use of the instrument and even 
became cavalier. As an example illustrating the ‘proliferation’ at the time, one accused 
charged with infliction of bodily harm causing death was offered a two years of 
imprisonment on probation as part of an agreement.369 When he refused to enter into the 
agreement he was sentenced to seven years. 
d. BGHSt 43, 195 (4th Penal Senate of BGH 28. 8. 1997) 
After the BGH already had to deal with the issue in several decisions,370 in 1997 it finally 
announced a seminal decision371 which set the terms and conditions for the admissibility of 
agreements. Although the BGH only dealt with confessions in exchange for a lenient 
sentence, the decision nevertheless formed case law that established plea bargaining in 
legal practice and served other courts as a general guideline.372 The BGH’s findings had 
great influence on the later s 257c. 
The BGH established the following principles (guiding principles):373 
(1.) An agreement in the criminal proceedings that involves a confession of the accused 
and the imposition of a sentence is not generally inadmissible. It has to be conducted 
however with the participation of all parties of the proceedings and in the main 
hearing of the trial. This does not exclude preliminary talks. 
(2.) The court cannot impose a particular sentence prior to the deliberations on the 
judgment. It may however, in case the accused confesses, announce an upper 
sentence limit that will not be exceeded. The court is not bound to the sentence limit 
imposed if the main proceedings emerge new and serious circumstances at the 
expense of the accused (that had been unknown to the court); such derogation has 
to be disclosed in the main proceedings. 
(3.) When imposing an upper sentence limit that is not to be exceeded, the court shall 
observe the general principles of sentencing as it is obliged to in the later 
judgment.374 The sentence limit imposed has to comply with the accused's guilt. 
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(4.) The refusal of a confession does not forbid a mitigation of the sentence. 
(5.) Any agreement on the waiver of the right to appeal before the pronouncement of the 
judgment is inadmissible. 
e. BGHSt 50, 40 (Grand Criminal Panel of BGH 3. 3. 2005) 
A second fundamental decision coming in 2005 dealt with waiving the right to file an 
appeal, which courts often willingly included in such agreements. Despite the fact that 
BGH 43, 195 had declared that a waiver of the right to appeal cannot be part of an 
agreement,375 practice had widely made use of the waiver as a second main negotiation 
position of the accused besides the notification of a confession. The waiver of the right to 
appeal became part of the vast majority of all negotiated cases and there was an 
uncertainty about the admissibility of that instrument.376 This provided the impetus for a 
new landmark decision of the BGH dealing with the issue.377 Once again the Grand 
Criminal Panel378 confirmed the admissibility of plea bargaining and its compatibility with 
the principles of criminal procedure.379 BGH 50, 40 also confirmed the earlier BGH 43, 195 
with regard to waiver of the right to appeal. The court was not entitled to steer negotiations 
in such a direction or to conclude an agreement of such content.380 The BGH stated that 
the court shall not participate actively.381 Nevertheless the accused remained entitled to 
introduce a possible waiver into the negotiations. However the BGH generally considered 
as effective a waiver declared subsequent to an agreement and after the pronouncement 
of the judgment.382 The BGH also decided that a waiver is ineffective if declared 
subsequent to an agreement that contained the promise of the accused to waive his right 
to appeal383 This conformed with the principle of a fair trial. Under aspects of legal security 
BGH did however set up a major exception to these principles and the legal consequences 
thereof. Upon qualified instruction, i.e., where the accused is instructed and made aware 
that his right to appeal remains untouched by the agreement, a later waiver of the right to 
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appeal is possible and effective.384 The Grand Criminal Panel held that the duty to provide 
the accused information regarding his rights was sufficient to secure the accused’s legal 
position.385 
The guiding principles of BGH 50, 40 give an overview of the presented principles:386 
(1.) In the course of negotiations toward an agreement, the court shall neither participate 
in the discussions with regard to, nor shall it work toward, a waiver of the right to 
appeal. 
(2.) Subsequent to each judgement based on an agreement, the person entitled to 
appellate remedy, who is to be instructed of such a right in terms of s 35a StPO, shall 
always also be instructed of the fact that the agreement does not affect his free 
decision whether to lodge an appeal (qualified instruction). This also applies in cases 
in which the agreement did not contain a waiver of the right to appeal. 
(3.) The waiver of the right to appeal subsequent to an agreement is inadmissible if the 
person entitled to appellate remedy has not received qualified instruction. 
f. Statutory law on agreements 
In 2005 the Grand Criminal Panel in BGH 50, 40 concluded that an agreement between 
the participants were about to lose the shape of 'open negotiations' that could easily 
comply with current principles of criminal proceedings.387 Instead the BGH considered plea 
negotiations as similar to a contractual procedure.388 German criminal procedure however 
was orientated toward the principle of material truth.389 Thus the Court called on the 
legislator to enact a law regulating the plea bargaining procedure.390 Various drafts for 
such a new law were presented.391 Finally, plea bargaining was regulated in 2009 in 
German law by the ‘Act to regulate the understanding in criminal procedure’ (‘Gesetz zur 
Regelung der Verständigung im Strafverfahren’392).  
The new law on agreements inserted several new sections into the StPO, namely ss 160b, 
202a, 212, 257b, 257c. While the others deal with agreements in the stadium of 
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preliminary proceedings or decisions concerning the opening of the main proceedings, s 
257c contains the central and most important provisions concerning the main proceedings 
themselves.393 The most striking feature of the new law is that it remains strictly faithful to 
the principle of ex proprio motu investigation.394 Due to inquisitorial law tradition the court 
retains its strong position. It is the judge who leads through the process and determines 
the scope of scrutiny. The purpose of the new law was to regulate a factual practice and 
procedure that has developed contra legem.395 The legislator did not consider himself to 
be in a position to suppress the practice of plea bargaining.396 On the contrary, the 
statutory law is a formal recognition of this practice.397 The legislator saw the benefit of 
shortened criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, the rationale of the new statutory law is to 
prevent a total domination of the principle that the subject-matter of a case is delimited by 
the parties in the criminal trial.398 Furthermore the purpose of the law is to ensure the 
autonomy of the accused in his procedural conduct.399 Finally, the law aims to uphold 
public interest and control of the criminal trial.400  
One could argue at this point that the legislature did not make a clear choice for a new 
consensual procedure.401 Others think that the legislature purpposely did not decide to 
establish a consensual procedure.402 Meyer-Goßner is of the opinion that s 257c implies a 
procedure that pretends to comply with the principles of criminal proceedings but in fact 
violates them.403 This will be further examined later: how the new law on agreements is to 
be judged in regard of its procedural nature.404 Interestingly, amongst 29 prosecutors and 
judges asked, 65 % were of the opinion that the new statutory law did not affect daily 
practice.405 That could be due to the fact that statutory law widely regulated what formerly 
has been case law. 
4. Concluding remark 
Plea bargaining is a worldwide phenomenon and has been adopted by criminal procedure 
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law and practice worldwide. The process of legislation in South Africa took years. Formerly 
recognized and accepted by case law, statutory provisions were inserted into the South 
African Criminal Procedure Act in 2001. In Germany the provisions on plea bargaining 
were drafted and enacted in rather short time. Nevertheless it was not until 2009 that the 
legislature decided to insert statutory provisions into the German law.  
IV. Essential features of the bargain procedure 
The bargain procedure in both legal systems differs. This is partly due to their different, 
accusatorial and inquisitorial, traditions. For instance these legal traditions fundamentally 
determine which role the judge plays throughout the trial and especially throughout the 
bargain procedure. The conduct of the bargain procedure shall be reviewed in order to 
thereafter examine and compare single problematic topics of further interest. 
1. Plea system in general 
A plea is ‘a formal statement by or on behalf of a defendant or prisoner, stating guilt or 
innocence in response to a charge, offering an allegation of fact, or claiming that a point of 
law should apply’.406 It is the accused’s first formal reaction to the state’s allegations.407 
The formal asking of the accused to plead determines the procedure which the court is to 
follow. The plea agreement in terms of s 105A substitutes the prescriptions of s 105 
Criminal Procedure Act.  
The German criminal procedure does not know a formal plea.408 Instead, at the beginning 
of a trial the defendant in terms of s 243 (4) of the StPO shall be informed that he may 
choose to respond to the charges or may choose not to make any statement on the 
charges. The presiding judge must, in terms of s 136 (2) of the StPO, offer the accused 
this opportunity to dispel the grounds of the accusations against him and to assert the 
facts which weigh in his favour.409 It is in the accused’s free will whether to respond to a 
charge by giving a statement or to remain silent. If the accused decides to respond, he 
undergoes a first examination by the terms of ss 243 (4), 136 (1) of the StPO. The 
provisions of s 243 (4) 2 of the StPO are aimed at enabling the accused to defend himself 
and to cause the court to take account of his statements throughout the further 
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procedure.410 He might even confess at the very outset of the trial. Anyhow, the 
opportunity the accused is given to make a statement during the first examination is not 
formalized and therefore does not affect the procedural rules to be followed in general. A 
recording of particular ‘pleas’ does not take place. Of course, whether the accused 
confesses will greatly influence how the trial is conducted. In this respect the confession 
can be compared to a plea of guilty.411 The confession is considered as evidence for the 
accused’s guilt and consequently substantially shortens the trial.412 The examination of the 
accused at the beginning of the trial and the confession he may make based on his or her 
free will without being asked for it shortens the taking of evidence. Nevertheless the 
confession does not determine the ambit of the dispute and the procedure to be chosen 
like for instance s 112 and s 115 CPA do in South African criminal procedure. In German 
law the accused cannot avoid the conventional trial procedure by pleading guilty.413 To 
sum it up and repeat it again with Weigend: ‘The defendant does not plead but is invited 
(though not obliged) to make a statement in open court. Even if he comes forward with a 
confession at the beginning of the trial, that does not relieve the court of the duty to 
"discover the truth." According to s 244 (2) of the StPO, the court is, responsible for 
ascertaining that all evidence needed to discover the truth about the case is produced at 
trial. Hence, even when the defendant has confessed, the court may have to call 
witnesses and take other evidence in order to find out to what extent the defendant 
correctly and completely related the facts of the case.’414 For that reason one cannot talk 
about ‘plea bargaining’ in German criminal procedure in its literal sense. This term 
however will be used as a general expression for agreements in criminal proceedings 
despite the lack of a formal system of pleas in Germany. 
2. Conduct of the bargain in South Africa 
How plea bargaining is conducted and how agreements are settled differs greatly in both 
legal systems. First, the South African system shall be briefly reviewed. As De Villers 
presents, the process of plea bargaining can be subdivided into five stages: 'negotiations 
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on plea and sentence, verification of requirements by court, consideration of plea 
agreement, consideration of sentence agreement and the keeping of records and 
statistics.'415 This enumeration forms a rough guideline of the following passages. 
a. Initiation and role of the participants 
The initiation of an agreement in terms of s 105A (1) usually is the result of negotiations 
between the prosecutor and the legally represented accused. S 105A (1) (a) states that a 
prosecutor authorised thereto in writing by the National Director of the Public Prosecutions 
and an accused who is legally represented may, before the accused pleads to the charge 
brought against him or her, negotiate and enter into an agreement. The negotiations are 
not described in further detail. S 105A remains non-prescriptive.416 It is up to the 
prosecution not only to initiate negotiations but also to steer them and find a common 
ground with the accused that can be presented to the court.417 The Directives issued by 
the NDPP in terms of s 105A (11) lead the prosecutor and further describe how 
negotiations are to be conducted. As the prosecutor is, besides the defence, entitled to 
initiate negotiations, this also determines his role in the process. He has the power, even 
the duty, to decide whether the criminal proceeding is going to be settled in an agreement 
under s 105A.418 This implies a prejudgment of the accused’s guilt and also enables the 
prosecutor to avoid the uncertainty of a full trial and to ensure a conviction by means of a s 
105A agreement.419 Plea bargaining is a demonstration of the prosecutor’s discretion 
which he not only retains in full throughout in bargain procedure but which also provides 
him with greater bargaining power.420 Whether the prosecutor would abuse his power, and 
how this situation can be avoided, will be further examined later.421 
Nevertheless, s 105A provides for some further prescriptions: The agreement is to be 
settled by the prosecution through a plea of guilty by the accused to the offence charged 
or to an offence of which he or she may be convicted on the charge (s 105A (1) (a) (i)). If 
the accused is convicted of the offence to which he or she has agreed to plead guilty, the 
court will impose a just sentence, postpone the sentence according to the terms of section 
297 (1) (a), or will impose a just sentence which the operation of the whole or any part 
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thereof is to be suspended in terms of section 297 (1) (b). Also, if applicable, the court will 
award compensation as contemplated in section 300 (s 105A (1) (a) (ii)).  
The prosecutor has several duties during the pre-agreement stage. He has to be certain to 
comply with these before he may enter into the agreement as contemplated in s 105A (1) 
(a).422 In terms of s 105A (1) (b) the prosecutor may enter into an agreement after 
consultating with the person charged with the investigation of the case (s 105A (1) (b) (i)). 
This must happen with due regard to, at least, the nature of and circumstances relating to 
the offence, personal circumstances of the accused, previous convictions of the accused − 
if any − and the interests of the community (s 105A (1) (b) (ii)). Furthermore the prosecutor 
may enter into the agreement after affording the complainant or his or her representative, 
where it is reasonable to do so and taking into account the nature of and circumstances 
relating to the offence and the interests of the complainant, the opportunity to make 
representations to the prosecutor regarding the contents of the agreement. The prosecutor 
must also include in the agreement a condition relating to compensation or the rendering 
to the complainant of some specific benefit or service in lieu of compensation for damage 
or pecuniary loss (s 105A (1) (b) (iii)). The provision of s 105A (1) (c) states that the 
requirements of paragraph (b) (i) may be dispensed with if the prosecutor is satisfied that 
the consultation with the person charged with the investigation of the case will delay the 
proceedings to such an extent that it could cause substantial prejudice to the prosecution, 
the accused, the complainant or his or her representative (s 105A (1) (c) (i)) and affect the 
administration of justice adversely (s 105A (1) (c) (ii)). This aspect will be referred to later. 
What should be annotated and be briefly afforded attention is the relationship between 
prosecution and defence. In the present criminal procedure prosecutor and defence are 
equals ‘on either side of the adversarial fence’.423 Formerly, the accused was deprived of 
any insight into the evidence that the State held against them.424 Police dockets were 
privileges and neither the accused nor his legal representative could sight thereof.425 With 
the present law, the accused is entitled to view the content of police dockets and also to 
consult with state-witnesses at a pre-trial stage.426 On the other hand, the prosecution is 
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not entitled to investigate details of accused’s defence and the evidence held by them.427 
The prosecutor still has the advantage of unlimited access to state’s resources to use for 
investigations though.428 To sum it up, the negotiating parties conduct the bargain as 
equals.  
Regarding the judge, s 105A (3) provides that the court shall not participate in the 
negotiations. This will be revealed as a major difference to the German provisions and 
should therefore be kept in mind. It is appropriate to note at this stage that although judicial 
participation in the negotiations is not allowed, the outcome of the negotiations is required 
to be approved by the court. This will be presented in the following.429 
b. Form and information 
Formal requirements of the agreement are set up in s 105A (2). The parties need to 
present the court a ‘package’.430 According to the provision, the agreement shall be in 
writing and shall at least state that the accused, before entering into the agreement, has 
been informed that he has the right: to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt, to remain silent and not to testify during the proceedings and to 
protected against compulsory self-incrimination. Furthermore, the agreement shall state 
fully the terms of the agreement, the substantial facts of the matter, all other facts relevant 
to the sentence agreement and any admissions made by the accused. Finally, the 
agreement must be signed by the prosecutor and the accused and his or her legal 
representative, and, if the accused has negotiated with the prosecutor through an 
interpreter, must contain a certificate by the interpreter to the effect that he interpreted 
accurately during the negotiations and in respect of the contents of the agreement. 
There is also an obligation to inform the accused of certain rights. This is, after the 
prescriptive of the written form, the second safeguard to ensure that a plea and sentence 
agreement is not obtained at the expense of substantial rights of the accused.431 The 
agreement has to confirm that the accuse was, before entering into the agreement, 
informed of his right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt 
(s 105A (2) (a) (i)), his right to remain silent and not to testify during the proceedings (s 
                                            
427
  North Western Dence Concrete CC v Director of the Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) 1999 (2) 
SACR 669 (C) at 676b,c. 
428
  North Western Dence Concrete CC v Director of the Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) 1999 (2) 
SACR 669 (C) at 676c. 
429
  Compare Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-8. 
430
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-7. 
431
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-14. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
 
105A (2) (a) (ii)) and his right not be compelled with self-incriminating evidence (s 105A (2) 
(a) (ii)). These rights are all components of the constitutional right to a fair trial and are 
contained in s 35 (3) (h) and (j) of the Bill of Rights.432 The rights may also be called the 
‘passive defensive rights of an accused’.433  
Interestingly, the provisions fail to indicate whose responsibility the duty to inform is.434 
They simply state that the written agreement must declare that this information has been 
given. Du Toit et al hold that it was not the court’s nor the prosecution’s duty to inform the 
accused of his rights but instead is the duty of the accused’s legal representative.435 With 
Rodgers it can be said that although there is no primary duty of the court and the 
prosecution to inform, it is in the state’s and court’s best interest to ensure that the 
accused is aware of his constitutional rights before the agreement is finalised, in order to 
avoid judicial disapproval.436 
c. Admissible content 
The subject of a plea bargain may vary. As s 105A (1) (a) (i) and s 105A (1) (a) (ii) (aa) 
show, an agreement must at least contain a plea of guilty to an offence and an agreement 
upon the sentence. German provisions are not that restrictive, as will be revealed later. 
d. Verification of basis 
S 105A (4) (a) states that the prosecutor has the duty to inform the court that a written 
agreement has been negotiated. The accused will not be required to plead before the 
prosecutor fulfills this duty. The court must then satisfy itself of two aspects:437 first, s 105A 
(4) (a) (i), which provides that the court must require the accused to confirm that such an 
agreement has been entered into; and second, s 105A (4) (a) (ii), which provides that the 
judge must make sure that the prosecutor has consulted the person charged with the 
investigation of the case (s 105A (1) (b) (ii)) and, where it is reasonable, has afforded the 
complainant or his representative the opportunity to make representations (s 105A (1) (b) 
(iii)). However ‘the pre-agreement consultation as required by s 105A (1) (b) (i) can be 
dispensed with if the prosecutor is satisfied that such a consultation will delay the 
proceedings to such an extent that it not only could cause substantial prejudice to the 
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prosecution, the accused, the complainant or the latter’s representative (s 105A (1) (c) (i)) 
but could also affect the administration of justice adversely (s 105A (1) (c) (ii)).’438 If the 
court is not satisfied that the agreement complies with the requirements of s 105A (1) (b) 
(i) and (iii), the court must inform the prosecutor and the accused of the reasons for non-
compliance and afford them both the opportunity to comply with the requirements 
concerned. Interestingly, there is no further written duty that the court must prove 
compliance with s 105A (2) and its formal requirements for the agreement.439 Taking a 
closer look at the provision of s 105A (2) with its peremptory terms, however, it appears 
that there is a court duty to ensure that these requirements have been met.440 The reason 
for this assumption is that it would otherwise not be appropriate for the court to proceed on 
the basis of an inadmissible agreement.441 
e. Scrutiny of agreement 
S 105A (5) states that, if the court is satisfied that the agreement complies with the 
requirements of subsection (1) (b) (i) and (iii), then the court shall require the accused to 
plead to the charge and shall order that the contents of the agreement be disclosed in 
court. After the disclosure of the contents of the agreement, s 105A (6) (a) provides for a 
judicial questioning of the accused. By the terms of the provision, once the contents have 
been disclosed the court has to make sure that the accused confirms the terms of the 
agreement and the admission made by him in the agreement (s 105A (6) (a) (i)). 
Furthermore the court has to ascertain whether, with reference to the alleged facts of the 
case, he admits to the allegations to which he has agreed to plead guilty (s 105A (6) (a) 
(ii)). To this judicial questioning, case law rules and principles relating to s 112 (1) (b) are 
applicable, though with the necessary changes.442 The court furthermore is required to 
ensure that the agreement was entered into freely and voluntarily in his or her sound and 
sober senses and without having been unduly influenced (s 105A (6) (a) (iii)). To plead 
guilty freely and voluntarily is a fundamental principle of South African criminal 
procedure.443  
After the questioning of the accused the court should in terms of s 105A (6) (b) in three 
                                            
438
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-11. 
439
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-16. 
440
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-16. 
441
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-16. 
442
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-17. 
443
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-2; 15-17; Chetty v Cronje 1979 (1) SA 294 
(O) p. 297g-h; S v Mbothoma en ‘n ander 1978 (2) SA 530 (O); S v Seabi & another 2003 (1) SACR 620 
(T) 623f-h. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
 
cases record a plea of not guilty and inform the prosecutor and the accused of the reasons 
therefore. The plea of not guilty is to be recorded: if the court is not satisfied that the 
accused is guilty of the offence in respect of which the agreement was entered into (s 
105A (6) (b) (i)); if it appears to the court that the accused does not admit an allegation in 
the charge or that the accused has incorrectly admitted and such allegation or that the 
accused has a valid defence to the charge (s 105A (6) (b) (ii)); or, for any other reason, if 
the court is of the opinion that the plea of guilty by the accused should not stand (s 105A 
(6) (b) (iii)). Once the court has recorded a plea of not guilty, the agreement becomes null 
and void.444 Also prior to the recording, there is no opportunity for both prosecutor and 
defence to convince the court of the guilt of the accused by presenting new evidence.445 
Furthermore the accused is not entitled to demand a verdict on the merits – an acquittal or 
conviction – as provided for in s 106 (4). The provision of s 105A (6) (c) clarifies that after 
the recording of a plea of not guilty, the trial will start de novo before another presiding 
officer. By the terms of this section the accused may also, in the alternative, waive his or 
her right to be tried before another presiding officer. Although not provided for in the 
provision, the prosecutor where appropriate may bring an application that another 
presiding officer should preside the trial de novo despite the accused’s waiver, as referred 
to in s 105A (6) (c).446 
If the court is satisfied that the accused admits the allegations in the charge and that he is 
guilty of the offence in respect of which the agreement was entered into, the court shall 
then under S 105A (7) (a) proceed to consider the sentence agreement. It is important to 
point out that the court must proceed to consider the agreement without yet having 
formally convicted the accused.447 This only happens after the sentence, upon which the 
parties have agreed, has been found just, as required in s 105A (8).448 For the purpose of 
the court’s consideration in terms of s 105A (7) (a), the court may direct relevant questions 
− including questions about the previous convictions of the accused − to the prosecutor 
and the accused and hear evidence, including a statement by or on behalf of the accused 
or the complainant (s 105A (7) (b) (i)). The questioning about previous convictions appears 
unusual as, in a conventional trial, such questioning by the court would be irregular if the 
prosecutor has decided not to prove any previous convictions.449 As Du Toit et al state, 
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this provision is sensible because ‘the previous convictions of the accused should right 
from the start form part of the facts which the parties wish to present to the court in support 
of the sentence agreement.’450 
During the course of the consideration mentioned above, the court has the power and the 
duty to receive evidence and other statements for purpose of considering the sentence 
agreement. That the court in its consideration of the sentence is not limited to those facts 
placed before it by the parties is a fundamental principle of criminal procedure.451 The 
section applies to the conventional trial situation and the relevant provisions of s 121 (7), 
which states that nothing shall prevent 'the court from hearing evidence, including 
evidence or a statement by or on behalf of the accused, with regard to sentence, or from 
questioning the accused on any aspect of the case for the purposes of determining an 
appropriate sentence’ and to s 274 (1), which states that the ‘court may, before passing 
sentence, receive such evidence as it thinks fit in order to inform itself as to the proper 
sentence to be passed’.452 The purpose is to be sure that the court holds sufficient 
information upon which to base its conviction.453 S 105A (7) (b) (i) ensures that this 
standard is also met in the plea bargaining procedure. The section empowers the court to 
call witnesses where the parties have failed to provide sufficient information for the 
purpose of considering the agreement.454 It remains a question, however, how extensively 
the courts will make use of this opportunity to have an inquisitorial review of the case and 
to search for further evidence. It appears that this might only be the case if the parties 
failed to present the court with a solid basis for their agreement. The parties are entitled to 
adduce evidence or to present a statement though. It should be noted however that this 
cannot occur permanently, as it conflicts with the procedure provided in s 105A.455 The 
factual bases of an agreement are usually not in dispute.456 
Furthermore, the court must give due regard to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Act and other law (s 105A (7) (b) (ii)) if the offence concerned is an offence referred to in 
the Schedule to the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (Act 105 of 1997) or is an offence 
for which a minimum penalty is prescribed in the law creating the offence,.457 The provision 
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clarifies that prescribed minimum sentences cannot be disregarded on the simple fact that 
one has agreed that these barriers are not applicable.458 A similar protection is intended by 
Directives 12 and 13 issued by the NDPP. 
Finally, the court has to satisfy itself that the sentence is just in terms of s 105A (8). If so, 
the court shall inform the prosecutor and the accused that it is satisfied, whereupon the 
court shall convict the accused of the offence charged and sentence the accused in 
accordance with the sentence agreement. If not, if the court finds that the sentence 
agreement is unjust, s 105A (9) (a) provides that the court shall inform the prosecutor and 
the accused of the sentence which it considers just. A court finding that an agreed 
sentence is unjust will likely negate the prior achievements of negotiation and render a 
successful outcome of the s 105A procedure doubtful. Both prosecutor and accused may 
by the terms of s 105A (9) (b) abide by the agreement with reference to the charge and 
inform the court that, subject to the right to lead evidence and to present argument 
relevant to sentencing, the court may proceed with the imposition of sentence or they may 
withdraw from the agreement. If the prosecutor and the accused abide by the agreement 
as contemplated in subsection (b) (i), the court shall convict the accused of the offence 
charged and impose the sentence which it considers just (s 105A (9) (c)). If the prosecutor 
or the accused withdraw from the agreement, the trial shall start de novo before another 
presiding officer, provided that the accused may waive his or her right to be tried before 
another presiding officer (s 105A (9) (d)). 
f. Conclusion of the agreement 
The agreement comes into existence as soon as the parties sign a written agreement that 
complies with the prerequisites of s 105A (2). Before or apart from a formal agreement, 
negotiations might possibly develop a binding effect due to the principle of a fair trial and 
the rule of law. To discuss the point in time in which the agreement exactly is concluded 
might appear to be of less relevance. In South African bargain procedure the signing 
terminates the negotiations and at the same time initiates the scrutiny. By contrast, the 
conclusion of the agreement in Germany marks the end of both the negotiations and the 
court’s scrutiny. The whole issue will be examined in detail later.459 
g. Other procedure 
It is important to note that the presented procedure only describes the branch of bargains 
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that has been implemented by the statutory provisions. Already, Directive No. 1 reveals 
that ‘the procedure enacted in s 105A does not supplant the standard procedure for pleas 
of guilty in terms of s 112 of the Act’. In North Western Dense Concrete CC, which took 
place in 1999, at a stage prior to the advent of statutory provisions on plea bargaining, a 
‘plea explanation’ was settled in terms of 112 (1) (b).460 Uijs AJ stated, while explaining the 
then-little known and judicially less recognized procedure of plea bargaining that, as 
mentioned before, s 112 was ‘virtually tailormade’ for such agreements.461 If s 112 could 
provide for plea agreements, one could ask whether s 112 is still of relevance to the 
subject after the statutory amendment of s 105A. This will be further examined throughout 
the thesis. Furthermore the previously mentioned Directive No. 1 states that ‘the 
established practice of accepting initial pleas of guilty on the basis of bona fide consensus 
reached, remains applicable’. Moreover, the legislature only tends to regulate the bargains 
on plea and sentence. Informal bargaining, for instance on subjects other than the plea 
and sentence or at a stage when charges are not yet filed, remains possible.462 Thus there 
are more models of plea bargaining than those presented here. Their relevance will be 
examined later. 
h. Concluding remark 
The South African conduct of the plea bargaining procedure is generally accusatorial. That 
means that prosecution and accused independently initiate and carry out the bargain 
procedure. Nonetheless s 105A prescribes inquisitorial elements such as verification and 
scrutiny by the court. In practice however this scrutiny is almost completely focused on 
formal points. 
3. Conduct of the bargain in Germany 
A better understanding of plea bargaining requires taking a first look at the conduct of the 
procedure in Germany and highlighting obvious and clearly noticeable essential 
differences compared to the South African provisions. The German criminal procedure 
differs in several essential aspects, a few of which will be briefly pointed out here at the 
outset. For one, German law does not provide for a jury trial. Lay participation is 
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guaranteed through lay judges who together with the professional judge or judges 
represent the court.463 The vote of lay judges counts equally to those of the professional 
judges.464 Also, as mentioned before, in Germany there is no formal plea of the defendant 
at the beginning of a trial, as there is under South African law.465 Nevertheless, it is 
possible to base a sentence on a reliable confession.466 If the reliability is in doubt, then 
the judge is obliged to clarify.467 Inconsistent pleading is thus not possible.468 
When s 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act is compared to s 257c of the StPO, which 
regulates plea bargaining in Germany, the first thing to notice is the length of the 
provisions. The South African law on plea bargaining is much more detailed and explicitly 
describes the specific steps to be taken. Take, for instance, that S 105A consists of 
approximately 1750 words whereas s 257c StPO only contains around 300 words.469 This 
is due to a different methodology by which to shape law. German law in general tends to 
keep provisions brief and short. The use of undetermined legal terms and notions, which 
have to be interpreted and extracted in order to reveal their essential meaning, is very 
common to the German system of law. Thus there is often a need for interpretation. This 
explains the difference in the length of the provisions. 
Negotiations can take place in the main proceedings in terms of s 257c or at an earlier 
stage. The point in time in which both discussion and negotiations take place is not further 
specified.470 Already, the wording of s 257c (1), speaking of the opportunity to reach an 
agreement ‘on the further course and outcome of the proceedings,’ reveals that these 
negotiations have to occur at the beginning of the proceedings.471 The position of s 257c 
after the sections about the taking of evidence in s 244 to s 257 and right before the s 258 
about the closing arguments to the mind of Meyer-Goßner gives the false impression that 
the agreement is to be concluded at the end of the taking of evidence.472 Indeed, the 
purpose of plea bargaining, i.e., to avoid a further, possibly large-scale or delicate 
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procedure, (e.g., hearing witnesses), should dictate that it occur at the beginning of trial.473 
It has to be admitted that the bargain usually takes places at the beginning of the trial. 
However, the formal conclusion, i.e., the parties’ declaration of their mutual consent to the 
terms, instead occurs towards the end of the trial, as the position of s 257c indicates. 
Nevertheless, however early the parties come up with an agreement in terms of s 257c, 
the formal conclusion must be predated by, at the least, the prosecutor reading out the 
charges (s 342 (3)) and the court verifying the identity of the accused and examining his 
personal situation (s 243 (2) 2).474 
a. Initiation and role of the participants 
A crucial aspect of the new statutory provisions in Germany to point out upfront is that the 
German approach is unique compared to all other commonly-known law systems.475 The 
German legislature gave the judge, among various others, the role of guiding the criminal 
proceedings.476 This role is further emphasized and maintained in the new provisions on 
agreements. S 257c (1) states that in suitable cases it is the court that may, in accordance 
with the following subsections, reach an agreement with the participants on the further 
course and outcome of the proceedings. As contemplated in s 257c (3) 1, it is the court’s 
duty to announce what content the negotiated agreement might have. This requires, prior 
to the announcement, a discussion of the status of the proceedings in terms of s 257b. 
That section states that at the main hearing the court may discuss the status of the 
proceedings with the participants insofar as this appears suitable to expedite the 
proceedings. The significance of s 257b is very limited. The major provision on bargains 
remains s 257c.  
The abovementioned provisions state that discussions on the status of the proceedings 
and the subsequent agreement under German law are to be initiated by the court. It should 
be emphasized that although the court has the right to initiate the plea barging according 
to German law, it remains inadmissible for the court to put pressure on the accused.477 
Under South African law, the participation of the court in the negotiations is explicitly 
forbidden by s 105A (3), a major difference between the legal systems. 
However, the initiation of negotiations is not limited to the court under German law. The 
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agreement can also be suggested by the prosecutor or the accused or his legal 
representative.478 This occurs often because many times negotiations will already have 
taken place at the stage of preliminary proceedings according to the terms of s 160b.479 As 
a consequence, s 257c, in stating that the court ‘may’ reach an agreement, only indicates 
the legislature’s assumption as to the usual procedure. In practice the initation is most 
frequently done by the defence.480 It should be remarked that legal representation is not a 
prerequisite to the bargain. Mandatory legal representation may only result out of the 
general provision of s 140 StPO, for instance if the case is placed before a Regional Court. 
b. Form and information 
Under German law the recording of the agreement is less formal than in South Africa. At 
the beginning of the main hearing the presiding judge states whether discussions toward 
an agreement have taken place and, if so, states their essential content.481 The agreement 
is then only put to court record in terms of s 273 (1a) of the StPO, which requires that the 
record indicate in essence the course and content as well as the outcome of the 
negotiated agreement.By the terms of s 267 (3) 5, the agreement furthermore is 
mentioned in the ensuing judgment. Thus, in German criminal proceeding requirements 
such as written components of the agreement are only, if ever, fulfilled in the judgment 
itself. It should be emphasized that the judgment only contains rough outlines of the 
agreement, oftentimes only consisting of a few sentences. The agreement is thus only 
documented roughly in the judgment as well as in the court record.482 There is also no 
need for the participants to sign. As a result the agreement according to German s 257c 
StPO might appear less like a contract.  
Subsection (5) of s 257c prescribes an obligation to instruct the accused of certain 
consequences of the agreement. It states that the defendant shall be instructed as to the 
prerequisites for and consequences of a deviation by the court from the prospective 
outcome pursuant to subsection (4). Subsection (4) states that ‘the court shall cease to be 
bound by a negotiated agreement if legal or factually significant circumstances have been 
overlooked or have arisen and the court therefore becomes convinced that the prospective 
sentencing range is no longer appropriate to the gravity of the offence or the degree of 
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guilt. The same shall apply if the further conduct of the defendant at the trial does not 
correspond to that upon which the court’s prediction was based.’ Other than in South 
African law, the information given to the accused is not about his fundamental legal rights, 
such his right to remain silent, but about the actual legal consequences of the agreement 
to be concluded. It should be emphasized however that – as the bargain procedure in 
Germany is conducted in a conventional trial – comparable instructions are nevertheless 
given at the outset of each conventional trial according to the terms of the general 
provision of s 243 (5). The instruction in the terms of s 257c however has to take place 
prior to the conclusion itself.483 The instruction must also be indicated in the court’s record 
by the terms of S 273 (1a) 2. The duty to instruct is upon the court. The accused may 
waive his right to be instructed, which he may do if already instructed by his legal 
representative,484 but it remains the court’s primary duty to inform. 
c. Admissible content 
S 257c (2) 1 prescribes the admissible content of an agreement and states that ‘the 
subject matter of this agreement may only comprise the legal consequences that could be 
the content of the judgment and of the associated rulings, other procedural measures 
relating to the course of the underlying adjudication proceedings, and the conduct of the 
participants during the trial.’ S 257 (3) 2 provides that an agreement can also indicate an 
upper and lower sentence limit. The provision is interpreted very strictly. It is impermissible 
to negotiate on a certain specific sentence.485 The reason therefore lies in basic guidelines 
of German criminal procedure and the inquisitorial law tradition. Those will be further 
examined later. It should be emphasized at this stage that the impermissibility of a specific 
sentence, e.g., specifying exactly 2 years and 6 months of imprisonment, as part of an 
sentence agreement occurs to be unique in comparison to many other jurisdictions similar 
to South Africa. 
The confession is not a necessary component of the agreement. The indication of an 
upper or lower sentence limit therefore does not require a confession quid pro quo. It can 
also be set forth in exchange for any other kind of the conduct on the part of the 
accused.486 The accused’s contribution to the agreement is thus not limited to the 
confession, and a confession is not required for an agreement to come into existence. If 
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the accused’s offer includes particular conduct, which he is free to negotiate, this could for 
instance be in exchange for a waiver of some procedural application.487 An example of a 
right that can be waived is the right to an objection in the proceedings by the terms of s 
238 (2) on the grounds that an order by the presiding judge relating to the conduct of the 
hearing is inadmissible.488 Furthermore, the accused may consent to the replacement of a 
witness’s examination, whether from an expert or co-accused, by reading out a record of 
another examination or a certificate containing a written statement originating from him as 
according to s 251 (1) No. 1.489 Another example is the accused’s opportunity to waive his 
procedural right concerning the obligation to fulfil the time limits for summons by the terms 
of s 217 (2).490 That provision provides that, if such time limit has not been observed, the 
defendant may request suspension of the hearing at any time prior to commencement of 
his examination on the charge.491 
d. Verification of basis 
There is an essential difference between the two countries’ systems in the court’s scrutiny. 
As in South African law prosecutor and accused conduct and conclude the negotiations 
independently and then form an agreement, there is thus a need for the court’s approval 
that certain requirements have been met. The material content in adversarial terms is 
more up to the parties, which is why the court’s scrutiny is basically focused on formal 
aspects. In the inquisitorial tradition – at least that is the legislature’s assumption – the 
German court leads through the process of bargaining and participates in each and every 
step towards the finalisation of the agreement. It is not the court’s duty to check whether 
the prosecution has complied with certain formal prerequisites. Moreover the court, as the 
leader throughout the bargain procedure, itself underlies such formal requirements. Thus, 
the following passage will present the usual conduct of the bargain. 
A striking and basic difference to South African law on criminal procedure that must be 
emphasized at this point is that in Germany the judge has full knowledge of the 
prosecution file. The file is sent to the judge in advance of the trial. Throughout the main 
proceedings and right from the beginning the judge is through that means familiar with the 
case, all its details and all investigations already undertaken. Consequently, the judge can 
independently develop an opinion with full awareness of both the pre-trial investigations 
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and the outcome of the hearings.492 The fact that the judge fully reads and goes through 
the prosecution file determines to a huge extent his role in the process. This difference to 
South African law cannot be emphasized enough. This smacks of a problem area with 
regard to the judge’s role in the agreement procedure, as will be discussed further. 
The crucial conduct of the plea bargain procedure is set down in subsection (3) of s 257c. 
According to s 257c (1), as presented before, the court initiates the plea bargain. Usually 
the proposal of an agreement already contains the possible subjects for negotations 
according to the terms of s 257c (3) 1. Thus, the law does not provide for a consideration 
or an approval of the content that would have been discussed earlier by the parties, as 
German law advises the court to propose all possible content right away. If the court role 
has the role of deciding which subjects should form part of an agreement, there is no 
further need for an approval through the court. Factually, however, negotiations will often 
have already taken place in between the parties at an earlier, pre-trial stage. The sections 
160b, 202a, 212 of the StPO deal with these preceding discussions of the status of the 
proceedings. The discussions usually already have the character of negotiations toward a 
concrete agreement. As a consequence, there is a already pre-discussed and thus 
negotiated content to an agreement that must be scrutinized through the court in order to 
determine that its content is admissible and takes into account all provisions on the 
agreement procedure. It can however be stated that, even if the agreement is pre-
discussed, the court usually conducts the bargain in the same way, as if the judge had 
presented the possible content. Consequently, if it is not already part of the court’s 
proposal of an agreement or if the court consented to a sentence limit the parties had 
earlier negotiated, the court may, upon its free evaluation of all circumstances, then 
indicate an upper and lower sentence limit by the terms of s 257 (3) 2. According to s 257 
(3) 3, thereafter the court is obliged to give the parties the opportunity to make 
submissions. Finally, by the terms of s 257 (3) 4, the negotiated agreement comes into 
existence if the defendant and the public prosecution office agree to the court’s proposal. 
The complainant is not involved and has no right to veto.493 
e. Scrutiny of agreement 
There is no scrutiny that takes place after the conclusion of the agreement. Rather, the 
agreement usually is initiated by and always concluded under the guidance of the court, 
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which implies judicial approval during the process of negotiating. Thus, under German law 
there is no need for judicial scrutiny of what the parties had negotiated in camera, as the 
court participated in such negotiations right from the start or at least joined and 
substantially influenced the negotiations toward the finalisation of the agreement. Thus, 
what shall be presented under the topic of the scrutiny is the guidelines the court must 
follow when proposing the possible content (or in practice consenting to the parties 
proposal) of an agreement.  
S 257 (2) 1 states that 244 (2) remains unaffected. S 244 (2) provides that in order to 
establish the truth the court shall proprio motu extend the taking of evidence to all facts 
and means of proof relevant to the decision. This presumption of a full taking of evidence 
does not comport with the reality in the court rooms.494 Some scholars have marked this 
provision as a ‘legislator’s lie’.495 If the obligation to establish the truth fully applied, the 
benefits of plea bargaining would be diminished. S 257c (1) 2 must be applied in such a 
way that the court and the participants, in light of the obligation to establish the truth, 
cannot agree on a certain legal consequence without at least briefly investigating the facts 
of the case.496 The court has to understand and state the facts of the case. By the terms of 
s 257c (2) 3, a verdict of guilty is not negotiable, e.g., qualifications that the accused 
caused bodily harm by dangerous means cannot be dropped by agreement. The court is 
obligated to scrutinize whether the confession complies with the outcome of the 
prosecutions investigations.497 A ‘formal’ confession, i.e., an accused’s confession that is 
not further examined as to whether it conforms to material facts – which would be 
comparable to a plea of guilty which does not exist in German law – is not sufficient.498 
The confession has to appear plausible.499 The formal scope of the scrutiny is thus rather 
wide. It will however be examined later how courts deal with the obligation to investigate, 
at the least, the substantial facts the agreement is based on in practice.500 
f. Conclusion of the agreement 
First of all, recall that there is no written plea and sentence agreement in German law. 
Consequently, one cannot refer to a signing. Furthermore, it is fundamentally important to 
consider that in German law the agreement is the final outcome of the bargain process, 
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which also already includes a process of judicial scrutiny. Thus, the question of when 
exactly the agreement is conluded is essential due to the fact that at that point the bargain 
procedure has been determined and only has to be finalised by the subsequent conviction 
and sentencing to be done by the court solely.  
S 257c on plea bargaining does not regulate a conclusion of the agreement. German law 
provides for certain general principles concerning the roles of the participants though.501 
The conclusion procedure can be explained through the terminology of the civil law (which 
suits the contractual nature of plea bargaining in general). The ‘offer,’ i.e., the proposal of 
an agreement, is presented by the court.502 Accused and prosecutor then have to declare 
‘acceptance’ of the court’s proposal.503 Thus, the court’s proposal has to contain the 
‘essentiali negotii’ of the agreement.504 The court furthermore has to act with the intention 
of creating legal relationships.505 The mutual ‘contractual services’ have to be named 
explicitly.506 Nevertheless, the exact point in time when the agreement is concluded 
remains in the dark as the process of negotiations may be lengthy. Much will rely on the 
participants’ determination. The strongest indicator for the conclusion of an agreement is 
an official entry into the court record. Statements prior to an official entry into the court 
record might either be interpreted as consent to the agreement or might become binding 
due to the principle of a fair trial. These aspects will be examined in more depth later. 
g. Other procedure 
The main focus of the present described procedure was on the bargain procedure in the 
terms of s 257c. The section corresponds to s 105A, i.e., it deals with bargains during the 
main proceedings. The act that regulated plea bargaining in German criminal procedure 
did however also implement some other provisions into the StPO, such as s 160b, 202a 
and 212. They regulate bargaining that takes place during the preliminary stage, before a 
charge is filed, or on bargaining at the stage when the judge descides whether to proceed 
with the main proceedings.507 Such regulation is unknown in the South African provisions. 
The South African provisions, mainly dealing with pre-trial agreements, will be surveyed in 
further detail later. 
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Other procedures that are in some way linked to the issue of bargains may be seen in the 
sections on the dispensation of charges in s 153 seqq. The decision not to proceed with or 
not to begin prosecution in exchange to the fulfilment of certain terms and conditions by 
the accused may be contained in the elements of the agreement. Furthermore, the penal 
order (Strafbefehl) in terms of s 407 seqq. could be mentioned.508 The penal order 
procedure, similar to the bargaining procedure, breaks with essential principles of the 
criminal procedure.509 Just to name one example, penal orders do not require any search 
for substantial truth or any investigation of facts by the court. The relevance of the topic will 
be exposed later. 
Finally, it must be mentioned that in German law there are no specific Directives of the 
prosecution offices concerning plea bargaining. The Directives for Criminal Procedure and 
Fine Procedure (Richtlinien für das Strafverfahren und das Bußgeldverfahren – RiStBV), 
which is an administrative regulation, does not provide for any provisions concerning 
negotiations and agreements. 
h. Concluding remark 
From a procedural point of view, the German provisions on plea bargaining provide for a 
strong role of the court which comports with inquisitorial values of the German criminal 
procedure. It is for instance already the court who in suitable cases may initiate the 
bargain and propose the possible content. Nonetheless, the legal practice is strongly 
oriented towards accusatorial values. The most outstanding differences in comparison to 
the South African system might be that the agreement is not set forth in writing, that there 
are no compulsory material components such as an agreement on the sentence and that 
the accused does not require legal representation. 
4. Concluding remark 
Essential differences in the practice of plea bargaining shall be presented once again in 
the following table. Further distinctions will be uncovered thereafter. 
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Feature South Africa Germany 
G
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l 
General law 
tradition 
English and Roman-
Dutch 
National 
Legal system Common law Continental 
Criminal 
Procedure 
Accusatorial Inquisitorial 
P
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a
 b
a
rg
a
in
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g
 
Statutory Law 2001 2009 
Typical 
participants 
Defence, prosecutor Defence, prosecutor, 
judge 
Formal 
requirements 
Written agreement 
that is signed by all 
participants 
Rough content filed in 
the court record and 
mentioned in the 
judgement 
Legal 
representatio
n 
Required Not required 
Prosecutor Written authorisation Generally authorized 
without special permit 
Subject Agreement on plea 
and sentence is 
mandatory 
No mandatory 
content 
Offences No limitation No limitation 
Active role of 
the judge 
No Yes 
Waiver of 
right to 
appeal 
Admissible Inadmissible 
Percentage 
of bargains 
Could not be 
ascertained510 
~ 50 % 
V. Problem areas 
In both the South African and German legal systems, agreements are still a controversial 
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issue even after many years of practice and, in the case of South Africa, over a decade 
since the statutory amendment in 2001. As Bennun remarks, ‘there is a great deal to be 
uneasy about concerning plea bargaining generally in an accusatorial system, for it 
involves bypassing the finder of fact.’ The legitimacy and success of a criminal process is 
put into question if it is concluded by way of a plea and sentence agreement.511 Bennun 
highlights that ‘the enthusiasm for plea bargaining has distracted attention from the 
consideration that a s 105A agreement which bypasses a proper trial in the usual manner 
is an exceptional procedure and not the normal procedure in which criminal justice should 
be dispensed.’512 ‘The well intended attempt to codify and to regulate the negotiated 
outcomes of a prosecution’, he states further, ‘seems to have been implemented without 
adequate consideration being given to the enormous implications this would have for some 
of the most fundamental issues in criminal justice.’513  
Three facts are especially enriching upon comparing the South African and German 
systems. The first is a similarity: both legal systems have adopted plea bargaining and 
codified it over the last decade. The second is a dissimilarity: South African law 
implements plea bargaining into a common law legal system with accusatorial traditions 
whereas German law however is a continental law system characterized by inquisitorial 
roots. The third fact is that the German approach to plea bargaining is unique because it 
illustrates the difficulties of reconciling agreement procedure with inquisitorial principles 
and has developed out of itself rather than being adopted after the model of another legal 
system.514 
1. Subject of agreements 
Already the admissible content of an agreement varies in both countries, which uncovers 
fundamental differences. Generally, the subject to plea bargaining can be differentiated 
into two aspects. Negotiations and agreements can either relate to the progress or the 
outcome of the proceedings.515 An example of a subject concerning the progress of the 
proceedings is an agreement on the procedures for taking evidence or on the extent of 
such procedures. The outcome of a process, on the other hand, can be negotiated with 
regard to the sentence but also with the aim of a dispensation or limitation of the 
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prosecution.516 
a. Mandatory content 
In South Africa s 105A proceedings require, in addition to the accused’s consent to plead 
guilty, an agreement on the sentence.517 On the contrary, in Germany a sentence 
agreement can form part of the agreement by the terms of s 257c, but this is not a 
compulsory component. The reason for this – as will be presented – is the fundamental 
differences in the background and understanding of plea bargaining. Already at this stage, 
it can be observed that South African law is closer to a contractual and adversarial 
understanding whereas German law still seems, even with regard to the bargain 
procedure, to uphold the inquisitorial nature and tradition of the criminal procedure. 
Consequently, German juridical practice considers the bargain as a means to ‘streamline’, 
‘optimize’ or even ‘simplify’ the conventional criminal procedure in cases that are suitable 
for a bargain. As the final agreement is not to be equated with the conviction – to the 
contrary it only serves the role of a ‘preparatory assistance’ towards a conventional 
conviction – it is in the eyes of German scholars, courts and practitioners not necessary to 
make the ‘essentiali negotii’ of a usual criminal conviction, i.e. the plea and sentence, a 
mandatory part of the bargain. The function of the bargain thus differs greatly in both legal 
systems from an initial standpoint. South African law regards the bargain as a method to 
avoid having to conduct a conventional trial. German law can make use of the bargain in 
such a way, but such an application is not absolutely essential. Rather, negotiations and 
agreements can help to advance and promote the proceedings through any usable aspect. 
This also is evidenced by ss 160b, 202a, 212 StPO, speaking simply of pre-trial 
discussions on the status of the proceedings. The discussions in term of the mentioned 
provisions do not afford to focus on certain essential components. Rather they can deal 
with almost every aspect of the proceedings. 
Consequently, German law is not restrictive concerning the possible content of the 
agreement. There are no mandatory components, although s 257c (2) 3 states that a 
confession should be an integral part of any negotiated agreement.518 The confession is 
the counterpart to the plea of guilty in German law, but itis not a mandatory component 
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either.519 Nevertheless, in the usual bargain procedure, an agreement on the accused’s 
confession is the core of all negotiations. 
b. Further possible content 
Bennun states that it is ‘misleading and simplistic to regard the process of negotiating the 
outcome of a trial as involving no more than the plea and the sentence, which the South 
African legislation seems to imply.’520 A look at a common definition of plea bargaining 
casts light on what negotiations are about. A plea bargain is ‘an exchange of any 
concession, actual or apparent, for a plea of guilty,’ which includes sentence bargaining, 
charge bargaining and ‘implicit’ bargaining.521 One could also speak of ‘fact bargaining’.522 
This explains what is meant by ‘any concession’.523 One can imagine an accused’s interest 
in having certain facts presented in a particular way or in withholding an aggravating 
feature in exchange for a guilty plea.524  
As a criminal trial is a complex process,525 the subject of plea bargaining cannot be 
reduced to the conviction and sentencing.526 Under the practice of plea bargaining a whole 
range of possible outcomes can be negotiated.527 It is nearly impossible to limit the scope 
of the negotiations.528 The actions and activities to be dealt with by way of plea bargaining 
depend on the interests of the parties involved.529 Steyn names various examples:530 
- A plea to the main charge but on the basis of lesser culpability, i.e. admitting dolus 
eventualis as opposed to dolus directus; 
- A withdrawal of charges against co-accused on condition that the other accused 
pleads guilty to the charges; 
- A conditional withdrawal of a charge based on a undertaking by the accused to 
perform certain duties, for example to attend counselling sessions or to do 
community work; 
- A request to the court to dispose of a matter in terms of s 112 (1) (a) as opposed to 
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s 112 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act; 
- The issuing of a notice in terms of s 57A of the Criminal Procedure Act whereby the 
accused can pay an admission of guilt fine with specific conditions for its 
suspension; 
- An undertaking not to seek a sentence of direct imprisonment; 
- An undertaking not to request that the accused would be under ‘house arrest’ as 
opposed to direct imprisonment, an application of s 276(h) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act; 
- An undertaking as to what facts would be revealed to the presiding officer. 
The scope of possible content in Germany is unlimited and consequently negotiations on 
almost every subject are imaginable. Nevertheless, a summary of some principles for 
admissible subjects to plea negotiations in German law is possible. The subject of the 
agreement has to comply with formal and material law. S 257c does not provide for 
unwritten exceptions from the provisions of the StPO.531 Measures and decisions that are 
inadmissible where there are no negotiations or agreements do not suddenly become 
admissible through an agreement. An agreement can only generate admissibility where 
such measures and decisions depend on the consent of the participants. In such cases, 
the agreement contains the parties’ consent to the particular instrument or conduct. S 257c 
(2) 3 provides for inadmissible content. The provision clarifies that the verdict of guilt, as 
well as measures of reform and prevention, are not admissible subjects of a negotiated 
agreement. Furthermore, to mention one of the unwritten examples, the so called 
‘measures of rehabilitation and incapacitation’532 cannot be part of an agreement.533 
Another example for an inadmissible subject would be the driving disqualification order 
described in s 69 of the StGB (Strafgesetzbuch).534 Generally, it can be said that 
prosecution and court cannot agree on a measure or declare to make a particular decision 
if prosecutor or judge is not permitted to act, i.e., if they do not have authority and 
jurisdiction over the subject-matter and territory.535 Finally, the conduct has to be 
objectively justified by legitimate aims. The agreement can only serve the purpose of 
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carrying out appropriate and necessary means.536 
c. Concluding remark 
It can be summed up that in both legal systems the subject of plea bargaining can vary. 
Negotiations traditionally surround the subject of plea and sentence but are not necessarily 
limited to these issues. In South African law an agreement on the fact that the accused will 
plead guilty to a charge and on a certain sentence are essential and mandatory 
components. In German law the scope of possible subjects is entirely free. Even a plea, 
i.e., a confession and/or a sentence agreement under German law, is not mandatory. 
2. Pre-trial agreements 
As indicated before, German provisions provide for so called ‘discussions’ at a pre-trial 
stage in s 160b.537 It should be examined then: whether South African law also provides 
for bargaining at a pre-trial stage; to what extent pre-trial bargaining in general affects the 
further proceedings; and, what can be subject to the bargain outside the main 
proceedings. Inquiries show that in Germany agreements mainly occur outside the main 
proceedings, under exclusion of the public, lay judges and the accused.538 The term ‘pre-
trial agreement’ is not precise with regard to the South African law system. In South Africa 
the plea and sentence agreement results in a trial not being conducted. Some scholars 
thus generally speak of ‘pre-trial negotiations’ to describe negotiations toward an 
agreement, as the agreement terminates the further trial procedure.539 Nevertheless, the 
distinction between pre-trial agreements and agreements in the main proceedings shall be 
upheld. ‘Pre-trial’ can be understood as the stage before the prosecution files a charge 
against the accused. Bennun explains that it was clear from s 105A (1) ‘that, before any 
question of plea and sentence negotiations can possibly arise, there must first be a 
decision to prosecute and a charge accordingly brought against an accused.’540 
Consequently, the stage after the decision to prosecute but before the charge is brought 
against the accused can be named ‘pre-trial’. 
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a. Statutory recognition 
German law acknowledges pre-trial agreements, although the term ‘agreement’ is not 
used. Instead of the term ‘Verständigung’ (understanding, convergence of minds), which is 
used by s 257c StPO for agreements in the main proceeding, pre-trial negotiations are 
called ‘Erörterung’ (discussion) in s 160b StPO. This carefully chosen term reveals the 
concerns of the German legislature. It is intended to avoid the impression of negotiations 
and agreements in a contractual sense. Nevertheless, the provision aims to enhance the 
participants’ ability to discuss the status of the proceedings at the stage of preliminary 
proceedings.541 Such discussions have always been common practice.542 A prohibition of 
such a communication would not be enforceable.543 
In South Africa negotiations and agreements seem to be less considered or even maybe 
less recognized as a pre-trial instrument. Unlike in Germany, there are no explicit 
provisions regulating discussions towards mutual consent at a pre-trial stage. However, 
South African scholars unwittingly touch on the issue. Steyn mentions in passing that plea 
bargaining − with regard to the situation prior to 2001 − once 'lacked formal recognition as 
a pre-trial procedure that fulfilled a specific function in the criminal process'.544 He points 
out that 'prosecutors are in a position to withdraw charges and stop prosecutions without 
any questions being asked by the judiciary as to what informed the decision'.545 Steyn 
makes the personal observation that such prosecutorial discretion in a majority of cases 
was the result of informal plea negotiations or representations that were made by the 
defence to the prosecutor to intervene in this way. This 'informal' practice, in his mind, was 
formalised by s 105A.546 The use of the term 'informal' in this context is thus misleading. 
Whether bargains are formal or informal simply depends on the question of whether they 
comply with existing statutory provisions. What Steyn touches upon instead is the 
distinction between different stages of proceedings, i.e., the pre-trial and trial stages. 
Clearly, the use of the term ‘pre-trial’ oftentimes is used to describe plea bargaining in 
general, as the right to a trial is relinquished by the accused. Nevertheless, Steyn reveals 
that he speaks of the negotiations during the preliminary proceedings when he mentions 
the prosecution’s discretion to steer the proceedings, i.e., to decide whether to initiate or 
stop prosecution. 
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Although pre-trial communication will often prepare for and result in a s 105A bargain 
procedure, such early discussions should not be equated with the usual plea bargain 
procedure before the court. Technically they have to be differentiated, i.e., the pre-trial 
stage has to be viewed separately from the trial and the main proceedings. This is already 
evidenced by the fact that pre-trial negotiations can by themselves lead towards the 
withdrawal of the charges, which makes a plea and sentence agreement superfluous. 
Thus, this stands to disagree with Steyn, who seems to be of the opinion that pre-trial 
negotiations became statutory in South Africa in 2001. As the comparison with Germany 
shows, while the explicit s 160b was inserted into the code along with the s 257c 
regulating the bargain in the main proceedings, such a provision cannot be found in the 
South African law. S 105A obviously does not include pre-trial negotiations. Thus, it can be 
concluded that pre-trial negotiations still are conducted informally due to a lack of 
provisions. This will later be further proven by the presentation of Rodgers’ view.547 
b. Conduct of pre-trial agreements 
The prosecution can initiate pre-trial discussions but is not obliged to do so.548 The 
participants of the pre-trial stage are the same as in the later main trial, except that the 
court does not take part.549 The acting parties of the pre-trial stage obviously include the 
defendant and his legal representative.550 The victim as a complainant can also take part 
in these discussions.551 Oftentimes it will be appropriate to integrate the victim into the 
discussion.552 Witnesses however usually do not participate.553 The requirement that the 
status of the proceedings has to appear suitable to expedite the proceedings – as 
prescribed in s 160b – cannot be overstressed.554 Usually this requirement is fulfilled.555 
Most of the discussion involves the dispensation of the prosecution.556 Possible reasons 
for dispensing prosecution are petty offences (s 153) or a dismissal under conditions and 
instructions that are sufficient to eliminate the public interest in criminal prosecution (s 
153a). Furthermore, the prosecution may discuss the dismissal of insignificant secondary 
penalties (s 154) or may limit the prosecution if individual, severable parts of an offence or 
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some of several violations of law committed arising from the same conduct are not 
particularly significant (s 154a StPO). 
Another purpose is the preparation of a s 257c-agreement in the main proceedings. S 
160b opens the door to sounding out whether the other party is willing to enter into an 
agreement later or to negotiate the possible content at present.557 Discussions can still 
take place after the decision to open the main proceedings has been made. The provision 
of s 202a of the StPO is very similar to s 160b of the StPO. The difference is that, after the 
court’s decision to open the main proceedings, now the court formally initiates discussions. 
The court’s initiation may also be replaced by an initiation of the discussion by the accused 
and his legal representative or the prosecution.558 Other accused in the same trial must be 
informed of the content of the discussion.559 Only if the court plans not to open the main 
proceeding is the initiation of discussion inadmissible. S 202a discussions usually serve 
the function of preparing for a s 257c procedure, including a final agreement. In contrast 
with the s 160b procedure, s 202a discussions cannot enter into the conclusion of an 
agreement. The content of s 202a discussions does not become binding.560 This 
demonstrates the preparatory function of s 202a, i.e., it only prepares for a full s 257c 
agreement at the stage of the deciding whether to open the main proceedings. 
Consequently, a pre-trial agreement that ends the proceedings prior to the trial can only be 
concluded in terms of s 160b. 
There are no formal requirements for pre-trial discussions.561 Usually they are conducted 
orally.562 Not all participants have to be present.563 In accordance with s 160b 2564 of the 
StPO, the essential content of the discussion has to be documented in the prosecution 
file.565 A major difference is that the court is not involved, as with the agreement procedure 
during the main proceedings.566 This must be highlighted due to the fact that in German 
law the judge generally plays a central role throughout the bargain procedure. 
Nevertheless, at a pre-trial stage such involvement of the court is not possible. Thus, the 
discussions can be conducted more liberally and can be free from any conflicting 
intentions the court might have.  
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Another striking difference to the usual bargain procedure during the main proceedings is 
that s 243 (4) StPO is not applicable with regard to s 160b negotiations, i.e., negotiations 
that only have occurred during the pre-trial stage and which have not formally been 
implemented in the main proceedings. This provision describes the course of the main 
proceedings and states that the presiding judge shall declare whether discussions 
pursuant to ss 202a or 212 have taken place. Thus, s 160b negotiations are not disclosed 
in the trial. It can be assumed that informal negotiations, i.e., negotiations that do not 
comply with mandatory formal requirements and that are ‘kept in the dark,’ are associated 
with s 160b StPO. The provision does not set clear borders or requirements for the 
bargain, and oftentimes the parties will not think of the provision when negotiating at the 
early stages of proceedings. As s 160b StPO simply allows these ‘discussions’, parties 
disregard statutory legality in case that they stick to negotiated terms during the 
subsequent trial without disclosing such consent to the court. 
As said before, pre-trial negotiations in South Africa are not regulated by law. 
Consequently, there is no formal bargain procedure that can be presented. Pre-trial 
negotiations in South Africa are instead conducted informally. The application of these 
informal bargains at a pre-trial stage will be presented in the subsequent chapter.567 
c. Related procedure 
Bargaining at a pre-trial stage in both legal systems has been surrounded by provisions 
with consensual elements for a long time. Whereas plea bargaining at the trial-stage had 
not been regulated before the advent of s 105A in 2001 and of s 257c in 2009, provisions 
on, for instance, the consensual dispensation of charges have long been known. This 
particular procedure is regulated by s 153 seqq. of the German StPO. The consensual 
disposal of proceedings at a pre-trial stage is not completely unknown under South African 
law either. Generally, it is within the discretion of the prosecutor to decide which offence 
will be charged and whether the prosecution will proceed.568 For example, a prosecutor 
may charge an accused with a less severe offence, which due to prescribed maximum 
sentences materially affects the ability of the court to sentence the accused.569 The 
prosecutor may consequently accept a plea of guilty to an alternative or lesser charge, as 
contemplated in s 6 of the South African Criminal Procedure Act.570 Isakov and van Zyl 
                                            
567
  Compare Chapter V.3.c. 
568
  South African Law Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) at para 3.1. 
569
  South African Law Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) at para 3.1. 
570
  South African Law Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) at para 3.2. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
74 
 
Smit explain that ‘accordingly the prosecutor may at any stage before the trial accept such 
reduced pleas as he think fit’.571 Also, s 57, providing for an admission of guilt and 
payment of fine without appearance in court, may be used in an arrangement with the 
accused. As these brief examples show, consensual disposal of charges prior to a trial is 
not foreign to the criminal law of either country. Provisions on the disposal of charges 
however do not regulate the mutuality of the bargain. Therefore, they have to be combined 
with agreements which in South Africa due to the lack of provisions are frequently informal. 
d. Concluding remark 
Under German law pre-trial discussions offer a loophole for liberal negotiations that are not 
formally guided by the court. This is an important benefit considering the fact that the 
German judge generally has a powerful and central position and thus dominates the 
conduct of the proceedings. By making use of pre-trial negotiations the parties, i.e., the 
defendant and the prosecutor, are enabled to even more effectively steer the later trial by 
themselves, if they have not already agreed dispense the charges. If negotiations take 
place in preparation for a s 257c-agreement, both the documentation in the prosecution file 
and the negotiated terms, such as the possible renunciation of a further search for 
evidence or the preliminary hearing of witnesses by the prosecutor, will affect the court’s 
view of the case. It has to be kept in mind that the prosecution file is the basis for the court 
to judge on the case. In South Africa, however, pre-trial discussions seem to be out of the 
scope of scholarship and mostly seem to be regarded as a mandatory first step towards a 
s 105A agreement. 
3. Informal agreements 
The term ‘informal agreement’ is used in two ways. One is to describe the practice of plea 
bargaining prior to the advent of statutory provisions such as s 105A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act and s 257c of the StPO. The other refers to negotiations and agreements 
that do not meet – and are not aimed to conform to – the formal requirements of statutory 
bargain provisions. This chapter will focus on the latter meaning of informal negotiations 
and agreements, i.e., the calculated neglect of formal requirements by the parties. Informal 
bargains may be conducted because of various aspects. Aside from examination in the 
context of specific problem areas, a general first approach to informal negotiations and 
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agreements shall be made upfront. 
a. Relevance 
Informal plea bargaining may be of relevance where statutory formal plea bargaining may 
not apply, where it sets insurmountable barriers or simply where it is too time consuming 
because it necessitates a certain formal conduct. De Villers even states that it could be 
argued 'that the only reason why an accused would rather enter into a cumbersome 
section 105A agreement instead of a conventional plea and sentence agreement is 
because the conventional agreement does not bind the court.'572 Some presiding officers 
may still not be willing to make use of s 105A agreements that could be − in the eyes of De 
Villers − easily done away with by means of appropriate legislation.573 De Villers however 
does not further specify this proposal.  
While informal plea bargaining remains possible in South Africa even in light of its statutory 
provisions,574 this is not the case in Germany. The new German law on agreements 
inserted, despite s 257c, the main provision on plea bargaining and several other 
provisions, such as ss 160b, 202a, 212 StPO, that deal with negotiations during the 
preliminary proceedings and the stage of preparation of the main hearing. The statutory 
law in Germany tries to cover negotiations of all kinds at any stage of the criminal 
procedure. S 160b, along with s 202a, describes the difference between formal and 
informal bargaining at a pre-trial stage and the obligation to document the essential 
content of the discussion. Documentation is only mandatory if the outcome of the 
discussion is either positive or negative; it is not necessary if the discussions have not 
dealt with essential aspects.575 The conclusion of an agreement has to be documented in 
detail to prevent dispute over its content at a later time.576 The same applies to an 
agreement that has been concluded with reference to a later agreement in the main 
proceedings.577 Thus, pre-trial ‘informal bargaining’ only needs to be documented in order 
to become formal. Against this background, the BGH recently stated that informal 
agreements that do not meet the requirements of the above mentioned provisions do not 
comply with the criminal procedure and therefore shall be null and void.578 Thus, informal 
bargaining can be assumed to be interdicted after the statutory amendment of the new 
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comprehensive provisions on plea bargaining in 2009.  
In South Africa, however, there may still be a bigger need for informal plea bargaining, 
because – to mention one example contrary to the German provisions – s 105A (1) (a) 
requires in addition to the plea of guilty a sentence agreement. As a result, the formal 
procedure is limited to cases in which the parties at least enter, into a sentence 
agreement, amongst others. It can be assumed that the legislator only intended to regulate 
the sentence agreement procedure.579 As a consequence, all bargaining that is not about 
a sentence agreement has to follow the informal procedure, whereas Germany’s s 257c 
covers all kind of negotiations. Another aspect indicating a need for informal bargaining is 
that formal bargaining is limited to accused that are legally represented. Thus, informal 
bargaining offers opportunities to those who are not represented. Summed up, all bargains 
that do not contain plea and sentence agreements under participation of a legally 
represented accused are informal.580  
An interesting aspect concerning the question of why informal bargains in South Africa 
coexist with statutory provisions lies within the very fundamental differences of the criminal 
procedure in both countries. In an accusatorial system, such as South Africa’s, informal 
negotiations remain admissible because the mutual consent of the accused and the 
prosecutor generally is a significant feature of the proceedings. In a system with 
inquisitorial traditions, such as the German StPO, all parties are bound to the instruments 
and written procedures that more strictly guide the investigation of facts.581 Nevertheless, 
in both legal systems it remains unclear what impact informal negotiations have on the 
trial. It will be examined later whether a court that waives certain formal requirements that 
would otherwise be necessary for a binding formal agreement is bound to its decision to 
waive those requirements due to the principle of fair trial.582 Furthermore, it will be 
presented whether there is a protection against having the court steer a trial and the 
conduct of the accused by making concerted use of informal plea bargaining.583 
b. Preceding of formal procedure 
Informal bargaining applies to the preparation of formal agreements in terms of s 105A or s 
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257c. Oftentimes these preceding negotiations will take place at a pre-trial stage during 
the preliminary investigations. Informal agreements that precede formal procedure will be 
approached here by taking a broad view of the issue.  
Rodgers examines the general difference between formal and informal agreements and 
starts off with the initiation process.584 Directive No. 17 issued by the NDPP provides for 
the manner in which s 105A bargaining is to be initiated.585 The rule states: 'Where it is 
clear that a legal representative of an accused has expressed a firm intention to enter into 
formal negotiations with a view to a s 105A agreement, the prosecutor must request a 
written offer to negotiate (which shall include the accused’s proposals) be submitted to 
him/her at least 14 days before the intended trial date. Where the decision to prosecute is 
that of a Senior Public Prosecutor, the written offer is to be submitted to that Prosecutor 
and the period for submissions may be lengthened particularly where the Senior Public 
Prosecutor is at a centre removed from the court.’ Rodgers holds that this description 
contains the distinction between formal and informal bargain.586 As the Directive provides 
for a very strict and formal initiation process, this procedure is usually predated by a non-
formal communication.587 Directive No. 17 is clear enough that one cannot within reason 
consider a simple communication as a part of the formal procedure.588 Thus, informal 
negotiations usually precede formal negotiations.589 Moreover, the formal negotiations 
offer the prosecution the opportunity to initiate the bargain.590 If the Directive is interpreted 
strictly − which it should be − formal initiation can only be done by the legal representative 
of the accused.591 Rodgers emphasizes that 'the effect of Directive 17 means that 
undertakings made during informal negotiations cannot bind the state until the defence 
requests that formal negotiations commence.'592 Thus, informal agreements can be 
initiated by both sides and formal negotiations only by the defence.593 Rodgers holds that 
her interpretation is also indirectly supported by Du Toit et al. The latter describe that 'it is 
left to the prosecutor (who must have the necessary authorisation) and the accused (who 
must have a legal representative) to initiate the process and find such common ground as 
they can for purposes of a plea and sentence agreement which they can present to the 
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court'.594 Furthermore she refers to Du Toit et al’s statement that 'in practice much will 
depend upon each party's assessment of the probable outcome of the case and the 
bargaining power available to him or her.’595 Under a strict interpretation of Directive 17 
these statements can only be seen as an allusion to informal bargaining.596 The conclusion 
that, once initial and tentative discussions have taken place and the defence has 
expressed an interest, Directive 17 should be followed describes the point in which 
informal procedure leads to formal proceedings.597 Rodgers’s distinction between formal 
and informal negotiations is indeed correct from a descriptive point of view. What Rodgers 
did not state clearly enough is that the distinction between formal and informal is not 
limited to the initiation of the bargain procedure, as she examined the distinction with 
special regard to Directive 17. Nor is the distinction limited to bargaining in the main 
proceedings.598 Moreover, the term ‘informal’ generally can be used to describe 
negotiations and agreements that do not comply with formal requirements.599 One specific 
feature of South African law is that it only provides for statutory law concerning the 
agreement concluded in the main proceedings. Bargaining at the pre-trial stage, or even 
very early in the trial, is not regulated by law. The fact that South African law does not 
contain explicit pre-trial provisions besides s 105A, regulating plea bargaining with regard 
to the trial, could be a reason why the general distinction between formal and informal 
might appear to the South African reader to be less significant than the distinction between 
procedures that comply with s 105A and those that do not. To speak of informal 
agreements only in the sense of agreements that do not conform to s 105A ignores that, in 
additon to this application, there is a second main field of application under South African 
law: the pre-trial stage. 
German law, however, with s 160b for the preliminary proceedings and s 202a, 212 for the 
stage of discussion whether to open the main proceedings, provides for provisions on 
bargaining at the pre-trial stage.600 The German legislature tried to regulate bargaining in 
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all forms and at all stages. Informal plea bargaining therefore is inadmissible. Nonetheless, 
there will always be informal bargaining at a pre-trial stage if the prosecution does not 
document successful or unsuccessful negotiations in the prosecution file (because the 
documentation makes the negotiations formal). However, as the documentation is the only 
prerequisite for formal pre-trial bargaining, there may occur informal bargaining due to 
carelessness with regard to this obligation. But there is no need for these informal 
bargains in order to circumvent certain requirements or limitations. These informal 
preparatory negotiations occur naturally. 
Discussions in terms of s 202a (which other than s 160b-discussions take place after the 
decision of the court to open the main proceedings) are preparatory negotiations towards 
an s 257c-agreement and therefore do not bind the court. 601 Without violating the agreed 
outcome of the preparatory discussions the court may deviate from the bespoken content. 
The court may only have the duty to indicate its deviation.602 This is a major distinction to 
the bargaining in terms of s 160b, which allows the conclusion of an enforceable 
agreement that binds the parties.603 
c. Strictly informal bargains 
In addition to the function of informal bargain as a forerunner of formal plea and sentence 
bargains, there is a field of application in which informal bargaining does not serve the 
function of arranging later formal procedure. Such bargaining is instead intended to remain 
informal throughout the whole proceedings and thus is used as an unofficial and hidden 
means. What shall be named a ‘strictly informal’ bargain can occur at the pre-trial stage or 
during the main proceedings. It is the consequent conduct of bargain in an informal 
manner. Steyn for instance states that her ‘personal experience suggests that the exercise 
of such prosecutorial discretion in a majority of cases is a result of informal plea 
negotiations or representations that are made by the defence to the prosecutor to 
intervene in his way.’604 De Villers holds that it was foreseeable that undefended accused 
will make use of the informal system of plea bargaining where there is less supervision 
than with the section 105A procedure.605 Thus there are fields of application for a strictly 
informal bargain procedure both at a pre-trial stage as well as an alternative to s 105A-
procedure. It is best to recall that in Germany it is assumed that with the new statutory 
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provisions on plea bargaining there is no room left for informal bargaining. Nevertheless, 
there will always be a tendency not to use mandatory procedural instruments that may 
even act, especially in case of pre-trial negotiations in terms of s 160b, simply to 
circumvent obligatory documentation requirements. On the other hand, in South Africa 
statutory plea bargaining is not considered the only admissible way to plea bargain. 
Although provisions on plea bargaining have been inserted in the South African criminal 
procedure, informal bargaining remains possible. As said before, the motivation to make 
use of these instruments might be even greater due to the fact that South African law sets 
up stricter requirements concerning, for instance, their admissible content. 
A recent BGH case illustrates the refusal to use formal procedure.606 In a case before the 
BGH, the court had entered into negotiations during the preparation stage the trial and had 
announced that a suspension of the sentence could possibly be allowed in return for the 
confessions already given. The court recorded that the negotiations did not result in an 
agreement under s 257c. Later, the court imposed a custodial sentence that was not 
suspended. The BGH dismissed the remedy against this decision. Meyer considers this an 
abuse of the only apparent distinction between formal agreements that met the standard of 
ss 202a, 257c of the StPO and informal agreements.607 He states further that the BGH 
violates the principle of a fair trial contained in Article 6 of the ECHR and the 
corresponding trust of the accused in a certain conduct of the court. This raises the 
question of which rules courts are bound to in informal negotiations. This is especialy 
relevant for German law, as the court according to s 257c (1) 1 has the right to initiate and 
lead through the negotiations, which it has not in South African law, s 105A (3) CPA. 
Should the court be allowed to negotiate and at the same time indicate a certain conduct, it 
is not bound if the judge simply formally declares that a s 257c - agreement has not been 
settled. As this question refers to a great extent to the question whether agreements bind 
or not, this shall be examined later.608 
d. Accidental informal procedure 
A third category concerns cases in which the court or the parties unwittingly fail to fulfil 
formal requirements. In contrast with the preceding category, informal procedure is not 
intentionally used as an alternative to the formal procedure. If the participants fail to 
conform to certain requirements, they will nonetheless have a shared interest to proceed in 
                                            
606
  BGH court order of 4 August 2010 − 2 StR 205/10 = (2011) NStZ 107. 
607
  Meyer (2011) HRRS 17 at 17. 
608
  Compare Chapter V.9.b. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
81 
 
the regular way. Thus, the issue is of less relevance because it can be assumed that the 
parties will not challenge the outcome of their wrongful negotiation. An example of 
accidental informal procedure is the case where a German prosecutor conducts 
negotiations and enters into an agreement with the accused on the further proceedings but 
later accidently fails to record the fact that negotiations and the parties’ agreement. In most 
cases, however, the record will be incomplete or too short, which will render as wrongful 
conduct a nevertheless formal bargain procedure. 
e. Legal consequences 
It is a key issue whether informal agreement procedure have an enforceable outcome, i.e., 
whether they bind the court or at least determine a particular conduct based on the 
principle of a fair trial. It can be said that informal agreements in both legal systems do not 
formally bind the court. 609 As informal agreements generally do not bind the court, this 
raises the question of how informal procedural actions affect the conduct of the trial. A 
binding effect, even though not formally acknowledged, may arise out of the principle of a 
fair trial. This will be further examined in the corresponding chapter which deals with the 
binding effect of agreements.610 
Another striking difference in the legal consequences is that informal bargains in South 
Africa do not replace the conventional trial procedure as the parties do not enter into a 
written agreement with an annexure that terminates the trial. In Germany on the other 
hand formal bargaining is marked only by the documentation of the bargain and a ‘few’ 
requirements that have to be fulfilled. The bargain procedure, apart from the 
documentation duties, is very similar, regardless of whether it is informal. Consequently, 
informal bargaining in South Africa is more of an alternative procedure which follows its 
own rules than in Germany. 
f. Concluding remark 
It can be summarized at this point that informal procedure in Germany is generally 
inadmissible, while in South Africa it is admissible. In practice, however, informal bargains 
also occur in Germany.  
There are two major functions of the informal bargain. One is to serve as an alternative 
procedure that does restricted by the requirements of formal plea bargaining which the 
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participants may wish to avoid. An example is the aspect of bargains that exceptionally do 
not contain an agreement on the sentence, (which South African law does strictly require) 
but instead are solitary deals with certain procedural steps. Another example would be an 
agreement in which the accused consents to a confession in exchange for the prosecution 
sparing certain family members from having to testify. The other major field of application 
of informal bargaining is the pre-trial stage. The actual state of legislation is presented in 
the following table. 
Feature South Africa Germany 
S
ta
g
e
 
Pre-trial Informal Formal 
(s 160b, 202a) 
Informal inadmissble 
Main proceedings Formal 
(s 105A) 
Informal admissible 
Formal 
(s 257c) 
Informal inadmissible 
S
u
b
je
c
t 
Sentence and plea 
related 
Formal Formal 
Not sentence and 
plea related 
Informal Formal 
4. Public trial before an ordinary court 
The right to a public trial is an essential constitutional principle both in South Africa and 
Germany. As plea bargaining mainly takes place between the accused and the 
prosecution, the principle that a trial has to be conducted in public could be violated. 
Usually only the trial is under public surveillance. Plea bargaining in South Africa replaces 
a trial; in Germany it significantly shortens it. Usually negotiations towards an agreement 
are conducted in camera outside the courtroom, which raises concerns.611 Already the pre-
statutory decision of BGHSt 43, 195 – motivated by broad criticism − stated in its first 
guiding principle that the bargain is to be conducted in a public trial, i.e., during the main 
hearing, and that this however does not exclude preliminary talks.612 Interestingly, the 
SARLC also observed that the public’s attitude toward agreements is one of suspicion and 
thus admitted that secret negotiations have a grave impact on the image of the 
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administration in justice.613 Nonetheless, the SALRC considered this argument to be ‘ill-
conceived’ if the process was properly regulated.614 The secrecy would be removed 
through the courts approval of the agreement.615 Furthermore, it would be unrealistic and 
unattainable to fully conduct an open trial.616 One could question if the abovementioned 
safeguards indeed have been installed with the statutory provisions as proposed by the 
SALRC and furthermore if a full performance of the bargain in the main proceedings as 
assumed in German law is realistic. 
a. Public trial and ordinary court 
The principle of a public trial and the right to be tried before an ordinary court shall be 
further examined. Directive 2 of the Directives issued by the National Director of the Public 
Prosecutions on 14 March 2002 states that ‘the demands of justice and/or the public 
interest’ shall not be sacrificed when utilizing the s 105A procedure. S 35 (3) (c) of the Bill 
of Rights states that an accused’s right to a fair trial includes the right ‘to a public trial 
before an ordinary court’.617 This right not only matters to the accused but also serves 
public interests. It is in the public interest that criminal justice is not been done behind 
closed doors.618 S 35 (3) (c) aims to guard against the iniquities of secret trials and is 
destined to contribute to public confidence in the justice system.619 A public trial is one that 
is open to the public and one that the media can report on.620 Although there are a number 
of statutory exceptions from this rule, such as for example s 153 (circumstances in which 
criminal proceedings shall not take place in open court.) and s 154 (prohibition of 
publication of certain information relating to criminal proceedings), s 105A does not 
provide for one. Although the public trial is not explicitly mentioned in the German 
Constitution, it is enshrined in the rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) in the terms of 
constitutional Article 20 (3) of the GG, Article 6 (1) 1 of the ECHR and explicitly in s 169 of 
the GVG of the legislation. 
‘Ordinary court’ does not only mean that an accused is tried in a court that is ‘previously 
established by law’ and which applies ‘duly established procedures’.621 Indeed, the term 
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‘ordinary court’ also tends to protect the accused from abuse by the executive to harm 
judicial independence and impartiality.622 These rights are secured by s 185 of the 
Constitution, outside the Bill of Rights.623 Plea bargaining may imply implications with 
these principles. 
b. Protection of the accused’s interests 
The principle of a public trial has a ‘passive’ and an ‘active’ component. The passive 
feature is that the public participates in criminal trials and by that means controls the 
criminal justice system. The active feature is that the accused has a right to be placed 
before an ordinary court and that the trial is held in public. The latter component shall be 
briefly examined.  
It is questionable in which way this constitutional right of the accused is secured 
throughout the plea bargaining procedure. Msimang J, in the S v Armugga case on 
defining the term plea bargaining, amongst other statements held that ‘the accused (is) 
bargaining away his right to go to trial’.624 Bennun explains to the point that ‘bargaining 
away the right’ can only be in reference to the accused’s constitutional rights. The accused 
would not be free to waive the right to a public trial, on the other hand, because in that 
case the public interest could be defied at will by the accused’.625 Bennun furthermore 
raises the question of ‘whether an accused has the right to use s 105A to secure a trial 
conducted in such a manner that evidence which would otherwise have been in the public 
domain does not reach it.’626 Indeed, the effect of an agreement ‘is to change greatly what 
the public may learn about a case from what would have emerged had there been no such 
agreement.’627 Thus, plea bargaining can offer the accused the opportunity to protect 
himself from unwelcomed public attention, which especially well-known personalities may 
appreciate. Whether the public interest opposes such conduct will be examined in the 
subsequent section. 
Although there are benefits for the accused, it should not be lost out of sight that the 
accused may be pressured to consent to deviate from the conventional trial procedure by 
means of the offer of a chance to receive a lenient sentence. Experience shows that plea 
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bargaining usually results in such a reduction and can even be considered as an essential 
part of the bargain.628 Consequently, the accused might fear losing the benefit of such a 
reduction if he refuses an offer to negotiate. If he agrees to negotiations under such 
circumstances, the accused might also lose the relief of being proved not guilty in a public 
trial or of presenting to the public the uncertainties of the case. 
c. Protection of public interests 
As presented earlier, the accused waiving his right to a public trial also affects public 
interests. One could therefore ask whether it would be in the public interest to allow an 
accused to waive the right to a public trial before an ordinary court, as mentioned in s 35 
(3) (c) of the Constitution, without considering the motives for the waiver.629 On the other 
hand, it is hard to imagine a procedure in which the accused would have to state his 
motives for the agreement. Thus, abuse of the bargain procedure possibly only is achieved 
by reliable legislation and a well-functioning internal control of the prosecution.630 
Consequently, it is not within the public’s discretion whether the accused waives his right 
to a public trial and enters into an agreement.  
The following remarks will confirm that it is the accused’s free decision whether to 
negotiate. Furthermore, the public elements of the plea bargaining procedure will be 
revealed. The first point to state is that s 105A CPA does not contain any restrictions 
intended to exclude certain cases from bargaining due to the public interest in a public 
trial. S 105A (2) (a) sets up the requirement that the accused must be informed of certain 
procedural rights at a pre-agreement stage. These rights are the right to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the right to remain silent and not to 
testify during the proceedings and the right not to be compelled to give self-incriminating 
evidence.631 The right to a public trial before an ordinary court does not form part of the 
information that has to be given to the accused. One reason could be that the legislature 
regarded a properly concluded agreement under s 105A not to stand in the way of a public 
trial before an ordinary court.632 This raises the question of to what extent plea bargaining 
still can be considered a ‘public’ trial, i.e., to what extent statutory plea bargaining secures 
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the public interest.633 Another question would be how abuse, i.e., ‘behind closed doors’ 
trials, can be avoided. The trial can still be considered ‘public’ due to s 105A (2) (b). The 
section contains the requirement that the factual basis of the plea and sentence 
agreement be set out fully, i.e., that the agreements ‘state fully the terms of the agreement, 
the substantial facts of the matter, all other facts relevant to the sentence agreement and 
any admission made by the accused.’634 This requirement is regarded to be of crucial 
importance due to the fact that a conventional trial will not take place.635 Bennun 
contrariwise puts into question whether compliance with the mentioned provisions already 
guarantees the trial to be ‘public’.636 The substantial facts would not include some 
information about the key witnesses and how their potential testimony is to be judged.637 
Indeed, the written agreement does not state anything about these judgments. Thus, there 
is no opportunity to form for oneself a picture of the substance of these facts, i.e., whether 
they are true or not. To emphasize it once again, the main problem is that the written 
agreements do not reveal the court’s view on the case other related thoughts and 
concerns. Furthermore, Bennun is right when he asks if these are not matters ‘in which the 
public might have a legitimate interest and, if they are, who would have the locus standi to 
porsue the matter – and by which procedure?’638 
A focus on the German Law at this point could be worthwhile. The right to a ‘public trial’ 
has always been an issue of outstanding significance.639 
German s 169 of the Courts Constitution Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, GVG) 
guarantees the right to a public trial. Thereafter the hearing before the adjudicating court, 
including the pronouncement of judgments and rulings, shall be public.640 A violation of 
that rule forms a so called ‘Absolute Ground for Appeal on Law,’ which means that the 
appeal in any case will be successful. S 338 No. 6 StPO, which enumerates all absolute 
grounds, explicitly mentions ‘the provisions concerning the public nature of the 
proceedings’. Already the pre-statutory BGH case law provided for the rule that 
negotiations toward an agreement have to take place in public main hearings and that all 
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participants of the trial have to be present.641 The decision was motivated on the following 
grounds. BGH stated that one of the greatest concerns that put the admissibility of 
agreements into doubt was the fact that they oftentimes were negotiated outside the main 
proceedings and the main hearing.642 In the eyes of the BGH the publicity of the trial as 
written in s 169 of the GVG was violated.643 The requirement that the trial be public is seen 
as one of the most fundamental institutions of the rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip).644 It 
serves not only to provide the public information but also as a means to control the justice 
system. Hence this ought to amount to trust in the courts. Control requires an insight into 
the essential course and the results of the main hearing.645 The BGH in 1997 thus 
considered these principles to be violated by the agreement practice in Germany at that 
time. To make sure that the trial remains public, BGH set up the following requirement. 
Introductory discussions outside the main hearing shall be principally admissible.646 But 
the court is required to expose the essential content of the negotiations and the outcome 
of the bargain in the main proceedings.647 
Statutory law adopted these case law principles. First, as already shown earlier, s 243 (4) 
StPO, describing the main hearing, states that the presiding judge shall state: whether 
negotiations at a preliminary stage have taken place, whether their subject matter had 
been the possibility of a negotiated agreement (s 257c) and, if so, their essential content. 
By the terms of s 243 (4), this duty shall also attach in the further course of the main 
hearing, insofar as changes have occurred in regard to the information given at the 
commencement of the main hearing. Second, s 273 on the record contains subsection 
(1a), inserted by the new law on agreements in 2009, which states that the record must 
also indicate, in essence, the course and content as well as the outcome of a negotiated 
agreement pursuant to s 257c. Furthermore, it states that the same shall apply to the 
observance of the information and instruction requirements set out in s 243 (4), s 257c (4) 
4 and s 257c (5). Finally, the provision stipulates that, if no agreement was negotiated, this 
shall also be noted in the record. Pre-trial negations also have to be filed in terms of ss 
160b and 202a. To sum it up, German law only provides for formal requirements 
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concerning the fact that negotiations have taken place and concerning their essential 
conduct. Although s 257 (2) 2 assures that the obligation to establish the truth as codified 
in s 244 (2) of the StPO remains unaffected, which means that the judge still has the duty 
to investigate and clear up the substantial facts of the matter.648 These investigations do 
not take place in the main hearing.649 There is no statutory duty to discuss these matters in 
public. The fact that an agreement has been concluded is only taken down in the final 
judgement in terms of s 267 (3) 5. The judement does not have to state the content of the 
bargain.650 This cannot serve the interest in a public trial, because the judgment stands at 
the end of the trial and frequently does not give any detailed information of the bargain 
procedure. Against this background the aim of preventing the court and the other 
participants from negotiating in the dark is not fulfilled under the use of a public trial. Actual 
case law only states that negotiations that have not been reduced to the court record in 
terms of s 273 (1a) do not bind the court.651 This is a protection against a complete 
concealment of the negotiations. It can be summed up that the procedure established to 
guarantee public information in Germany are rules on how the bargain has to be filed, on 
which components have to be mentioned in the court record and on the obligation to 
present the essential content of the agreement in the main proceedings. In South Africa 
the documentation of a written agreement is intended to declare what has been subject to 
negotiations. These aspects are the public components of plea bargaining. 
d. Public control 
It could be argued that the participation of lay judges would solve the problems of deficient 
information and especially of control by the public. As plea bargaining mainly occurs off the 
record, this might even be the central means by which to guarantee public control.652 But 
the role of lay judges is rather minimal.653 Lay judges usually first hear about the fact that 
negotiations have been concluded in the trial itself, not during the stage of preparing the 
trial or even before. This is because in German law they are not empanelled until the main 
proceedings begin.654 Furthermore, unlike the professional judge they are not entitled to 
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review the case file. 655 Not all professional judges extensively discuss the issue with their 
lay judges but rather ask for their consent. 656 Consequently, the lay judge’s influence is 
weak. 
Having examined the lay judges and shifting back to the public’s view, one could argue 
that the essential public interest in a ‘public trial’ however lies in a continuous report and 
full information about the process as it is conducted and on the court’s finding on important 
issues, such as the essential witnesses and their testimonies. This material duty that is 
also anchored in the obligation to establish the truth657 under German law, is not secured 
by formal requirements guaranteeing control by the public. Thus, the current state of 
legislation is comparable to the situation in South Africa. The public is neither given a 
satisfactory insight into the bargain procedure nor is provided a procedure by which to 
pursue matters that do not seem to comply with public interests in the case. However, one 
has to ask whether the public had such power in a conventional trial. In the conventional 
trial the public may enter into the courtroom and attend the trial. Procedural powers to 
steer the trial or review the judgment are not provided for. This task is fulfilled by the State. 
Even if assumed that the principle of a public trial is violated by the present regulations on 
plea bargaining in both countries, it must be asked whether the violation can be justified. A 
violation of constitutional principles is not always unlawful. The right to a public trial is 
limited where there are justified exceptions in terms of the limitation clause.658 A drawback 
of the principle of a public trial is imaginable for instance where available courtrooms are 
limited.659 Nevertheless, control through the public has to be upheld under all 
circumstances.660 Even if public attention is restricted, substantial control must be granted. 
A lack of public participation is certain because the agreement in South Africa and the 
court record in Germany only give a summary of substantial facts without going into further 
detail. But on the other hand, the legitimacy of the public’s interest should not be 
overrated. It is paramount that the public is acknowledged of the fact that a case has been 
bargained.  
The details of the agreement − for instance Bennun mentions the indication of witnesses 
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and the nature of their testimonies661 − are desirable, but not mandatory, components of 
the bargain procedure. This will be explained and justified as follows. First, in an 
accusatorial system such as South Africa’s, it is easier to explain why the public is partly 
excluded from criminal proceedings and only informed by way of a summary. The 
opposing parties are free to bargain out the factual bases of the case and to agree upon 
which evidence shall be presented. The responsibility for proof of guilt lies upon the parties 
and not the judge. Thus, it is in terms of an accusatorial thinking explainable why there has 
been established a procedure that to a great extent leaves out the public. The prosecutor 
that is involved in the bargain is indirectly controlled by the public. He needs a written 
authorisation by the NDPP, and the state administration generally has to justify its actions. 
Apart from that the legality of the process is warranted by inquisitorial elements, such as 
the court’s s 105A (4) obligation to satisfy itself that certain requirements of s 105A (1) (b) 
(i) and (iii) have been met. The latter sections contain formal requirements. The 
substantive requirements as contemplated in s 105A (1) (b) (ii), i.e., the nature of and 
circumstances relating to the offence, personal circumstances of the accused, any 
previous convictions of the accused and most importantly interests of the community, are 
within the responsibility of the prosecution, which on the bases of these features must 
initially decide whether to enter into negotiations. As said before, the prosecution has to be 
controlled by the public.662 Thus, one can conclude that although public participation is 
weak, the principle of a public trial is still warranted. 
In German law, as it comes from the inquisitorial tradition, it is argued that the principle of 
a public trial is not violated by the implementation of s 257c of StPO. Generally what is 
subject to a trial can be determined neither by the defence nor the prosecution. 
Inquisitorial principles afford that the court fully investigates a case and bases his 
conviction on findings of fact and on the guilt of the accused. However, there already exist 
procedures in German Criminal Procedure law that make an exception from these strict 
principles, for instance the possibility of a penal order. S 407 seqq. of the StPO provides a 
special type of procedure. S 407 (1) of the StPO states that, in proceedings before the 
criminal court judge and in proceedings within the jurisdiction of a court with lay judges, the 
legal consequences of the offence may, in the case of misdemeanours, be imposed, after 
written application by the public prosecution office, in a written penal order without a main 
hearing. Where objections to the penal order are not lodged in time the order shall in terms 
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of s 410 (3) StPO be equivalent to a judgment that has entered into force. As s 409 rules, 
the penal order requires very minimum content, amongst other things an enumeration of 
the evidence and legal consequences. The penal order does not reveal the court’s or the 
prosecution’s judgment of details. Even then, the court does not need to be convinced of 
the guilt of the accused; it is satisfactory that the court finds ‘sufficient grounds for 
suspicions.’663 This example reveals that established procedures, such as the penal order, 
limit the public’s participation with regard to the details of a conviction. Thus, one cannot 
conclude that a judgment following an orally concluded agreement − which usually only 
contains mere and formal statement with regard to the bargain procedure − necessarily 
violates public interests. Furthermore, it would be contradictory to allow adversarial 
elements to be adopted and at the same time to insist on strict inquisitorial principles which 
may very well include an extensive public participation.  
e. Concluding remark 
Regarding the aspect of a ‘public trial,’ neither legal system offers attractive instruments 
aimed at guaranteeing comprehensive public participation. That the accused may, out of 
selfish motives, waive his right to stand before the bench in public is accurate. It is the 
accused’s decision to shorten his own trial and spare himself from a lengthy procedure. In 
both legal systems the public’s interest is guaranteed by inquisitorial elements which 
require the court to check compliance of several requirements and report substantial facts 
of the matter, as well as of the procedure and a prosecution that is controlled by the public. 
Even if an extensive discussion and report of substantial facts regarding a plea bargained 
case may be desirable, neither country’s laws provide for such a requirement: not through 
legislative nor through constitutional demands. Furthermore, one would have to ask which 
procedure should be made available to the public in order to control plea bargaining.664 
Even in a conventional trial the public’s participation is limited to information. 
Consequently, both the German court record and the South African written agreement, 
each containing the outlines and the content on the plea bargain, have to be regarded as 
sufficient. 
5. Victim participation 
The issue of victim participation at first glance seems to embrace nothing but the interest 
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of those violated by an offence. In fact, the victim’s procedural power and position may 
also serve the public interest and could also help ensure that justice is served. In that 
specific aspect the participation of the victim relates to the topic discussed before, which is 
that victim participation should neither be viewed as an equivalent to nor as entirely 
separate from public participation. 665 The main difference, however, is that public 
participation concerns the public in general while victim participation is aimed at a specific 
group of people.666 Victim participation forms part of the German as well as of the South 
African provisions, which both recognise the interest of the victim in a formal way. 
Nevertheless, the victim’s role in the process remains formal in that the victim is not given 
the power to effectually influence the outcome of the plea bargaining procedure, as will be 
shown. 
a. Interests 
In his 1996 article Bekker points to three main interests that necessitate victim 
participation. First, he mentioned the victim’s financial interest in restitution being imposed 
as part of the sentence.667 Where there is a case bargain the aim is to ensure that the 
defendant pleads sufficiently seriously so to allow restitution; in case of sentence bargain 
the aim is to promote an award of restitution.668 Second, Bekker emphasizes the victim’s 
interest of revenge that can occur as one amongst other broader interests.669 Participation 
secures the victim’s feeling that the violation led to a severe punishment.670 Third, Bekker 
indicates society’s interest in giving the victim a right to participate in the plea bargain.671 
Society benefits from victim participation in that more information is provided to the 
decision maker. At the same time it endorses the effective functioning of the criminal 
justice system.672 The theory behind this view is that the consulted victim does not feel 
irrelevant and alienated and as a result is motivated to continue to report crime and 
cooperate in its investigation and prosecution.673 The victim’s participation could also help 
counteract the notion that bargaining serves only the interests of the accused.674 Society's 
interests exist parallel to the personal interests of the victim. Its participation lends 
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legitimacy and credibility to the process and furthermore enhances transparency.675 To 
sum up, it can be safely argued that the purpose of victim participation exceeds pure victim 
satisfaction and that victim participation serves public interests. 
The benefit of plea bargaining for the victim is widely considered to be the fact that it will 
not suffer the trauma of being exposed to secondary victimisation in court.676 The victim is 
spared from having to testify. This argument should not be generalized.677 How important 
the victim’s protection is throughout the process depends on several factors. There is for 
example the question of whether the victim is relatively young and/or whether victims of 
certain offences such as murder or rape are concerned.678 The degree to which the victim 
is affected always depends on individual characteristics of the offence and of the victim.679 
One could potentially doubt if there was indeed a profound benefit for the victim. A first hint 
to this assumption is an actual enquiry of lawyers in Germany. According to 59.5 % of the 
interviewees the victim never initiates the agreement procedure; 32.7% stated that this 
happens seldomly.680 For a better understanding of how solid the victim’s position actually 
is, it has to be taken a look at the procedural rights. 
b. Procedural participation 
S 105A (1) (b) (iii) of the South African Crimininal Procedure Act contains the prosecutor’s 
duty to afford the complainant or his representative the opportunity to make 
representations. It is one of the few provisions in South African criminal procedure that 
‘recognises the interests of the victim in a formal way’.681 It can be held that the provision 
accentuates the importance of victim participation.682 The requirement is confined by 
cases ‘where it is reasonable to do so and taking into account the nature of any 
circumstances relating to the offence and the interests of the complainant‘.683 Directive 11 
issued by the NDPP states that, in the case of a homicide, the relatives of the victim are to 
be consulted. According to Directive 10 a person in loco parentis is to be consulted in the 
event that the victim is a child under the age of 18.  
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S 105A (1) (b) does not state how the fulfilment of the requirement of the asking of the 
accused shall be indicated to court.684 In S v Sassin & others the participants gave 
affidavits confirming that s 105A (1) (b) had been satisfied.685 Watney recommends 
adopting this method if the complainant or another party does not agree to the terms of the 
agreement.686 It is however not required that effect should be given in the agreement to 
the complainant's representations.687 The prosecution is not bound by these 
representations, which means that the prosecutor is entitled to proceed with an agreement 
without adhering to the requests of the complainant.688 As a result the complainant who 
does not agree with the terms of the agreement is only able to announce disagreement in 
a formal way, i.e., without a profound impact on the further proceedings.689 Watney 
however holds that ‘the representations of the complainant (whether complied with by the 
prosecution or not) might be a factor the court may consider to determine whether the 
sentence agreement is just.’690  
It must also be highlighted that the victim’s participation does not depend on the formal 
invitation by the prosecutor. The complainant or his representative is entitled to make 
representations which the prosecutor should not ignore.691 This right of the accused serves 
an important function as it cultivates or strengthens society’s acceptance of plea and 
sentence agreements as a method of avoiding a traditional adversarial trial.692 
German law gives the victim a comparable set of rights to those descibed above. S 257c 
(3) 3 of the StPO states that the participants shall be given the opportunity to make 
submissions. The submissions are made in the main hearing before the court. The 
question is how a protest of the victim should be documented. S 243 (4) 3 only provides 
that the judge in the main proceedings shall announce the fact that a negotiated 
agreement has been entered into and describe its essential content. The reasons for the 
judgment in terms of s 267 (3) 5 only contain the fact that an agreement has been settled. 
The content or conduct does not need to be indicated.693 The general duty to document 
certain facts in the court record is regulated by s 273. The German court record thereafter 
only has to contain the ‘essential formalities’. As submissions are neither compulsory for 
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  Watney 2006 TSAR 224 at 226. 
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  S v Sassin & others 2003 (4) All SA 506 (NC) at 509. 
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  Watney 2006 TSAR 224 at 226. 
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  Watney 2006 TSAR 224 at 226. 
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  Watney 2006 TSAR 224 at 226. 
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  Watney 2006 TSAR 224 at 226. 
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  Watney 2006 TSAR 224 at 226. 
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  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-13. 
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  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-13. 
693
  BGH (2010) NStZ 348; (2011) NStZ 170. 
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the complainant to make nor do they affect the trial, they cannot be interpreted as 
procedural statements. Statements that have to be documented usually have to cause a 
particular legal consequence. Thus, it can be assumed that the submissions are not filed in 
the court record. Their lack of direct relevance opposes their qualification as an essential 
formality. Consequently, the victim’s submissions are only expressed orally or as a written 
statement in the court file and thus can only influence the actual proceedings, i.e., the 
attitude of the judge and the other participants towards the case. They cannot effectively 
influence the preceding bargain. Due to this lack of documentation, submissions have no 
further impact on the trial. Thus, it can be summed up that, although victim participation 
generally plays a more important role than in other jurisdictions, German law does not 
provide for an influence over the negotiations or consultation of victims before an 
agreement is reached.694 
Looking at the two pieces of legislation, it will be noticed that in both of them the victim’s 
participation is the sole formal right that cannot bind the prosecution or court. It hence 
serves only an advisory function. Du Toit et al’s statement that the process of plea 
bargaining provides for victim participation where possible, consequently must be 
opposed.695 The victim’s position in fact is weak. 
c. Informal agreements 
The victim’s participation in the process differs fundamentally between pre-statutory and 
statutory plea bargaining.696 Concerning the time of pre-stratutory barganinig in South 
Afirca, it remains in the dark whether victims actually participated in such negotiations 
towards an agreement at all and if so, to what extent they were able to influence the 
conduct of the negotiations.697 Rodgers describes that traditionally there were no formal or 
recognised rights in the process of plea negotiations698 and states that, by contrast, the 
new statutory law makes provisions for victim participation.699 What is also very interesting 
to examine is how victims’ rights relate to present informal plea bargaining in the sense 
that the bargain does not follow formal requirements of the statutory provisions on 
agreements.700 Very little is known, however, about if and how victims take part in these 
informal, even secret and invisible, negotiations. It can be argued that in informal 
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  Compare Turner/Chodosh, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, p. 105; stated in comparison to the USA. 
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  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-8. 
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agreements the prosecutor is not obliged to consider the victim’s participation and that 
there is no court scrutiny as to the reasons for excluding the victim.701 Under German law, 
informal bargaining is generally inadmissible, which is why there will not be victim 
participation either. Rodgers sums up that ‘victims in informal agreements are treated 
differently from victims in statutory agreements’ and that this differentiation is unlikely to 
withstand a constitutional challenge.’702 Although in South Africa a general rule on the 
complainant’s rights such as the German s 397 does not exist, the general rule of law 
affords that the victim is at least given the opportunity to make representations even 
though the bargain is conducted informally. This is why Rodgers’s view that an obligation 
to consider victim participation would not exist should be opposed.703 The prosecutor might 
not in each and every case be obliged to consult the victim, but in cases of heavier 
violations participation of the victim has to be considered. 
d. Active rights 
Steyn is of the opinion that s 105A could be interpreted in the sense that a victim has the 
right to request that the matter should go to trial in cases where they elect to find closure 
by way of the trial process.704 However, neither South African nor German law provides for 
such a right. 
Besides the requirement of the formal procedure that the victim has to be asked to make 
submissions, as shown above, German criminal procedure also provides for rights of the 
victim that enable the victim to steer the outcome of the trial and to secure constitutional 
rights. The complainant’s procedural position under German law is enshrined in s 397 (1) 
which states: ‘The complainant705 shall be entitled to be present at the main hearing even 
if he is to be examined as a witness. (...) The complainant shall also be entitled to 
challenge a judge (s 24 and 31) or an expert (s 74), to ask questions (s 240 (2)), to object 
to orders by the presiding judge (s 238 (2)) and to object to questions (s 242), to apply for 
evidence to be taken (s 244 s (3) to (6)), and to make statements (s 257 and 258). Unless 
otherwise provided by law, he shall be called in and heard to the same extent as the public 
prosecution office. (...).’ Especially the latter mentioned sentence raises questions. The 
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  Rodgers (2010) SACJ 239 at 258 in footnote 17. 
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  Rodgers (2010) SACJ 239 at 258 in footnote 17. 
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  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 213. 
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  The translation of s 397 StPO by the German Federal Ministry of Justice in cooperation with juris 
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position of the defendant is equated to that of the prosecution. The various rights of the 
complainant shall guarantee that he controls the court and ensures a proper application of 
the court’s obligation to establish the truth by the terms of s 244 (2).706 In general the 
complainant holds, for instance, the means to apply for further evidence to be taken. In the 
plea bargaining procedure the appreciable possibilities of the complainant to exert 
influence are drastically curtailed. The statement in s 257c (1) 2 that s 244 (2) remained 
unaffected has already been marked as a ‘lie’ by some scholars.707 The bargain procedure 
undercuts established rules on fact-finding and evidence-taking. This shortening of the 
fact-finding and evidence-taking is however the very essence of the bargain procedure. 
Consequently, the legislature’s intent to provide the complainant with a comprehensive 
means of influencing the search for truth grasps at thin air. 
The agreement also does not afford the complainant’s acceptance,708 nor does the 
complainant’s disagreement avoid the formation of the agreement.709 There is no power to 
veto upon the conclusion of an agreement.710 Böttcher remarks that, especially in cases in 
which the accused committed the offence of rape or caused grievous bodily harm, it may 
be frustrating to the victim if prosecutor and accused consent to a confession made by the 
accused in exchange for leniency ing sentencing.711 However, he admits that the 
legislature only regulated a right to be heard, which may have also resulted out of general 
principles but did not provide the complainant with further means to influence the trial.712 
Consequently, the complainant’s influence is limited to the opportunity to make 
submissions and thereby to possibly influence or even change the prosecutor’s and 
judge’s opinion on the case.713  
Although Majiedt J in S v Sassin & others held that victim participation was an ‘absolutely 
essential cog in the machinery of plea bargaining and plea agreements’, neither the South 
African provisions nor the case law provide for a stronger procedural position of the 
complainant than the German law.714 The position of the victim is in principle confined to 
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that of an ordinary witness.715 The right to be heard as contemplated in s 105A (1) (b) (iii) 
has already been presented. 
The question is whether the law on plea bargaining in both countries (de lege ferenda) 
affords the implementation of the power to veto upon the conclusion of an agreement by 
the complainant. In part, it is argued that ‘sufficient provision is made for participation that 
indirectly benefits the public and directly benefits the victims in particular.’716 Considering 
Böttcher and the example of heavy offences with grave consequences the victims has to 
suffer, this could be called into doubt.717 It has to be stated however that the prosecution of 
offences is the state’s task and generally cannot be suggested by other parties. The fact 
that one is violated by an offence generally does not modify this principle. Due to 
substantial personal rights – such as for instance in the German Constitution: the personal 
freedoms and dignity enshrined in Article 2 (1) and 1 as well as the right to life and 
physical integrity in Article 2 (2) – it is questionable to suggest that the heavily violated 
victim does not need to be provided with farther reaching rights. This is of relevance if the 
prosecution does not fulfil its duty to reach a conviction but instead agrees to too lenient a 
sentence. Thus, it is a question of how to avoid abuse of plea bargaining by the 
prosecution, which will be examined further later.718 
e. Concluding remark 
The legal status of the victim in South Africa and Germany is very similar. In the plea 
bargaining procedure the complainant is given the opportunity to make representations. In 
both countries there are no clear prerequisites for the documentation of the victim’s 
comment or attitude towards the fact that negotiations have been conducted. Nonetheless, 
it should be observed that the relatively weak position of the victim is not a specific feature 
of plea bargaining. Also, in the conventional trial or other special procedure the victim’s 
procedural position is not intended to be more powerful. 
6. Factual basis 
A central question within the plea bargaining procedure is whether the plea or the 
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confession reflects the facts of the case.719 The requirement that the factual basis be 
scrutinized serves the obligation to establish the truth. But its purpose is not limited to the 
truth-seeking function of the criminal trial; it also serves to protect the accused from false 
pleas.720 It is obvious that the plea bargain procedure in some way shortens, quickens or 
even undercuts the search for factual truth, as this acceleration is one of the main benefits 
of plea bargaining. Nonetheless, it is questionable which minimum requirement of factual 
proof has to be demanded in order to warrant the legitimacy of the process. 
a. Conventional trial practice 
The search for the facts is the central purpose of the criminal trial.721 The participants 
generally are entitled to demand that the court extends the taking of evidence to all facts 
and admissible means of evidence which are relevant to the case.722The scope of the 
court’s duty to ensure that all relevant facts are presented is determined by the file that the 
judge holds; thus, the participants’ application and requests and thereby how the facts that 
have been uncovered over the course of the proceedings urge a further search for facts.723 
An essential part is the appraisal of the circumstances and special features of the present 
case.724 The less the evidence seems to be sufficient and justified, the further court must 
search for other and new sources of evidence.725 The shown principles reflect the 
inquisitorial tradition of German criminal procedure. 
With South African law the approach is slightly different as fact-finding is not solely the 
duty of the court. Moreover, accusatorial principles determine the procedure to follow. At 
the outset of a South African trial, the parties place the evidence before the court. 
Similarly, under German law the prosecution file is sent to the court and forms the basis of 
the further procedure. But in contrast with the South African system, as soon as the trial 
begins the evidence and decision as to which evidence is to be heard or further searched 
for solely lies within the court’s discretion. To the contrary, the South African court relies on 
the facts and evidence presented to him by the parties. It is however a fundamental 
principle of South African law that a court at the stage of sentencing not be confined to 
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those facts placed before it by the parties.726 South African s 274, as a general rule of the 
conventional trial procedure, states in its subsection (1) that ‘a court may, before passing 
sentence, receive such evidence as it thinks fit in order to inform itself as to the proper 
sentence to be passed.’ The South African Constitutional Court confirmed that 'there was 
no legal reason why a judge should, in considering sentence, be restricted to the material 
placed before the Court by the parties.'727 Consequently, during the conventional trial 
procedure the judge depends initially on the facts and evidence placed before him, but 
when considering an appropriate sentence he is obliged to extend the scrutiny to all 
evidence which he considers relevant. The principles and elements shown here have been 
implemented into the provisions on plea bargaining.  
b. Scope of scrutiny in the bargain procedure 
Plea bargaining does not comport with the desire to search for material truth as it shortens 
the evidence gathering. Nonetheless, the German legislature tried to emphasise the 
importance of the court’s obligation to establish the truth enshrined in s 244 (2) by letting s 
257s (1) 2 state that this principle remains unaffected in the bargain procedure. It is 
remarkable that s 257c does not contain any other rules on the evidence gathering.728 
However, it is clear that the bargain will always affect the obligation to establish the truth 
and, furthermore, that the legislature’s assumption of a full application of the principle 
possibly gives us a false impression of the reality.729 Nonetheless, the legislature did not 
give way to a procedure in which the accused confesses on basis of facts that have been 
placed before the court by the parties and which are not further scrutinized by the judge. In 
this sense it can be assumed that the statement that s 244 (2), containing the obligation to 
establish the truth, found expression in the German provisions on plea bargaining.730 In 
accordance with the conventional trial system, plea bargaining in Germany only hopes to 
pave the way for a confession and to enhance the economy of the proceedings.731 It is 
hard to determine what way the rule on evidence-taking will be upheld in a bargain 
procedure. A full search for facts conflicts with the very essence of bargains. The purpose 
of plea bargaining is to reduce the obligation to establish the truth in order to shorten the 
                                            
726
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-19. 
727
  S v Dzukuda & others; S v Tshilo 2000 (2) SACR 443 (CC) with reference to S v Dlamini 1992 (1) SA 18 
(A) 30d-31d. 
728
  Compare the comprehensive legislation in South Africa in s 105A (6) and (7). 
729
  Compare op cit 495. 
730
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 33. 
731
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 33. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
101 
 
trial. 732 Velten seems to oppose this view and holds a surprisingly simple position. He 
states that the obligation to establish the truth generally does not require a full 
investigation of all facts and thus can be applied with unchanged content.733 The obligation 
to establish the truth indeed does not require taking all evidence available. The court can 
confine itself to the taking of evidence which it considers to be of essential importance.734 
Nevertheless, the court must tackle and consider exonerating evidence.735 Even if there is 
no exonerating evidence available, other evidence besides the confession has to be 
provided.736  
The need for evidence-taking is generally determined by the three factors: the content of 
the file, the participants and the outcome of the main hearing.737 The value of the already 
examined evidence has to be taken into account.738 Against the background of the general 
principles described earlier, Velten is right when he states that the obligation to establish 
the truth does not require a full investigation of all facts and evidence available. The 
characteristics of plea bargaining however afford a sophisticated view. In the typical 
situation, the court will not hold much more than the confession of the accused. Velten 
holds that with the general principles it is possible to base the conviction solely upon this 
confession, especially if it was – which he admits is not the rule − highly substantiated and 
credible.739 The problem with bargaining is that the confession is usually a so called 
‘formal’ or ‘slim’ confession, i.e., a confession that fully admits the charges and does not 
go into details. In that case it is not possible to base the conviction solely upon the 
conviction. Nevertheless, the fact that the accused made or is willing to make a confession 
reduces the expense of the evidence-taking.  
Case law regards it as sufficient that the confession conforms to the content of the file − 
even if there is possibly exonerating evidence available – as long as the court generally is 
convinced of the confession’s reliability.740 In order to prove the reliability, the court also 
has to question the accused in order to see if his statements conform to the outcome of 
the investigations. In part, it has been held that, in cases of ‘formal’ confessions that simply 
admit the allegations, the scrutiny has to go beyond the court file and the simple 
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questioning of the accused. The confession’s compliance with the facts has to be proven 
with other available evidence.741 The views presented slightly differ. Nevertheless, it can 
be annotated that the German legislature generally intended to preserve the inquisitorial 
principle in the terms of s 244 (2).742 The evidence-taking due to the fact that this is an 
essential component of plea bargaining is shortened. Nevertheless, the court has to 
ensure that the presented evidence, which is in most cases the confession, complies with 
the court file and other indications and evidence. 
The scope of scrutiny in South African law is different though. To a great extent this is due 
to its different, adversarial law tradition. It has to be recalled that the plea system in South 
Africa differs at a fundamental level from the German procedure. In Germany the plea 
system is unknown. Recall that the accused however may at the beginning of a trial 
announce that he is willing to confess, which also determines the further evidence 
gathering procedure, which then can be shortened. South African law with s 105 and s 106 
does provide for certain types of procedure depending on the kind of plea the accused 
chooses. Now in the case of a plea bargain, the accused pleads guilty after having 
negotiated certain conditions. The subsequent procedure follows specific rules that are 
contained in subsection (6) and (7) of s 105A.743 The essential feature is that no evidence 
is heard ‘from any witness other than the accused, whose testimony is limited in complying 
with the requirements of s 105A (6) (a)’.744 The section reads as follows: ‘After the 
contents of the agreement have been disclosed, the court shall question the accused to 
ascertain whether− (i) he or she confirms the terms of the agreement and the admissions 
made by him or her in the agreement; (ii) with reference to the alleged facts of the case, he 
or she admits the allegations in the charge to which he or she has agreed to plead guilty; 
and (iii) the agreement was entered into freely and voluntarily in his or her sound and 
sober senses and without having been unduly influenced.’ The essential part is subsection 
(ii) in which the court ensures that the plea of guilty complies with the alleged facts of the 
case. It has to be remarked and emphasized again that the plea of guilty only is scrutinized 
by a judicial questioning of the accused. Du Toit et al confirm that ‘neither the prosecution 
nor the defence can adduce evidence in an attempt to convince the court of the accused’s 
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guilt.745 It appears uncertain at exact what point in the procedure the court has to convince 
itself of the accused’s guilt. S 105A (6) does not state that the guilt of the accused has to 
be evident yet. On the other hand, the subsequent s 105A (7) (a) states that, ‘if the court is 
satisfied that the accused admits the allegations in the charge and that he or she is guilty 
of the offence in respect of which the agreement was entered into, the court shall proceed 
to consider the sentence agreement.’ Subsection (b) and the subordinated (i) (bb) then 
begins that ‘for purposes of paragraph (a), the court’ may ‘hear evidence, including 
evidence or a statement by or on behalf of the accused or the complainant’. The 
mechanisms of these provisions are not quite clear. It is not obvious whether the passage 
‘for purposes of paragraph (a)’ applies to the question if the court holds the accused guilty 
and considers the sentence agreement or whether it solely embraces the latter one. The 
question is of utmost relevance because it determines whether evidence has to be 
considered in order to find the accused guilty. Commentaries assume that the evidence-
taking only serves the function of considering the sentence agreement.746 Du Toit et al 
introduce subsection (7) as follows: ‘if the court is satisfied that the accused admits the 
allegations in the charge and that he is guilty (...), the court shall (then and only then)747 
proceed to consider the sentence agreement.’748 Thus, this demonstrates the adversarial 
character of the prescribed procedure. The guilt is proved solely upon the questioning of 
the accused and focuses mainly on the questions of whether the accused admits the 
allegations and whether he entered into the agreement freely and voluntarily. The 
evidence the judge may take in terms of s 105A (7) (b) (i) (bb) only relates to his scrutiny 
of the sentence. This is a fundamental difference to the German system in which the guilt 
has to be proved by evidence.749 It can be stated that this difference is based on the 
difference between adversarial and inquisitorial understanding. With the German 
inquisitorial thinking it is hard to accept that the courts satisfy themselves of the accused’s 
guilt without taking into account any evidence. 
As judicial evidence-taking however takes place in terms of s 105A (7), aiming to place the 
judge a the position where he can consider the sentence, the procedure shall be examined 
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in more detail. Even though the search for the factual basis of the agreement does not 
serve the function a proving the guilt, it nevertheless may fulfil the purpose of a safeguard 
against wrongful convictions. S 274 (1) contains the general rule for the conventional trial 
that the court, ‘before passing sentence, receive such evidence as it thinks fit in order to 
inform itself as to the proper sentence to be passed’. Summary trial rule s 112 (3) contains 
that ‘nothing in this section shall prevent the prosecutor from presenting evidence on any 
aspect of the charge, or the court from hearing evidence, including evidence or a 
statement by or on behalf of the accused, with regard to sentence, or from questioning the 
accused on any aspect of the case for the purposes of determining an appropriate 
sentence’. The rule also ensures that the court holds sufficient information to allow him to 
determine an appropriate sentence.750 Du Toit et al pointed out that ‘neither s 274 (1) nor s 
112 (3) caters explicitly for the situation where a court – though satisfied that an accused is 
guilty ut without having formally convicted an accused – is required to consider whether a 
sentence agreement is just’ and that s 105A (7) (b) (i) (bb) covers this situation.751 The 
provision empowers the judge but also makes it a duty for the court to call witnesses of its 
own accord.752 This is necessary where the parties fail to provide sufficient evidence.753 
However, even the accused may serve as a witness.754 Du Toit et al are right to remark 
that ‘however, it is submitted that such a procedure is highly undesirable and conflicts with 
the very essence of s 105A, namely that a plea and sentence agreement as presented by 
the parties has a factual basis which is not in dispute.’755 Thus they recommend the parties 
ensure that they agreed on facts that are comprehensive enough and upon which the 
sentence agreement can be based in order to avoid further evidence-taking by the 
court.756 Interestingly, s 105A (7) (b) (i) (bb) reveals the desire of the South African 
legislature of having inquisitorial elements implemented into the plea bargaining 
procedure. Obviously it did this half-heartedly as the court’s duty and opportunity to 
scrutinize and search for further evidence was set up with regard to sentencing but does 
not refer to the question of guilt, i.e., the conviction.  
                                            
750
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-19; S v Sikhindi 1978 (1) SA 1072 (N); S v 
Serumala 1978 (4) SA 811 (NC) 815a-b. 
751
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-19. 
752
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-19 also stating that the constitutional right 
of the accused to remain silent and not to testify during the proceedings in terms of s 35 (3) (h) remains 
applicable. 
753
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-19. 
754
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-19 with the restrictions annotated in op cit 
752. 
755
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-20. 
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  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-20. 
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To sum it up, the scope of scrutiny in both legal systems focuses on the plea or the 
confession, which is more or less only proven on points of consistency and credibility. 
Other facts and evidence are not included in the scrutiny of the South African court and 
only slightly so by the German court.757 Although the general procedural systems are 
opposed to each other, the standard situations of a negotiated plea of guilty in South Africa 
and the negotiated ‘formal’ or ‘slim’ confession in Germany are almost congruent. The 
slightly different scope in the judicial scrutiny has already been presented. It can be held 
that, against the background of the practice of a more or less brief approval by the court, 
the obligation to establish the truth only serves the function of a guideline and that its 
application in the context of plea bargaining only serves to control and prevent from heavy 
abuse.758 One could argue that the parties may suppress evidence and that the state may 
even breach its obligation to fully pursue offences, all while the court is limited to a 
symbolic approval of the agreement.759 Regardless, the parties’ ability to ‘suppress’ or in 
other words limit the scope of the evidence is a significant feature of the accusatorial 
system. If German law adopts a bargain procedure one may have to come to the terms 
with the fact that the fact-finding and evidence-taking is in some way restricted, although 
the general law tradition is not accusatorial but inquisitorial.760 
c. Scrutiny in practice 
German scholar Heller conducted an interesting inquiry on how the rules dealing with the 
obligation to establish the truth are handled in German practice.761 This inquiry especially 
illustrates which means German practice uses to ensure the credibility of the confession 
made in a bargain procedure. The essential conduct of the scrutiny has been documented 
as following: ‘rarely’ witnesses or experts were heard; ‘rarely to occasionally’ even no 
scrutiny at all would took place; ‘occasionally’ documentary evidence was compared; and, 
‘almost frequently’ the accused was questioned with regard to single issues and the 
confession was compared to the file. The outcome of the inquiry reveals that evidence is 
rarely considered beyond a comparison of the confession to the courts file along with a 
questioning of the accused. The classic instrument of evidence, the hearing of witnesses, 
is spared. One can assume that the usually undertaken scrutiny reflects the benefits of 
                                            
757
  Given that the confession is reliable, it is however − other then the plea of guilty − briefly compared tot 
he file and other sources evidence despite only the questioning of the accused. 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 1 and almost identical Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 15-20 commenting s 105A (7) (b) (i) (bb). 
759
  South African Law Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) at 5.14. 
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  Compare the later discussion on the true nature of plea bargaining in Chapter V.15. 
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  Heller, Das Gesetz zur Regelung der Verständigung, p. 307; inquiry of 2012 amongst German judges. 
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plea bargaining. Although it may have been the legislature’s wish that the judge scrutinize 
all essential facts and evidence, practice will always tend to minimize the effort made as 
the sparing of time and resources is one of the main benefits of plea bargaining. 
d. Concluding remark 
Plea bargaining can been criticized for its potential to undermine the search for truth.762 
Nevertheless a reduction of the effort to take evidence and search for the facts of the case 
lies within the nature of plea bargaining and can be regarded as its very essence. The 
obligation to establish the truth is formally warranted by the clear wording of German s 
257c (1) 2 as well as by the South African requirement of questioning the accused in terms 
of s 105A (6) (a) in order to confirm the guilt together with the possibility of a further 
scrutiny of evidence in terms of s 105A (7) (b) (i) (bb) to ensure that the considered 
sentence is adequate. Nevertheless, these principles will only form a guideline. A certain 
disregard of the facts lies within the nature of plea bargaining. 
7. Sentencing 
Sentencing is one of the court’s essential responsibilities in the criminal trial. As amongst 
others, the essential motive to bargain is to achieve a leniency in the sentence; the rules 
and features of sentencing are of specific interest. While the German judge retains his 
sentencing discretion, which is indicated by way that the agreement can only contain a 
lower and upper sentence limit (which is followed by the court’s decision which only has to 
comply with this sentence range), the South African judge is limited to an approval whether 
a specific sentence, upon which the parties had agreed, is just and appropriate. In view of 
both legal systems, it is an interesting question whether the scrutiny is more of an approval 
of negotiated terms concerning the sentence or if the judge undertakes a hypothetical 
sentencing with no regard to the negotiations. 
a. Justness of the sentence 
In the plea bargaining process the court has to ensure that the negotiated sentence fulfils 
certain requirements. Before the court can convict an accused on a charge, a presiding 
officer must determine whether the negotiated sentence is ‘just’.763 S 105A (8) CPA 
therefore states that ‘if the court is satisfied that the sentence agreement is just, the court 
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  Compare Turner/Chodosh, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, p. 1. 
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  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 214. 
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shall inform the prosecutor and the accused that the court is so satisfied, whereupon the 
court shall convict the accused of the sentence charged and sentence the accused in 
accordance with the sentence agreement.’ In s 105A (9) (a) it is written that ‘if the court is 
of the opinion that the sentence agreement is unjust, the court shall inform the prosecutor 
and the accused of the sentence which it considers just.’ It can be stated that the 
provisions on the judicial scrutiny of the agreed sentence do not provide for more than the 
term ‘just’. They do not lay down a formal guideline that, for instance, contains which 
aspects determine the justness of a sentence. Thus, the interpretation of these provisions 
leads to difficulties.764 
It is a significant aspect that the legislature chose the term ‘just’ as opposed to 
‘appropriate’.765 The Oxford Dictionary of English defines ‘just’ as ‘morally right and fair, 
appropriate, well founded or justifiable.’766 It is remarkable that the Afrikaans text of the 
Criminal Procedure Act uses the word ‘regverdig,’ which means ‘in ooreenstemming met 
wat reg is; regmatig, onpartydig, billik, eerlik’ which may add to the understanding of how 
the legislature’s intention is to be judged.767 It is however uncertain in what way the use of 
the term ‘just’ instead of the term ‘appropriate’ affects the scrutiny that has to be 
undertaken. Du Toit et al hold that ‘the question whether the sentence agreement is “just” 
does not require a fundamental readjustment of the ordinary approach which applies to the 
situation where an accused must be sentenced after having been convicted in a 
conventional trial’.768 With reference to Terblanche, it should be pointed out that the 
sentence has to be ‘appropriate, considering all the circumstances of the case’ and yet an 
‘appropriate sentence need not be the only appropriate sentence’.769 Sentencing is always 
regarded as an inexact and imperfect procedure and thus this leads to a substantial range 
of appropriate sentences.770 This might be a reason why the legislature preferred the use 
of the word ‘just’ as opposed to ‘appropriate’ sentence.771 The fact that the criterion ‘just’ is 
vague, to the mind of Du Toit et al, has the benefit that the term ‘creates scope for 
individualisation without sacrificing important principles such as equality before the law and 
                                            
764
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 214. 
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  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 214; S v Sassin & others 2003 (4) All SA 506 (NC) at 15.5. 
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  Oxford Dictionary of English, 3ed (2010), ‘plea bargaining‘, adjective. 
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  Compare S v Sassin & others 2003 (4) All SA 506 (NC) at 15.7. 
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  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-20. 
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  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-20; Terblanche, A Guide to Sentencing in 
South Africa, p. 146 and 165; S v Martin 1996 (2) SACR 378 (W) 380a-b. 
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  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-20; Terblanche, A Guide to Sentencing in 
South Africa, p. 146. 
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  Compare Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 214. 
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judicial consistency in sentencing.’772 It is further assumed that the task of the sentencing 
and the function of the court generally remain the same when imposing a sentence 
following a section 105A agreement.773 Terblanche holds that ‘a heavily mitigated 
sentence is possible because of the plea of guilty and its indications of remorse and 
because the interests of justice (and society) are served by the shortened process.’774 
Nevertheless, the principle of proportionality i.e., the principle that legal consequences 
must still fit the crime committed shall remain in force, despite the fact that other 
considerations can be taken into account.775 
Thus, it can be summed up that Du Toit et al hold that the question of whether the 
sentence is just or not applies to the situation in a regular trial where the accused is 
sentence after having been convicted.776 In the context of plea bargaining there is no need 
for a readjustment.777 The presiding officer judges on the basis of regular principles of 
sentencing, i.e., the principle that the judge is convinced that the negotiated sentence is an 
appropriate one.778 In the eyes of Du Toit et al ‘it need not be the most appropriate one’ or 
the ‘only one.’779 They further emphasize that s 105A does not contain a requirement that 
the court must find itself in full agreement with the negotiated sentence.780 The provision of 
s 105A (8), stipulating that the court has to be satisfied that the sentence is just, does not 
imply that the court necessarily agrees with the negotiated sentence.781 Els J approaches 
this result from a different angle and gives regard to practical aspects. Els J stated in S v 
Esterhuizen & others that ‘it must be so that the court, in considering the 'justness' or 
'unjustness' of a sentence agreement cannot simply decide for itself in vacuo what 
sentence it would have imposed for crimes to which the accused is pleading guilty.’782 The 
judge admitted in his judgment on the case that he ‘would not be able to find that the 
sentence as agreed on in this matter is “just”’ and that he ‘would have probably imposed a 
much heavier sentence under the circumstances.’783 He presumes that, in a case that is 
difficult to prove, the concession of a plea of guilty is a result which satisfies the interests 
                                            
772
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-20. 
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of justice, i.e., that the crime that has been committed results in a conviction that has been 
achieved through the bargain.784 Els J summarizes that ‘the price may be that the 
sentence which would normally flow from the commission of such a crime is lower than 
might otherwise have been imposed. This does not mean that justice has not been 
achieved.’785 Els J defines 'just' in terms of s 105A as a sentence that bears an adequate 
relationship to a crime and the moral blameworthiness content of the crime committed.786 
He finds this requirement fulfilled in his present case. Els J thereby admits that a sentence 
that does not completely comply with his personal view on the case however still serves 
the demands of justice. In the case, he stipulated the following rules the court has to 
follow:787 first, 'the consideration of the well-known triad as set out in S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 
537 (A)'.788 The ‘triad’ consists of ‘the crime, the offender and the interests of society’.789 
Second, 'the taking of a broad overview of the facts admitted790 and the crimes admitted to 
having been committed together with the proposed sentence to be imposed, all with a view 
toward establishing whether the sentence agreed upon and its effective content bear an 
adequate enough relationship to the crimes committed taking into account all of the agreed 
facts, both aggravating and mitigating, so that it can be said that justice had been 
served.'791 
It can be summed up that in South African Law the justness of the sentence in the context 
of plea bargaining is understood as an appropriate sentence that does not necessarily has 
to match the court’s own judgment of the case. The court serves the function of a 
safeguard and is limited to the task of ensuring that the sentence is not inadequate.792 The 
judge, through a process of questioning the accsued, remains responsible for assessing 
the guilt and thus remains the final arbiter of what an appropriate and just sentence is.793 
The plea and sentence agreement is subject to the court’s finding that the agreement is 
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  S v Esterhuizen & others 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 494g. 
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just and that the court decided independently of the parties of the agreement.794 Watney 
finds the following words: ‘the procedure to adopt in accessing whether a sentence 
agreement is “just”, involves consideration of the same factors a sentencing court would 
normally consider but with the proviso that any sentence that could possibly be considered 
appropriate under the circumstances would suffice’.795 
b. Idea of a sentence range 
The structure of sentencing in Germany generally is very complex as there are no specific 
provisions dealing with the principles of sentencing. Case law determines that the judge’s 
discretion to sentence is wide.796 The principle that the sentence has to be just is not 
written but is an accepted principle.797 The BGH also strictly forbids a sentence to the point 
(Punktstrafe), which is a sentence that has a specific amount and where specific features 
of the present case may not have been observed.798 The reason for that is that there will 
always result a personal impression of the accused and the case that forbids judging a 
case without letting these factors influence the sentencing decision.799 The law only 
indicates this in s 267 (3) 1, which states that ‘the criminal judgment shall further specify in 
its reasons the penal norm which was applied and shall set out the circumstances which 
were decisive in assessing the penalty.’ 
Against this background the German provision on plea bargaining under the specific 
aspect of sentencing is no surprise. S 257c (3) 2 StPO on the other hand states that the 
court only indicates an upper and lower sentence limit that the parties may consent to. The 
agreement on a specific sentence remains inadmissible, which is in line with the former 
case law of the BGH concerning informal agreements.800 This is motivated by the desire 
that the court’s ability to sentence remain unaffected as well as the aim that the principle of 
free consideration of evidence in terms of s 261 StPO not be violated by the parties’ 
agreement. 
In legal practice, however, the indicated upper sentence limit of the sentence range the 
court had imposed usually corresponds to the later sentencing such that one could safely 
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argue that in fact the parties do negotiate on a specified concrete sentence.801 The court 
and the parties are only entitled to discuss a sentence range. They do have to obey this 
principle in order to comply with BGH case law. In fact the parties however agree upon 
that the upper sentence limit is the later specific sentence.802 Consequently, also in 
Germany the agreement might contain –although not formally indicated – a specific 
sentence. It is held that this practice does not violate the prohibition of a sentence to the 
point (Punktstrafenverbot), as the possibility of a lower sentence still is given.803 
Due to the legislature’s presumption that the court only indicates a range, no provisions 
have been implemented that ensure that the terms of the negotiated agreement are just, 
i.e., that the parties bargained on a just sentence. In the German inquisitorial tradition, it is 
the court that indicates the possible sentence range and leads through the further 
proceedings. Consequently, there is no need for an approval on whether a negotiated 
sentence is just. Instead the court when indicating the sentence range has to apply the 
general sentencing principles. Nevertheless, these principles afford that the sentencing 
results in a ‘just’ sentence. Although the justness of the sentence is not a written 
requirement in German law, the prerequisite that the sentence range (on the in practice 
frequently only indicated upper sentence limit) be ‘just’ can be read into the present 
statutory provisions of German law. If the legislature decided to formally let the court 
decide and judge which sentence range it might indicate to the participant, it is more than 
clear that this also creates a duty for the court to make certain that any sentence range 
bargained for without the court’s participation complies with the court’s findings on the 
case. A further question is if there is a similar controversy concerning the difference 
between the sentence as a ‘just’ or an ‘appropriate’ one, as in South Africa. German 
legislation on plea bargaining does not use either of these terms, nor any comparable 
term. The judicial scrutiny of the ‘justness’ of the sentence is accomplished through the 
determination of the sentence range. Nevertheless, the general principles of sentencing 
have to be respected.804 They are indicated by s 46 of the StGB. The provision states: ‘(1) 
The guilt of the offender is the basis for sentencing. The effects which the sentence can be 
expected to have on the offender’s future life in society shall be taken into account. (2) 
When sentencing the court shall weigh the circumstances in favour of and against the 
offender. Consideration shall in particular be given to the motives and aims of the offender; 
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the attitude re ected in the offence and the degree of force of will involved in its 
commission; the degree of the violation of the offender’s duties; the modus operandi and 
the consequences caused by the offence to the extent that the offender is to blame for 
them; the offender’s prior history, his personal and financial circumstances; his conduct 
after the offence, particularly his efforts to make restitution for the harm caused as well as 
the offender’s efforts at reconciliation with the victim. (3) Circumstances which are already 
statutory elements of the offence must not be considered.’805 Thus the judge – based on 
the general principles of sentencing – has to independently evaluate all relevant facts of 
the case, both in the regular trial as well as in the plea agreement procedure.806 However, 
this does not reveal whether it is more appropriate that the court decides on the case 
without referring to the bargain or if the judge only ensures compliance of a bargained 
sentence range to general principles of sentencing. 
To emphasize the problem once more one could mark the problem as follows: the court 
that scrutinizes a bargained sentence concerning compliance to general provisions 
ensures that the sentence is ‘just’. On the contrary, an ‘appropriate’ sentence implies that 
the court either proposed the sentence without reference to an agreement or found the 
sentence agreement hypothetical.807 In the latter case the court could only consent to the 
agreement if the negotiated sentence exactly meets the findings the court would have 
made in a regular trial.808 As there is no way to simulate the regular outcome of a trial, this 
idea can only be pursued in theory, i.e., hypothetically. 
c. Hypothetical sentencing vs. approval 
In both legal system it remains vague whether sentencing in the context of plea bargaining 
is an approval of bargained terms or is the court’s own decision on the case. It can be 
stated that the whole idea of plea bargaining implies that the court does not undergo a 
scrutiny isolated from the bargain. Watney holds that ‘it is submitted that to interpret "just" 
to imply that the sentence should be the exact sentence what the court would have 
imposed, will render the purpose of section 105A meaningless.’809 Indeed, one of the main 
aims or benefits of plea bargaining is to receive a lenient sentence or at least to favour 
predictable sentencing. This benefit would be eliminated if the court would judge the case 
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without any reference or consideration to the outcome of earlier negotiations. As a 
consequence – given that the legislator in both legal systems decided to formally establish 
plea bargaining and to insert such provisions into the criminal procedure – the principle 
that the sentence agreement or the sentence range has to be ‘just,’ in terms of s 105A (8) 
of the South African Criminal Procedure Act or in terms of s 257c (3) 2 of the StPO 
respectively, can only mean the following: the court has to ensure compliance with 
fundamental principles of sentencing, has to take into account the substantial facts of the 
case and has to judge on the guilt of the accused. The process of determining and seeking 
a specific amount of sentence in both legal systems is obsolete.810 Thus, one could state 
that the court undergoes the full procedure of sentencing right to the point where the judge 
would impose a specific sentence. This is either left to parties that negotiate on a specific 
sentence or, if the court only indicates a sentence range (which under German law might 
also partly occur), left to the final judgment of the court. In either case, the court, even 
though it regards the general principles and guidelines of sentencing, does not at the stage 
of negotiations and agreements actually form a sentence This is subject to the bargain.  
d. Concluding remark 
The German legislature’s presumption is that the court retains its full sentence discretion 
and is only limited in the sense that the judge has to impose a sentence range for the 
agreement as prescribed in s 257c (3) 2. This is a strong inquisitorial element. 
Nevertheless, legal practice circumvents this prerequisite by using the upper sentence limit 
as a factual specific sentence the participants agree upon. South African law however 
provide that the agreement has to contain a certain sentence, upon which the court after s 
105A (8) and (9) has to decide whether it is just or not. The South African legislation has 
the advantage of providing an obvious indication of the sentence the participants are 
aiming for. Also, the procedure by which the court must explicitly announce whether the 
proposed sentence is just appears to be highly transparent. The German system of a 
sentence range gives the false impression of flexibility and untouched judicial sentencing 
discretion, which in realtiy does not exist. 
8. Legal representation 
A main difference in between the South African and the German provisions is the aspect of 
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legal representation. According to s 105A the accused must have a legal representative to 
enter into a plea and sentence agreement. This requirement has been criticized in that it 
puts into question the usefulness of s 105A, as the procedure is then only available to the 
relatively small percentage of represented accused.811 In contrast, German s 257 (3) 4 
states that the accused’s consent to the agreement is sufficient. The accused does not 
necessarily have to be legally represented.812 
a. Mandatory legal representation 
The advantage of mandatory legal representation is quite obvious. Procedural rights of the 
accused are typically better protected when the prosecution has to face a legally educated 
counterpart. As a result, the risk of procedural or other abuse is diminished. In the bargain 
procedure, mandatory legal representation is a strong safeguard against a misuse of the 
procedure against uninformed and indigent accused.813 On the other hand it limits 
agreements to cases where the accused either is able to afford legal representation or 
where representation is compulsory, after s 73 of the Criminal Procedure Act as well as s 
35 (2) (c) and s 35 (3) (g) of the Constitution. In addition, to De Villers the South African 
provision seems quite indecisive since the unrepresented accused is able to plead guilty in 
terms of s 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act and can also be sentenced without the 
assistance of a representative.814 Even a conventional trial allows conviction of an 
unrepresented accused.815 The plea bargaining procedure does provide for the 
prerequisite of full information of the accused in terms of s 105A (2) (a) and for the judge to 
assure himself of the guilt of the accused in terms of s 105A (6) and (7). It can be said that 
the plea bargaining procedure would even ensure a safe procedure for the accused where 
he does not have the assistance of a representative. Consequently, the reason for the 
prerequisite of a mandatory legal representation cannot be seen in the simple fact that the 
accused consents to pleading guilty or that he has to be aware of certain rights. Providing 
information to the accused is warranted throughout the bargain. 
The only apparent explanation for the need of compulsory legal representation is that the 
legislature feared an abuse of the bargain procedure which motivated him to strengthen 
the accused’s position. Legal representation generally is necessary in cases of serious 
offences or cases where the facts and evidence are difficult to judge. The plea bargain 
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procedure by which the accused relinquishes his right might be seen to be of such a 
quality that it necessitates a relatively complex judgment. The accused has to anticipate 
the hypothetical outcome of a procedure and possibly, on the other hand, even anticipate 
the routine and predictable behaviour of the prosecution in the bargain procedure, like for 
instance which evidence the prosecutor usually holds and how much leniency he might 
offer. These are good reasons to provide the accused with the professionalism and 
experience of a representative. 
However, the accused might rather favour to waive his right to counsel. One could imagine 
a situation in which the prosecutor might offer a favourable plea and sentence agreement 
and the accused is held back from consenting to it simply out of the fact that he is not 
legally represented.816 If then convicted to a harsh sentence, compulsory legal 
representation appears questionable. However, a waiver of the right to counsel is not 
possible under the actual South African law as it is clearly required as written in s 105A 
(1). 
b. Social impact 
Steyn reports that plea bargaining has been viewed in South Africa as a procedure that will 
only benefit the rich.817 Successful bargains of members of parliament, Mark Thatcher818 
and Roger Kebble,819 who by means of an agreement achieved to be released from 
prison, reinforce this perception.820 Also, plea bargaining has been traditionally applied 
mostly in white collar crimes where the accused can typically afford legal representatives. 
It should not to be lost from sight, however, that most accused in the lower courts cannot 
afford a legal representative.821As a consequence, those accused are not able to benefit 
from plea bargaining.822 Steyn points out that the principle of a fair trial, enshrined in s 35 
(3) of the Constitution, secures an equal treatment.823 Whether constitutionality is affected 
by the fact that a significant portion of the South African population is excluded from the 
benefits of plea bargaining by way of the requirement of legal representation has not yet 
                                            
816
  Compare De Villers (2004) De Jure 244 at 254. 
817
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 218. 
818
  Sir Mark Thatcher(*1953), 2nd Baronet, son of Sir Denis Thatcher and Lady Margaret Thachter, the 
former Conservatice British Prime Minister (www.wikipedia.org). 
819
  Roger Brett Kebble (1964-2005) was a South African mining magnate with close links to factions in the 
ruling political party (www.wikipedia.org). 
820
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 218 with further references. 
821
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 218. 
822
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 218. 
823
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 218. 
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been challenged.824 Steyn doubts if s 105A will survive such scrutiny.825 
Interestingly, in his 1996 article, Bekker suggests that the system of legal aid and public 
defence would have to be increased dramatically before accepting the existence of plea 
bargaining.826 However, he admits that at that time this still was impossible and 
impracticable.827 As long as there is a lack of funds for such support of undefended 
accused, Bekker proposes or at least suggests to allow plea bargaining only at the 
Supreme Court.828 However, in present practice plea bargaining is a practice used in all 
courts. 
c. Alternatives for unrepresented accused 
The ‘problem’ of mandatory legal representation could be of lesser relevance than 
assumed due to the fact that many lower court bargains possibly can be and are solved by 
way of a plea of guilty in summary trials as contemplated in s 112. S 112 aims to avoid 
injustice by providing measures referred to the guilty plea in summary trials.829 If the court 
is of the view that a reasonably minor punishment is appropriate, it may accept the plea of 
guilty and abide further actions (s 112 (1) (a)).830 In cases of relatively heavy punishments, 
the presiding judge is obligated to verify the accused’s plea of guilty before he can convict 
(s 112 (1 (b) and (2)).831 Thus, the procedure might also provide sufficient safeguards 
against abuse.832 Moreover, De Villers is right when he states that it was ‘foreseeable that 
undefended accused will simply make use of the informal system of plea bargaining where 
there is less supervision than with the section 105A procedure‘.833 Thus there are various 
alternative methods of which the accused may make use. It should not be lost out of 
scope, however, that statutory plea bargaining offers the accused several important 
benefits. Just to mention two: the accused in the formal bargain procedure enters into a 
written agreement which documents and thereby ensures him an exact outcome of the 
bargain to which prosecution and court are bound. Informal bargains for instance do not 
offer such certainty. Second, the assistance of legally sophisticated assistance is generally 
advisable. The lack of counsel to poor accused in the ideal case is solved by the institution 
                                            
824
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 218. 
825
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 218. 
826
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 222. 
827
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 222. 
828
  Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 222. 
829
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-2. 
830
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-2. 
831
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-2. 
832
  S 112 will be extensively examined in Chapter V.12. 
833
  De Villers (2004) De Jure 244 at 254. 
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of public defence. However, as predicted by Bekker in 1996, money to realise this is 
lacking.834 
d. Optional legal representation 
German law has no prerequisite of legal representation in the s 257c bargain procedure. 
The issue of whether this would be a useful supplement to the provisions on plea 
bargaining surprisingly has not been a substantial part of the controversy yet. However, 
the demand for counsel can arise out of general provisions. The agreement procedure 
formally is conducted before the court and forms part of the conventional trial procedure. 
Thus, the general rule of s 140 of the StPO that provides for cases in which defence is 
mandatory can be applied. The participation of defence counsel thereafter is mandatory if: 
‘1. the main hearing at first instance is held at the Higher Regional Court or at the Regional 
Court; 2. the accused is charged with a felony; 3. the proceedings may result in an order 
prohibiting the pursuit of an occupation; 4. remand detention pursuant to Sections 112 or 
112a or provisional committal pursuant to Section 126a or Section 275a subsection (5) is 
executed against an accused; 5. the accused has been in an institution for at least three 
months based on judicial order or with the approval of the judge and will not be released 
from such institution at least two weeks prior to commencement of the main hearing; 6. 
committal of the accused pursuant to Section 81 is being considered for the purpose of 
preparing an opinion on his mental condition; 7. proceedings for preventive detention are 
conducted; 8. the previous defence counsel is excluded from participation in the 
proceedings by a decision.’835 In other cases ‘the presiding judge shall appoint defence 
counsel upon application or ex officio if the assistance of defence counsel appears 
necessary because of the seriousness of the offence or because of a difficult factual or 
legal situation (...)’836 If not already due to one of the enumerated formal reasons, the latter 
prerequisite of a case with a difficult factual or legal situation can be applied to a bargain 
situation that is possibly accompanied by difficulties. It can be summed up that as soon as 
the situation involves grave consequences, s 140 prescribes legal representation. Thus, 
most cases of plea bargaining in Germany will include representation, nonetheless it is not 
a formal prerequisite be concluded under the surveillance and aid of a representative. 
Moreover, it can be assumed that due to inquisitorial law traditions, courts and prosecutors 
will hesitate to initiate a bargain procedure with an unrepresented accused as he lacks the 
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  Compare above. 
835
  S 140 (1) StPO. 
836
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assistance of an equal counterpart. Inquiries have shown that in approximately 59 % of all 
cases the accused’s representative initiates the bargain.837 Finally, it can be stated that the 
situation of an unrepresented accused almost never occurs, in scholarly opinion on 
bargaining in Germany, a last indicator for some minor relevance of the issue. 
e. Concluding remark 
The prerequisite of mandatory legal representation offers both advantages and 
disadvantages. The duty to have a counsel gives the impression of a more accurate 
protection to the accused against the abuse of plea bargaining. Moreover, the accused 
benefits from a more equal bargain position as he is supported by a professional advocate. 
At the same time, the unrepresented accused suffers inconvenience from procedures that 
may serve for him as an alternative to for instance informal plea bargaining. It is hard to 
determine whether German law should adopt the duty to have a counsel or not. It can be 
held, however, that in practice however in a majority of the cases the accused is legally 
represented. In South Africa, against the background of an equal treatment of the rich and 
the poor, there might be a need for either abolishing the prerequisite or else practice 
should – which would be the solution to be preferred − provide for public defenders for 
those who cannot afford a legal representative. 
9. Binding effect of agreements 
An highly relevant issue is whether agreements bind the court. Interestingly, in U.S. law, 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure dealing with plea bargaining provides 
for types of agreements that bind the court and others that do not.838 On the contrary, both 
South African and German law do not know such a distinction under statutory law. 
Agreements in terms of their statutory provisions generally aim to bind the participants. It is 
                                            
837
  Schöch, Urteilsabsprachen in der Strafrechtspraxis, p. 132 in an inquiry amongst judges, prosecutors 
and defence counsels. 
838
  Rule 11 (c) (1) of the U.S. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reads as follows: 'An attorney for the 
government and the defendant's attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and 
reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate in these discussions. If the defendant pleads 
guilty or nolo contendere to either a charged offense or a lesser or related offense, the plea agreement 
may specify that an attorney for the government will: [...] (B) recommend, or agree not to oppose the 
defendant's request, that a particular sentence or sentencing range is appropriate or that a particular 
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply 
(such a recommendation or request does not bind the court); or (C) agree that a specific sentence or 
sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a 
recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement). [...]‘; emphasis 
added. 
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however questionable at what point in time the procedure becomes binding for the further 
procedure and if there exists a bargain procedure that has no binding effect. 
a. Statutory agreements 
The key issue to be discussed in the present and the subsequent passages is when 
exactly a bargain process becomes binding. This question might appear confusing to the 
South African reader. South African provisions provide for the conclusion of a signed 
agreement that is subsequently scrutinized by the court. Thus, it can be held that the 
agreement is binding right from the start. German procedure however differs essentially. 
The negotiations on the one hand and the court’s scrutiny on the other form a 
homogenous process in Germany. Both parallel running and mutually conducted parts of 
the process are finalised by the conclusion of the agreement at the very end of the whole 
bargain procedure. Thus, both issues, i.e. when the agreement becomes effective and 
when the parties are bound to it, are of high relevance. It is for instance imaginable that 
certain behaviour already leads to a binding effect before the parties have formally 
consented to an agreement. The German law in s 257c (3) 4 states that the agreement 
becomes effective as soon as both the accused or his legal representative and the 
prosecutor accept the court’s proposal. The exact time the parties actually do accept the 
agreement is not quite obvious. Instead of a signing of a written agreement, in Germany 
the agreement is only put to the court record. It is essential to remark that this step is only 
declaratory. The parties might have already agreed at an earlier stage. The problem is that 
the terms and conditions of the bargain are fluently discussed. One has to point out the 
time by which court, prosecutor and accused have consented to the ‘essentialia negotii’ of 
the bargain.839 
The court is bound to the agreement once it comes into existence. Prior to the statutory 
law, case law therefore had to refer to the principle of a fair trial in terms of Article 6 of the 
ECHR. With the statutory law there still is no written binding effect on the court. Rather, 
such effect is taken for granted without reference to explicit statutory provisions.840 S 257c 
(4) 1 only tells in which case the court shall cease to be bound. Argumentum e contratrio, 
the court generally is bound as soon as the agreement becomes effective. It is essential 
that the agreement does not only bind the court but also offers the accused a claim for 
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  Concerning the conclusion of the agreement review Chapter IV.3.f. 
840
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 28. 
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performance.841 The agreement is enforceable.842 This is considered to be the most 
fundamental improvement of the legal position of the accused in comparison to the 
formerly unregulated informal practice of bargaining.843 That ability to call for compliance to 
the content of the agreement refers to all stages of the proceedings and only ends with the 
final judgment.844 Without a doubt this binding effect applies to the court of first instance.845 
Case law partly tends to hold that only the court of first instance that participated in the 
bargain shall be bound.846 It is argued that the appeals courts would not have been part of 
the negotiations and the agreement and therefore cannot be bound to what has been 
negotiated. Velten however holds that this view violates the principle that the bargain 
finalises the trial.847 Velten’s opinion is accurate. If appeals courts were not bound to the 
agreement, the accused could not trust in the outcome of the bargain. This would diminish 
the benefits of plea bargaining and offend its very essence.848  
The binding of prosecutor and accused is not regulated. Nevertheless is must be so that 
after having given their consent prosecutor and accused are bound to the agreement.849 
As ‘debtors’ of ‘contractual commitments,’ their obligation arises out of the promise of a 
certain procedural behaviour.850 As there are no written rules, the binding of prosecutor 
and accused in statutory agreements follows the same mechanisms as in the informal 
agreement procedure. That is why the issue shall be discussed in the subsequent chapter 
on informal agreements.  
As presented earlier, the conclusion and binding of agreements have to be precisely 
analysed under the German provision of s 257c. There is a need to determine the exact 
point in time during the negotiation process that the parties consider the agreement as 
concluded. In South African law, however, the point of conclusion under the terms of s 
105A (2) is obvious. It can be assumed that the agreement becomes binding as soon as 
the accused actually pleads guilty.851  
                                            
841
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 29. 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 29. 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 29. 
844
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 29. 
845
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 29. 
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  OLG Düsseldorf (2011) StV 80 at 81. 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 29. 
848
  The issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V.9. 
849
  Niemöller/Schlothauer/Weidner-Niemöller, Gesetz zur Verständigung im Strafverfahren, p. 28. 
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  Compare SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 28. 
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  Compare Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 206 with reference to U.S. law. 
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b. Informal agreements 
Considering the procedural conduct of the bargain, formal bargaining in Germany is mainly 
characterised by the documentation in the court record and certain rules like that the 
parties may only consent to a sentence range. The process of consenting is a matter of 
material mutuality. Thus, no matter whether the outcome of the bargain is later 
documented (which makes it a statutory bargain) or is solely agreed upon in camera 
(which makes it an informal bargain), the ‘contractual principles’ of consenting are the 
same. These have been presented earlier.852 Thus, the agreement becomes effective by 
the time the conduct of the parties can be interpreted as a mutual consent. 
A striking point important to emphasize is that South African informal agreements are very 
similar to the German procedure of bargaining. German plea bargain procedure is an 
example of the formalisation of an informal procedure.853 The mechanics of concluding an 
agreement have in essence retained their informal characteristics.854 Consequently, the 
above presented principles concerning statutory plea bargaining in Germany apply not 
only to the German informal bargain procedure but also to the application of informal 
procedure in South Africa. The relevance to South African law shall be explained once 
more. The conclusion of the agreement in terms of statutory law, as well as the conclusion 
of informal agreements, is not a matter of concern in South Africa. As soon as the 
requirements of s 105A (2) are fulfilled, the agreement comes into existence. In contrast, 
the informal bargain does not result in an agreement document. The conclusion of the 
agreement has to be interpreted by the conduct of the participants.  
The interesting question that shall now be examined for both German and South African 
informal bargains is if the agreements are binding. Scholarly opinion in South Africa is that 
informal agreements do not bind.855In Germany, however, informal bargaining has 
generally been considered inadmissible since the advent of the new provisions on plea 
bargaining. Before, there was nothing but an informal bargain procedure. These former 
informal negotiations had a binding effect on the participants.856 Courts therefore referred 
to the principle of a fair trial in terms of Article 6 of the ECHR. With the new law on 
agreements, however, any bypassing of statutory formal requirements in terms of s 257c 
                                            
852
  Compare Chapter IV.3.f. 
853
  Turner still generally names German plea bargaining ‘informal‘; compare Turner/Chodosh, Plea 
Bargaining Across Borders, p. 73 seqq. 
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  Remember that there is no written agreement and the outcome is only documented in the court record 
in essence. 
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  De Villers (2004) De Jure 244 at 253. 
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  See generally BGHSt 43, 195; 50, 40. 
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means that the agreement is not binding.857 Consequently, informal bargaining in Germany 
has no binding effect.858 Thus, it can be summed up that both in Germany and in South 
Africa informal bargains generally do not have a binding effect. 
This rule is surprisingly strictly upheld. Most scholars and courts seem to have lost out of 
scope that certain conduct and statements made may bind the court or the prosecutor 
even though formal requirements are not met. What is described as a binding effect in this 
context is not a formal rule stating that the agreement becomes binding on all participants 
involved. Moreover, the acting participants may be bound due to the principle of fairness 
and the rationale that forbids a venire contra factum proprium. If an agreement procedure 
does not comply with statutory provisions, it is difficult to refer to a legal basis. Flemming 
DJP for instance experienced such difficulties when he tried to explain in a judgment why 
the acceptance of the state to a s 112 (2) statement binds the court even where the 
statement was not entirely consistent with the allegations and general probabilities of the 
situation, i.e., an informal agreement.859 If all participants mutually agree to the terms of an 
agreement, they are bound to that agreement on the basis of the principle of a fair trial. 
Otherwise the court and the prosecutor would act against the very fundamental essence of 
the rule and law and the principle of fairness. The nonformal binding will be presented with 
the help of an actual BGH case. In that case, there was no mutual consent given to an 
informal agreement. As will be shown, there are nevertheless fields of application for 
certain behaviour to have a binding effect if the accused trusts, and is entitled to trust, in it. 
c. Fairness and trust 
The recent BGH case (2011) NStZ 107 dealt with the question of whether a court may be 
bound to an agreement that actually never came into existence. The accused in the case 
claimed that he had trusted in the negotiations, although a formal settlement of an 
agreement never took place. The BGH denied any binding effect of the procedure. This 
view of the case can – as will be shown – be opposed for good reason. It will be shown 
that the constitutional principle of trust has a huge impact on our view on informal 
agreements. 
The factual basis of the trial at first instance was as follows: In the case, the legal 
representative of the accused and the presiding judge spoke over telephone at a pre-trial 
stage, i.e., at the stage of s 199 seqq. of the StPO, which is in German law an interim 
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  BGH court order of 4 August 2010 − 2 StR 205/10 = (2011) NStZ 107. 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 32; BGH (2010) BeckRS 28284. 
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procedure on the decision concerning the opening of the main proceedings. The presiding 
judge announced as a possible subject to an agreement a suspended sentence of two 
years of imprisonment in exchange for a confession. As a consequence, the main hearing 
would be shortened to two days’ length and some witnesses would not be summoned. The 
prosecution gave its consent to the proposal. The presiding judge 'F' then became ill. The 
subsequent main proceeding then took place with the new judge 'B' that replaced the ill 
judge 'F'. The main hearing lasted two days and some witnesses were, as initially planned, 
not summoned. But other than expected by the accused, Judge 'B' now refused to enter 
into a formal s 257c agreement, due to the fact that the evidence was good.860 At the 
beginning of the main hearing the judge put down in the record that discussions between 
the legal representative of the accused and the presiding judge 'F' had taken place. He 
further declared to the record, that 'F' had declared that an agreement (with the 
abovementioned content) is possible. The record further contained that in the main 
proceedings the judge 'B' had thought about entering into a s 257c agreement on the 
present basis. The final decision however was abstain from entering into an agreement. 
The accused then only partly confessed. The judge 'B' then recalled the accused, on the 
grounds that a full confession could help the accused to get a suspension on the sentence. 
He spoke of the ‘desired suspended sentence’. That motivated the accused to fully 
confess. The judge then recorded once again that an agreement had not been settled. At 
the end of the hearing the judge asked the accused how much he would be able to pay 
monthly (which is a condition of a suspension in respect of s 56b StGB). Finally, the 
prosecution pleaded for a suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment.861 The 
defence pleaded accordingly. The court then convicted the accused - surprisingly - to a 
two year, nine month custodial sentence without a suspension. The appeal against this 
judgment before the BGH, as the ‘German Supreme Court of appeal,’ was not successful. 
The BGH held that a violation of the provision of s 257c as complained by the accused did 
not occur. The reason was that a formal agreement in respect of s 257c had not been 
settled. The conclusion of an informal agreement in the case appeared to be possible but 
was not proven. However, an informal bargain would not generate a binding effect as 
prescribed for statutory bargains in s 257c (3) 4 and (4) StPO. A formal agreement, that 
has to be recorded, obviously did not come into existence. 
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The BGH then examined a possible violation of the principle of a fair trial. Such a violation 
requires behaviour on the part of the court that would be misleading and unclear. The 
accused has to be confused in a way that he cannot figure out how his own procedural 
conduct will affect the further outcome of the proceeding and whether it harms him. This 
requires proof that the court gave the accused the impression that it considers itself bound 
by the negotiations – here, with the ill judge ‘F’ – and that the accused can trust in a settled 
agreement. Here, the BGH held that the court of first instance was right not to consider 
itself bound to the informal pre-trial discussion and the ‘offer’ of Judge ‘F’. Then Judge ‘B’ 
had no other possibility than to simply state that he would not accept the so far undertaken 
negotiations and to clearly state so in the record. He did so at the beginning of the main 
hearing and once again at the end. In the eyes of the BGH there was not further or more 
far-reaching possibility to state that the court considers itself as not being bound and that 
the accused had no right to trust in the pre-trial proposal.862 
Meyer strongly opposes the decision of the BGH on that case.863 He admits that the BGH 
was right when stating that informal agreements generally do not bind the court. This 
already conforms to pre-statutory case law.864 Actual case law confirms this 
understanding.865 Meyer however stated that the question of whether agreements bind the 
court cannot be put on a level with the protection of trust.866 The constitutional principle 
that trust is protected could not be cleared away simply because of a lack of formal 
requirements or the inadmissibility of an agreement.867 The fact that the agreement in the 
case did not bind the court had not effect on the principle of trust. The trust of the accused 
has to be protected even though an agreement was inadmissible only if trust had been 
generated through particular conduct during the proceedings.868 In the opinion of Meyer – 
which can be supported − the principle of a fair trial, as contained in Article 6 of the ECHR, 
was not well enough considered by the BGH.869 The appeal decision did not focus sharply 
enough on the court’s conduct during the proceeding.870 BGH only held that it was 
                                            
862
  It has to annotated that the BGH also referred to a lack of presentation of facts by the accsued that 
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  Meyer (2011) HRRS 17. 
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essential that the recorded statements at the beginning and towards the end of the main 
hearing had declared that a formal agreement had not taken place. What should have 
been reflected by the BGH instead was the whole conduct of the court of first instance and 
the influence it had on the accused in between.871  
Meyer reveals two aspects that should have been scrutinized by the BGH more deeply.872 
First, he mentions that trust in the agreement is not solely destroyed by the court’s 
recordings stating that no agreement had been disclosed.873 One should rather take into 
consideration the judge’s behaviour as a whole, especially during the hearing of the 
accused. Second, in the case there had been other possibilities – which the BGH does not 
admit – to further state that the court considers itself not bound by the informal agreement, 
i.e., to further clarify that there was no right to trust in the proposal of judge ‘F’, who later 
became ill.874 The court could have stated more clearly that it was still considering 
convicting the accused and imposing a non-suspended sentence.875 Instead, the judge 
gave the impression that he would stick to the negotiated terms. To destroy any trust on 
the part of the accused, the court could have stated that the chance for a suspended 
sentence is factually not exaggerated, instead of encouraging the accused to fully confess 
and recalling the ‘desired suspended sentence’ that the accused could achieve.876 Finally, 
the court had conducted the proceedings as if the informal agreement was in force. There 
were only two days planned for the main hearing and some witnesses were not 
summoned, which conformed to the presumptions of the initial negotiations. 
Summing all these facts and possible alternative actions up, it cannot be regarded as 
evident that the accused had no reasonto trust in what had been discussed at a pre-trial 
stage. To be more specific, trust was not caused by the pre-trial discussions and judge 
‘F’’s proposal for an agreement. Trust and confidence in the final outcome of the trial was 
rather encouraged through the later conduct of the main proceeding in which judge ‘B’ 
largely referred to negotiated terms, even while pretending that he did not consider himself 
bound to the negotiations anymore. 
The case shows that the principle of a fair trial plays an important role in bargain 
procedures that are informal. The principle can be referred to the rule of law and to Article 
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6 of the ECHR for Germans and to s 35 (3) of the South African Constitution. BGH 
however interpreted these principles too strictly. Whenever the accused has a legitimate 
reason to presume certain behaviour, he can trust in such an outcome and consequently 
the court and prosecutor are bound to their indications. 
d. Concluding remark 
Statutory agreements in both countries do indeed bind the participants. On the contrary, 
informal bargains have no binding effect. The conclusion of an informal agreement in 
South Africa can generally be compared to the German bargain procedure. The reason 
therefore is that the German law does not know specific formalities and rules concerning 
the act of agreeing to the agreement. Rather, it can be described as a mutual process of 
consenting. Both South African and German informal bargain procedures, although not 
binding, have to comply with the rule of law and the principle of a fair trial. Consequently, 
the courts are not free to choose the informal bargain procedure and to thereby throw 
overboard the accused’s fundamental rights by fostering trust in a reasonable and 
predictable conduct of the trial. It cannot be right that the accused is influenced by subtle 
indications and secret offers and on the other hand has no right to claim the performance 
that has been imposed on him.877 The courts in such a scenario would have free rein to 
communicate nonformally and to use subtle indications which could under no 
circumstances become binding to them.878 
10. Non-compliance and withdrawal 
Oftentimes the parties intend to comply with formal prerequisites but accidently fail to do 
so or even willingly circumvent such prerequisites. The consequences of this are difficult to 
ascertain. It is apparent that not every formal fault transforms a formal bargain procedure 
into informal negotiations. Thus, there have to be legal consequences that are applied if 
the parties fail to comply with formal prerequisites. What consequences results where a 
party decides to resile from a concluded agreement is of much interest to this discussion. 
a. Non-compliance 
Both in Germany and South Africa statutory law knows several provisions establishing 
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formal prerequisites that must be considered in the bargain procedure.879 It shall be 
examined which provisions cause a major irregularitiy and which failures in the 
proceedings can be cured. 
In the Solomons case, the Cape High Court had to deal with the consequences of judicial 
noncompliance.880 The court had to deal with three irregularities that had occurred in the 
proceedings. The first was that the accused only repeated his admissions instead of 
confirming the facts upon which those admissions are based, as contemplated in s 105A 
(6) (a) (ii).881 Second, the fulfilment of s 105A (6) (a) (iii) had not been documented, i.e., 
the accused had entered into the agreement freely and voluntarily in his sound and sober 
senses without having been unduly influenced.882 The third was that the record of the 
proceedings did not disclose what sentence the presiding officer regarded as 'just' before 
convicting the accused and imposing the sentence.883 It appeared that the presiding officer 
was of the opinion that the agreed upon sentence was not an appropriate one.884 He did 
however proceed to impose the sentence which he regarded as just. 885 The purpose of 
making such information known is to enable the parties to make an informed choice 
whether to abide by the plea bargaining process or to resile there from.886  
S 105A provides for consequences of noncompliance by the negotiating parties, but it 
does not state any consequences of judicial noncompliance. However, the High Court 
held, that, as a consequence, the magistrate violated s 105A (9) (a).887 Moosa J did not 
further explain his conclusion. The procedure laid down in s 105A (9) however offers the 
prosecutor and the accused the possibility to decide whether they abide by the agreement 
under the terms of the sentence that the court imposes to be just or, alternatively, to 
withdraw therefrom, s 105A (9) (b)-(d). It can be assumed that the non-indication of the 
just sentence violates the right of the parties to decide whether to proceed with the 
agreement under the modified terms on the sentence or to start a trial de novo. The Cape 
High Court consequently set aside the conviction and sentence and remitted the matter to 
the magistrate’s court for hearing de novo before another presiding officer.888 
                                            
879
  It can be remarked that German rules on pre-trial discussions in terms of s 160b, 202a, 212 only know 
the duty to document the essential contetn in ther court record. 
880
  Rodgers (2010) SACJ 239 at 260 at 254; S v Solomons 2005 (2) SACR 432 (C). 
881
  Rodgers (2010) SACJ 239 at 260 at 254; S v Solomons 2005 (2) SACR 432 (C) at 435h. 
882
  S v Solomons 2005 (2) SACR 432 (C) at 435h.. 
883
  S v Solomons 2005 (2) SACR 432 (C) at 436a. 
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  S v Solomons 2005 (2) SACR 432 (C) at 436b. 
885
  S v Solomons 2005 (2) SACR 432 (C) at 436b. 
886
  S v Solomons 2005 (2) SACR 432 (C) at 436d-e. 
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  S v Solomons 2005 (2) SACR 432 (C) at 436e. 
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Unfortunately, the High Court failed to state whether the failure of the magistrate to state 
whether he considers the sentence to be just was of relevance. Furthermore, the court 
failed to indicate whether any single irregularity, or the cumulative effect of irregularities, 
motivated its decision.889 Considering that s 105A (9) (a) is one of the core provisions of s 
105A, noncompliance in this instance causes a major irregularity.890 Rodgers sums up that 
it is possible to set aside a conviction based upon judicial noncompliance with a single 
core provision of s 105A such as subsection (9).891 There is however a question as to 
which formal provisions are to be interpreted as core provisions – Rodgers also names 
them ‘material’ provisions892 – and which are not. For instance, Rodgers holds that a 
nonfulfilment of s 105A (6) (a) (iii), whereby the court should ask the accused whether he 
freely consents, should be of no further relevance if the overall documentation is clear on 
the point that such will of the accused was given.893 Thus, one has to distinguish between 
provisions that only contain formal prerequisites that intend to lead through the bargain 
and provisions that enshrine material rights. In the present case, s 105A (9) (a) was 
violated because the court’s indication that it considered the agreed sentence as unjust 
would have given the parties further opportunities to react. To name one more example of 
an insufficient irregularity: it can be assumed that if the parties fail to fulfil all formal 
requirements in terms of s 105A (2) (b), they have failed to fully state the terms of the 
agreement and this should not cause a major irregularity as long as the content can be 
proved by other means. 
German law also refers to the rationale of the procedural provision that has been 
violated.894 The legal consequences of such violations are however as unregulated as in 
South African law.895 Thus, is has to be judged whether the violated rule serves the public 
interest or not. For instance, the rule in s 257c (5), which states that the defendant shall be 
instructed as to the prerequisites for and consequences of a deviation by the court from 
the prospective outcome pursuant to that subsection, only serves the interests of the 
accused. Thus, the agreement remains effective even if this information had not been 
given.896 A problem arises if the court unilaterally violates provisions that serve public 
interest. The accused in these cases may have to be protected in his trust in the 
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  Rodgers (2010) SACJ 239 at 255. 
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  Rodgers (2010) SACJ 239 at 255. 
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  Rodgers (2010) SACJ 239 at 255. 
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  Rodgers (2010) SACJ 239 at 255. 
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  Rodgers (2010) SACJ 239 at 255. 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 32. 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 32. 
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proceedings. An example of a rule that serves public interest is the obligation to document 
the bargain proceedings in terms of s 273 (1) 2 and (1a).897 It is however held that the trust 
of the accused in these cases does not predominate the public interest. Thus, the 
agreement does not become effective. The accused however is protected in various other 
ways. The unilateral non-use of formal prerequisites by the courts usually indicates the 
judge’s bias in cases in which it seems obvious that the court misuses his position to force 
the accused into certain conditions of an agreement.898 Moreover, it can be assumed that 
the court oftentimes violates the principle of a fair trial.899 Finally, the confession will not be 
used where s 136a (5) 2 is applied, such that statements obtained under application of 
prohibited methods may not be used even if the accused consents to their use.900 
Thus, it can be summed up that only the breach of declaratory rules not serving any public 
interest possibly do not cause legal consequences. Others usually let the agreement 
become ineffective. The accused may be protected by rights such as the one to a fair trial. 
b. Claim for performance 
The accused in cases of noncompliance may even have a right to ‘claim for performance.’ 
Although this is a civil law term, it may serve to describe the accused’s position in the plea 
bargain procedure. There are two situations imaginable. The first is the case of formal 
noncompliance as described beforehand. The second is the case where all formal 
requirements have been met but a party refuses to fulfil its part of the agreement. In the 
latter case, it has to be distinguished between the refusing parties. It can be stated that the 
accused generally is entitled to claim for performance.901 However, the rule of law affords 
that once the accused fails to perform, the state or the court cannot claim fulfilment. 
Moreover, the consequence is that the latter parties cease to be bound by the 
agreement.902 The right to claim depends on the point in time in which the agreement 
binds the parties. Under South African law it can be assumed that once the plea of guilty is 
accepted the agreement becomes binding and constitutionally enforceable.903 In the case 
of the nonfulfilment by the court of formal prerequisites that serve public interests, the 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 32. 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 32; Compare once again BGH court order of 4 August 2010 − 2 StR 
205/10 = (2011) NStZ 107. 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 32. 
900
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 32. 
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  Heller, Die gescheiterte Urteilsabsprache, p. 61-94. 
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  Compare Bekker (1996) 19 (1) CILSA 168 at 206 with reference to U.S. law. 
903
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accused has no right to claim performance.904 The rationale is that otherwise the interests 
of the public could be undermined by the accused.905 
c. Court’s withdrawal 
In German and South African law the court ceases to be bound by the agreement in 
different situations. 
South African s 105A (10) (a) states that an agreement shall be null and void in the event 
that a trial starts de novo as contemplated in subsection (6) (c) or (9) (d). The main 
purpose of that provision is to encourage the prosecution and defence to negotiate by 
means of giving the assurance that their statements in the negotiation process cannot be 
used against them where a trial starts de novo.906 According to subsection (6) (c), the 
reason can be that: the court recorded a plea of guilty because it is not satisfied of the 
accused’s guilt (s 105A (6) (b) (i)), the accused does not admit the facts to which he had 
pleaded guilty (s 105A (6) (b) (ii)) or for another reason the court is of the opinion that the 
plea of guilty should not stand (s 105A (6) (b) (iii)). By the terms of subsection (9) (b) (ii), 
the trial starts de novo due to the prosecutors or the accused’s withdrawal from the 
agreement, which will be the case if they dissent from the court’s proposal for an 
alternative sentence which the judge considers to be just. It has to be emphasized that 
subsection (10) (a) (i) to (iii), dealing with the legal consequences, does not distinguish 
between the two possible reasons for a trial to start de novo.907 Although there is no 
reference in s 105A (10) (a) to the situation where the prosecutor and the accused 
negotiated but failed to reach a plea and sentence agreement, it is submitted that all 
statements are inadmissible evidence at the subsequent trial.908 Trollpi JA in Naidoo v 
Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd pointed out that it serves public policy if the 
participants negotiate amicably without the fear that, if the negotiations fail, any 
admissions made by them will be used against them.909 S v Forbes case already dealt with 
the problem of excluding evidence in respect of ‘considerations of public policy’.910 To sum 
it up, s 105A (10) (b) helps avoiding successive unsuccessful plea and sentence 
agreements by stating that prosecutor and the accused may not enter into another 
agreement in the trial de novo. Furthermore, it encourages the participants to agree on a 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 32. 
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  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 32. 
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  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-21. 
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  Compare Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-21. 
908
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viable and realistic agreement as there is only a single opportunity to do so. Nevertheless, 
where a trial starts de novo, the participants will oftentimes continue informal negotiation 
despite s 105A.911 
The German statutory provisions on plea bargaining, inserted into the StPO in 2009, 
eased the court’s withdrawal from the agreement as compared to the former case law of 
the BGH.912 Former case law bound the court to the pronounced upper sentence limit 
unless the further outcome of the trial revealed so far unknown and grave new facts 
concerning the accused’s guilt.913 The BGH’s Grand Criminal Panel later in addition 
permitted deviations from the indicated upper sentence limit if the facts existing during the 
negotiations later proved to be wrong.914 The presented case law has been further 
restricted by s 257c (4) 1, which states that the indicated sentence limits in addition have 
to appear inappropriate when compared to the accused’s guilt and the crime he 
committed. The section reads as follows: ‘the court shall cease to be bound by a 
negotiated agreement if legal or factually significant circumstances have been overlooked 
or have arisen and the court therefore becomes convinced that the prospective sentencing 
range is no longer appropriate to the gravity of the offence or the degree of guilt.’ What 
eases the withdrawal now is that the possible carelessness of the court can form a ground 
to withdraw. If the court for instance did not read the file closely enough, he might in terms 
of the section ‘overlook’ substantial facts and base the proceedings on his insufficient 
knowledge of the case. If later the parties enter into an agreement this simple fact would 
provide grounds to withdraw. However, the legislature’s intention was to promote just 
convictions.915 The provision is similar to the South African s 105A (9). The provision of 
257c (4) 1 aims for a just conviction. Other than in South African law, however, the rule not 
only allows withdrawal if the court is of the opinion that the sentence agreement is unjust, 
but rather it also provides for withdrawal where the court has failed to ensure its own 
proper information. Furthermore, s 257c (4) 2 provides for another interesting grounds for 
withdrawal. That provision refers to the situation where the ‘conduct’ of the accused does 
not correspond to the court’s prediction. ‘Conduct’ used in this context does not mean the 
appearance before the bench and the shown behaviour during the trial but instead means 
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  Geldenhuys/Joubert/Swanepoel/Terblanche/van der Merwe, Criminal Procedure Handbook, p. 244 
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the accused’s use of procedural rights.916 This basically means that the accused waives 
the right to make motions to admit evidence.917 Thereby, the court’s obligation to establish 
the truth, i. e. the duty to search for the substantial facts of the matter, is affected. Without 
information from the participants, the court’s investigation is a limited one. In particular, the 
indication of a upper sentence limit, which most likely indicates the specific sentence the 
court is aiming for in exchange for adjusted and pleasant ‘conduct,’ appears 
questionable.918 If the court ceases to be bound by the agreement due to unexpected 
conduct, this opens the possibility of misuse and inappropriate pressure toward the use of 
procedural rights. However, there is not much case law in the field on this section. Legal 
practice will have to show if the relatively young provisions will be applied in an 
inappropriate way or not. 
d. Legal consequences 
Having presented the different grounds for withdrawal, the further proceedings in both 
legal systems shall be reviewed. The legal consequence in South Africa is prescribed by s 
105A (10), stating that a trial takes place de novo. A trial de novo is a ‘new’ trial. S 105A 
(6) (c) and (9) (d) state that the trial starts de novo before another presiding judge. Usually 
an appeals court will order such a new trial. Nevertheless, s 105A provides for such a 
consequence already at first instance. Where a trial starts de novo as contemplated in 
subsection (6) (c) (or as contemplated in subsection (9) (d) as well), the agreement shall 
be null and void and no regard shall be given or reference made to any negotiations which 
preceded the formation of the agreement or to any record of the agreement in any 
proceedings relating thereto. The only exception is where the accused consents to the 
recording of all or certain admissions made by him or her in the agreement or during any 
proceedings relating thereto, and any admission so recorded shall stand as proof of such 
admission (s 105A (10)). The prosecutor and the accused may not enter into a plea and 
sentence agreement in respect of a charge arising out of the same facts. Furthermore, the 
prosecutor may proceed on any charge. The purpose of these provisions is to encourage 
the prosecution and the accused to negotiate and reach an agreement by giving them both 
a statutory guarantee that their admissions and concessions made in regard to the 
agreement cannot be used against them when a trial start de novo. 
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In Germany, however, the same trial continues even though the parties have withdrawn 
from the agreement or substantial irregularities have occurred. The legal consequences 
are nevertheless comparable to those under South African law. S 257 (4) 3 states that the 
accused’s confession may not be used. This provision is necessary due to the fact that the 
accused in most cases has made a confession that generally remains usable evidence. 
The use of the confession after the withdrawal however would violate the principle of a fair 
trial.919 In civil law terms the accused has the right to a condictio of his confession.920  
Another point asks for comparison. There is no German rule that a trial continued after a 
failed agreement has to be taken before another presiding officer, as South African s 105A 
(10) prescribes as a general rule. The same consequence can however result out of the 
general provision. The judge may be challenged for bias under the terms of s 24 (1) of the 
StPO. Subsection (2) describes that ‘a challenge for fear of bias may be brought where 
there is reason to doubt the impartiality of a judge’. The failure of an agreement results in 
an increased judge’s workload. This already could indicate a lack of impartiality.921 Another 
reason might be that the confession the accused made in first place, although it is not 
usable as evidence, might have already formed the basis of court’s opinion.922 Others 
however trust in the judge’s independence and deny such grounds for bias.923 
Interestingly, South African law in s 105A (10) (b) forbids any further agreements based on 
a charge arising out of the same facts. The question of whether a failed agreement can be 
followed by a second, subsequent agreement has not yet been considered in the German 
controversy.924 The rationale of prohibiting a second agreement is that in the interest of 
justice finality must be reached.925 Successive unsuccessful agreements could greatly 
delay the proceedings.926 It can be held that the main benefit of plea bargaining, to shorten 
the trial, cannot be achieved anymore once an agreement has failed. In that case each 
subsequent agreement will cause great uncertainty. Nevertheless, the parties that already 
have been opposed in a first agreement proceeding will already be infected by what has 
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been discussed earlier. Thus, even though the parties do not intend or simply are not 
entitled to proceed with a second formal bargain, they will however informally negotiate on 
the case. It can be assumed that it is the prosecutor’s and the accused’s will to fix the 
failure of the first agreement procedure. The German court is entitled and, due to the 
inadmissibility of informal bargaining, is forced to conduct a secondary formal agreement. 
The judge will however have a simultaneous interest in terminating the proceedings in 
relatively short time. Thus the German judge, as the formal initiator of the bargain 
procedure, will only enter into a second bargain if they see opportunity for a quick 
conclusion of the procedure. This will depend on whether the first agreement failed due to 
formal irregularities or rather whether it showed misuse, grave dissent or even 
unwillingness. It can be summed up that there are good reasons for a general prohibition 
of successive bargains though, as they may have little chance to actually shorten the trial 
and also may conflict with the rule of law. 
e. Concluding remark 
Noncompliance to formal prerequisites is of relevance where the public interest is touched. 
The non-use of the procedural achievements after an agreement has failed against the will 
of the accused in South Africa is enshrined in s 105A (10) (a), whereas in Germany it is an 
unwritten principle. An agreement in both laws is constitutionally enforceable by the 
accused. The withdrawal from an agreement in Germany is only ruled with regard to 
certain aspects but has not yet raised greater concerns. The grounds for withdrawal are in 
essence very similar to the corresponding South African provisions. If one assumes that 
the primary legal consequence of a bargain is the accused’s claim for performance, the 
secondary legal consequence then describes what happens if the agreement is not further 
upheld or if the court withdrew from it. South African law provides for a trial de novo before 
another presiding officer. German law on the other hand considers the confession as not 
usable evidence and proceeds with the present trial in the usual manner. German law, 
unlike South African s 105A (10) (b), does not prohibit successive agreements. 
Nevertheless, in practice they will not occur very often due to the immanent uncertainty of 
such a second bargain procedure. 
11. Remedies 
A key issue surrounding plea bargaining is the question of whether and to what extent 
convictions based on agreements are appealable. The question of whether one party is 
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entitled to appeal against the conviction or the sentence is connected to the question of 
whether a party is entitled to resile from the agreement.927 Furthermore, it will be 
discussed as an issue of particular interest.  
Waivers that form part of agreements were controversial for a long time in Germany until 
the statutory amendment finally straightened the issue. Until the statutory amendment in 
2009, German case law accepted the waiver of the right to appeal as a part of the 
agreement. This was even considered to be one of the main benefits of plea bargaining. 
Until a crucial decision of the BGH in 2005 that set up requirements for a waiver,928 the 
legal practice had made extensive use of this instrument. Surprisingly, the newly inserted 
2009 main provision on plea bargaining was accompanied – amongst others – by a s 302 
(1) 2 StPO. This provision strictly forbids any waiver of the right to appeal that forms part of 
an agreement. This was a major caesura in the history of plea bargaining in Germany to 
that date. The waiver of the right to appeal in connection with agreements does not seem 
to have been a major issue in the controversy surrounding plea bargaining in South Africa 
so far. 
a. General system 
To understand the legal practice in both countries, it first has to be taken a look at the 
general provision on the right to appeal. 
Remedies in terms of South African criminal law can be subdivided into review and appeal. 
S 35 (3) (o) guarantees, as part of the right to a fair trial, every accused person’s right of 
review or appeal by a court of higher instance.929 A minimum of this right is ‘the opportunity 
for an adequate reappraisal of every case and an informed decision on it’.930 Thus the 
principle of a fair trial is not restricted by written law and legal standards.931 It is moreover 
a question of whether justice has been served or not.932 S 25 (3) and s 35 (3) of the South 
African Constitution enshrine and even extend this principle. It should not only be asked if 
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a ‘failure in justice’ occurred but also if the trial was fairly regarded as whole.933 
Consequently, the trial must not only be conducted in compliance with previous 
requirements and standards;934 it must also match to the concept of substantive fairness 
and justice.935 To sum it up, appeal and review are constitutional rights. 
Review is the best way to seek redress in the event that a party should feel aggrieved 
about an irregularity involved in arriving the conviction.936 An accused who challenges the 
correctness of his conviction or sentence should however appeal against such conviction 
or sentence.937 The reason therefore is that the evidence is not considered as carefully 
upon appeal and the same weight is not attached to technical points in the procedure, 
since the review is only concerned with the question of whether the proceedings accord 
with the demands of justice.938 Furthermore, it has to be distinguished between an appeal 
on facts and an appeal on a question of law. The former unlimited or absolute right to 
appeal to a court of higher instance against a decision or order of a lower court was 
amended in favour of a limited right to appeal when the Criminal Procedure Amendment 
Act 76 of 1997 came into operation on 28 May 1999.939 
German law does not establish the institution of review. Each court of every instance 
comes to a final decision without the need of an approval of another court of higher 
instance. The South African law provides that sentences of magistrate’s courts have to be 
reviewed by a provincial or local division of the High Courts, even if the accused does not 
request it (‘automatic review’940).941 This is considered a benefit because by such means 
the High Court constantly controls the administration of justice in the magistrate’s courts. 
942 Such an ‘automatic’ control is not provided for in German law. Apart from that the 
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provisions concerning the appeal are similar to South African law. German law allows 
appeal on points of fact and law (Berufung) by the terms of s 312 and allows appeal on 
points of law only (Revision) in s 33. An appeal on points of fact and law is, by the terms of 
s 312, only admissible against judgments of the criminal court judge and of the court with 
lay judges, which are comparable to the magistrate courts as the lower courts of first 
instance. The appeal on points of fact initiates a full trial at the court of second instance. 
Evidence is retaken and witnesses have to testify again. The rationale behind the fact that 
only lower court decisions are appealable on points of fact is that these courts are only 
made up of a single professional judge and that there might be less extensive fact-finding. 
Thus, one considers the possibility to initiate a second evidence-taking by means of an 
appeal on points of fact as necessary. If the court of first instance is a higher court, the 
initial evidence-taking of the first instance cannot be repeated. According to German ss 
333, 335 of the StPO, generally decisions of all courts are appealable on points of law 
only. 
There may exist similarities between the South African review and the German appeal on 
points of facts. As the function of both institutions differs, i.e. review as a means to control 
the magistrate’s court versus appeal as an accused’s right, they cannot be considered 
comparable. 
b. Appeal against agreements 
Mismang J held in the S v Armugga & others case that the right of appeal would be a 
limited one in cases in which the accused was convicted in terms or his plea and sentence 
agreement.943 Relief can only be granted under exceptional circumstances.944 The wording 
in the S v Taylor decision might also reveal that the accused based his decision to review 
on the grounds, amongst others, that the magistrate had 'failed to ensure that the applicant 
was adequately represented and fully and correctly informed of the consequences of the s 
105A agreement, including the loss of any right to appeal against the sentence imposed in 
terms thereof'.945 As this latter example illustrates, South African practice might even 
regard the right to appeal to be set aside by a settled plea and sentence agreement under 
the terms of s 105A. 
To learn more about the abovementioned result, one has to take a closer look at the S v 
Armugga case. In that case, a number of accused appeared before the court of first 
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instance charged with offences of conspiracy and fraud, each one of them represented by 
one attorney.946 All accused entered into written plea and sentence agreements with the 
prosecution by the terms of s 105A. The agreements contained, in addition to the 
circumstances of the crime and the particular role of each accused the consent, that the 
accused was guilty.947 Each agreement was signed by the respective accused, his 
attorney and the prosecutor.948 Thereafter, the magistrate’s court convicted the accused. 
The sentencing was carried out in accordance with each agreement. The magistrate 
stated that it complied with certain provisions such as and s 105A (6) (a), which contain 
that the court satisfies itself that: the agreement was concluded by the accused freely and 
voluntarily, in his sound and sober senses, without having been unduly influenced; that the 
accused confirms the facts and admissions set out in the agreement and that he has 
indeed agreed to plead guilty.949 Fourteen accused then appealed against their 
convictions. The appeals were solely directed against the sentence imposed by the court 
of first instance. They argued that, because of a lack of a further inquiry, the sentence 
imposed was not just and the court had therefore not complied with the provisions of s 
105A (8). The section provides that the court has to satisfy itself that the sentence 
agreement is just before informing the prosecutor and finally convicting and sentencing the 
accused.950 They pointed out that the facts in the agreements were limited. The court 
should have conducted a more in-depth inquiry, examining the personal circumstances of 
the accused.951 Especially, they focused on subsequent convictions which were − to their 
minds − less severe. As a result, the imposed sentence appeared to them as a shock.952 
The appeal court then scrutinized the effect of an agreement upon the contracting parties 
and questioned if one can, after having concluded the agreement, unilaterally resile from 
the same or later appeal against a conviction.953 The court therefore recapitulated the 
development toward s 105A under aspects of appeal, as described in the following.  
The South African Law Commission that helped to draft s 105A had already taken notice 
of the issue. Subsection (10) had been planned stating that ‘a conviction or sentence 
imposed by any court in terms of an agreement under this section shall not be subject to 
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appeal’.954 The Commission later commented that it ‘remains of the view that the right to 
appeal should be limited’.955 In the discussion paper, the commission was of the view that 
review should be the appropriate remedy. The Commission adheres to the view that ‘it 
makes no sense to permit someone who pleads guilty and agrees to a sentence to appeal’ 
and that ‘it may, however, occur that the agreed facts do not constitute the offence. In such 
a case, an appeal would be justified.’956 The planned subsection (10) thereafter did not 
become statutory however. The right of appeal for those convicted and sentenced 
pursuant to plea bargaining agreements as a consequence was generally fully 
preserved.957 
Msimang J nevertheless sought to restrain the right to appeal for cases that have been 
plea bargained. He drew a comparison to Canadian law. A Canadian law commission 
once stated that where an accused has pleaded guilty there should be no right to appeal 
unless it was shown that the prosecutor, in the course of plea discussions, was wilfully 
misled by the accused in some material respect or that the court, in passing sentence, was 
wilfully misled in some material respect.958 He concluded that the right to appeal has to be 
a limited one. A comparison could be made to the position of an appellant who is convicted 
on his plea of guilty and afterwards appeals against this conviction. Just like in cases of 
plea bargaining, only in exceptional cases will the accused who has been convicted 
subsequent to and in accordance with his plea of guilty be granted relief on appeal.959 
Msimang J held that ‘the position can be equated with the position of an appellant who is 
convicted on his plea of “guilty” and thereafter appeals against the very same conviction.’ 
In such cases, case law provided the prerequisite of exceptional circumstances.960 
Msimang J then only said that exceptional circumstances were not revealed in the present 
appeals, without giving a more detailed explanation or a further analysis of the case.961 
Furthermore Msimang J emphasized that sentencing was not an exact science with 
uniform standards.962 Instead the sentencing court had to decide in each particular case 
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what weight to give to the single elements of the triad.963 Msimang J finally held that 
enough of the relevant information had been placed before the court, which enabled the 
judge to decide upon an appropriate sentence.964 There were no signs that the sentences 
were unjust, which was why he dismissed the appeals and confirmed the convictions and 
sentences of first instance.965 
Another case, S v De Koker, confirms this view.966 With regard to the court’s sentencing 
discretion, Breitenbach AJ explained that ‘the test for interference by an appeal court in a 
sentence imposed by a trial court is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is 
vitiated by irregularity or misdirection, or, even in the absence of misdirection, whether the 
sentence is disturbingly inappropriate in the sense that the appeal court is satisfied that the 
trial court did not exercise its discretion reasonably and imposed a sentence which was not 
appropriate.’967 In the case, Breitenbach AJ stated that the regional magistrate had 
explained to the appellant the implications of sentence and especially the minimum-
sentence provisions, about which the appellant later complained. Furthermore, the 
agreement had stated that the parties ‘were agreed that, in the appellant's case, there 
were no substantial and compelling circumstances which justified imposing a lesser 
sentence than the prescribed minima.’ 968 Consequently the appeal was dismissed. 
As presented, South African law generally limits the appeal against agreements. In 
German law the question whether an appeal against a conviction and sentence achieved 
by an agreement is admissible has long been discussed. Latest case law confirms that s 
257c does not provide for any restriction concerning the appeal on convictions and 
sentences that have been based on agreements.969 It was the legislature’s intention not to 
restrict that right.970 Even the prosecution is entitled to appeal; an appeal is even 
admissible if all formal requirements of the agreement procedure have been fulfilled and 
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the prosecution points towards material grounds.971 This is opposite of the practice in 
South Africa, which regards the right to appeal to be – apart from cases with exceptional 
circumstances – set aside by the agreement.972 In Germany, appeals on points of fact and 
law, as well as appeals on points of law only, are preserved.973 This is considered to be of 
substantial importance due to the fact that statutory law on agreements exceeds the scope 
of plea and sentence agreements against former jurisdiction.974 The unrestricted appeal 
therefore lends the accused the opportunity to fully control the plea bargain procedure.975 
An early BGH decision raised the question of whether certain grounds of appeal, such as 
the obligation to establish the truth, should be excluded because they would reveal 
contradictory behaviour.976 Limiting the remedies against agreement-based judgments to 
the appeal on point of law only was proposed in order to underscore the binding character 
of the agreement.977 The statutory amendment set these thoughts aside and clarified that 
the judgment generally is appealable.978 However, there is a need for a certain restriction 
of the right to appeal or at least a clarification as to which grounds of appeals ought to be 
successful. It is obvious that a totally unlimited right to appeal, for instance a right of the 
prosecution to challenge the sentence although it had agreed to a certain upper limit, 
would violate the very essence of bargaining. The individual directions an appeal can aim 
for have to be distinguished. The accused’s appeal is successful against the court’s 
withdrawal from features the judge had accepted.979 The violation of the procedure laid 
down in s 257c can also be challenged by appeal.980 It even has been held that the fact 
that the bargain was informal entitles a successful remedy.981 Highly problematic is the fact 
that it can be assumed that abusive agreement procedures are not documented.982 This 
makes it difficult for the appellant to prove failures. The major issue, however, is how the 
accused is protected from appeals made by the prosecution. As presented earlier, the 
accused might have a right to trust in the bargain procedure and its outcome. An appeal of 
the prosecution could destroy this trust and violate the principle of a fair trial in the terms of 
Article 6 of the ECHR. The prosecution, although having concluded an agreement, 
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generally remains entitled to challenge the conviction and sentencing by remedies.983 The 
remedy against particular terms of the agreement upon which the accused was allowed to 
trust and that came part of the conviction and sentence is a breach of trust.984 German 
case law accepts this fact. The offered solution, however, surprises. The appeal of the 
prosecution violates the principle of a venire contra factum proprium.985 Such behaviour 
does not affect procedural declarations such as the agreement though.986 It remains in 
force. Also, Article 6 of the ECHR and the fair trial maxim do not touch the agreement 
itself. German courts apply this general rule in cases where a party resiles from the 
agreement. The provision of s 257c (4) 1, regulating the situation in which the court ceases 
to be bound to the agreement, is used by analogy.987 The confession loses its quality as 
usable evidence.988 The principle that once one party resiles from the agreement then the 
other party, in this case the accused, is not bound to the terms of the agreement anymore 
is adapted to the situation of the prosecution’s remedy. Consequently, the appeals court 
would have to weigh the case again and could not use the accused’s confession. This 
however opposes the purposes of plea bargaining, i.e., finding a consensual solution that 
brings the trial to an end such the accused can trust in it. 989 It is therefore necessary that, 
in cases in which the prosecution appeals against the declared terms of the agreement, 
the accused can claim that the agreement remains effective and that his confession 
remains usable evidence.990 With the present case law the accused’s trust in the 
agreement is not fully protected. Courts ignore the fact that it not only affords a protection 
of the accused against the use of his confession in case ‘things go wrong’. Rather the 
accused’s interest is to be protected against ‘contractual breach’ of the terms of the 
agreement by the prosecution or even the court. 
c. Review of agreements 
In a lower court, an accused person not satisfied with the outcome of a criminal trial may 
choose either appeal or else a review to bring the matter before a High court having 
jurisdiction.991 Generally, where the correctness of the conviction or sentence is 
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challenged, it is best to choose an appeal.992 If the accused believes that the irregularities 
took place in the proceedings, he should seek relief by way of review.993 In specific cases 
both means can be apposite.994  
There exist various categories of review procedures. Statutory provisions provide for 
automatic review in terms of s 301, extraordinary review in terms of s 304 (4), review of 
proceedings before sentencing in terms of s 304A and the procedure in which the accused 
may set down case for argument in terms of s 306.995 A second category, acknowledged in 
s 173 of the Constitution, is of common law origin and contains the High Court’s common 
law inherent jurisdiction on review.996 The Supreme Court has no common law jurisdiction 
to review High court decisions.997 A third category of review is based on ‘other 
legislation.’998 Clearly, this jurisdiction of review is far wider than the above mentioned 
ones and even embraces reviews related to violations of constitutional rules and 
principles. The latter effect may however not have been intended.999 Nevertheless, such a 
review is applicable. The provision of s 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for 
reviewability. The section contains that certain sentences imposed by a magistrate's court, 
such as for instance a sentence of imprisonment exceeding a period of three months 
under specified circumstances, has to be subject to review in the ordinary course by a 
judge of the provincial or local division having jurisdiction. The review in terms of s 304 
examines whether the proceedings were conducted in accordance with justice. As will be 
shown, the statutory provisions on the review are not the only rules that are applicable. 
Especially in the case that formal requirements have been fully met, it must be asked 
which section might form the guideline for a review that is based on nonformal aspects, 
such as the question of whether the judge had ignored certain aspects or facts of the case. 
In S v Taylor, such review was not possible.1000 The case contained a plea and sentence 
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agreement that gave rise to various questions surrounding the reviewability of agreements 
and thus shows how plea bargaining can be approached under the aspect of review. An 
accused who was legally represented throughout the agreement procedure applied for a 
review and sought relief of his conviction. The grounds upon which the accused sought to 
have the proceedings reviewed were, amongst others, that the magistrate failed to ensure 
and to protect his constitutional and legal rights and failed to ensure due and proper 
process and procedure.1001 Furthermore, he claimed that the judge had failed to make 
certain that the procedure at the trial was just, fair, reasonable and that it complied with all 
the accepted principles of justice and equity.1002 He pointed out that the judge had failed to 
ensure that the accused was fully informed of all his rights and of the consequences – in 
particular with regard to the loss of any right to appeal against the sentence imposed – of 
the s 105A agreement he had entered into prior to the conviction and sentence.1003 He 
mentioned finally that proper legal representation had not been guaranteed throughout the 
agreement procedure and that thus he was not protected against misleading advice given 
by his legal representative, particularly concerning the consequences of a s 105A 
agreement.1004 Yekiso J held in the case that the proposed review was not a review as 
contemplated in s 302 because the accused was – formally – legally represented.1005 Nor, 
he stated, was it a case of s 304 (1) due to the fact that it had not been a magistrate who 
presided at the trial of first instance.1006 The irregularities that had motivated the accused 
to propose a review could not be certified. The agreement was signed by all necessary 
parties, including the legal representative of the accused.1007 In affidavits the prosecution 
officials disputed that any irregularities either in the conclusion of the agreement itself or in 
the proceedings themselves had occurred.1008 The record of the trial confirms that the 
requirements of s 105A (6) (a) and (8) were met. The accused was adequately legally 
represented, signed all relevant documents, was satisfied with the terms and conditions of 
the agreement and, finally, had stated that he was unduly influenced.1009 It can only be 
remarked that, as can be drawn from the record, the accused answered all imposed 
questions with 'Yes your worship'.1010 This could indicate that the trial situation − which the 
                                            
1001
  S v Taylor 2006 (1) SACR 51 (C) at 54g. 
1002
  S v Taylor 2006 (1) SACR 51 (C) at 54h. 
1003
  S v Taylor 2006 (1) SACR 51 (C) at 54h. 
1004
  S v Taylor 2006 (1) SACR 51 (C) at 54i. 
1005
  S v Taylor 2006 (1) SACR 51 (C) at 54e. 
1006
  S v Taylor 2006 (1) SACR 51 (C) at 54f. 
1007
  S v Taylor 2006 (1) SACR 51 (C) at 55f. 
1008
  S v Taylor 2006 (1) SACR 51 (C) at 55g. 
1009
  S v Taylor 2006 (1) SACR 51 (C) at 59d-e. 
1010
  S v Taylor 2006 (1) SACR 51 (C) at 56h-57c. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
145 
 
review court did not consider − was not freely conducted. An accused giving monotone 
answers to questions does not give the impression of a full application of all rights that are 
intended to secure his legal position in a trial. This shall only be mentioned and not 
examined further. Yekiso J posed himself the question of which grounds for review could 
be given: if the matter was neither reviewable under s 302 nor reviewable under s 304 
(1).1011 Yekiso J remarked that, if a matter was not reviewable in terms of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, s 24 of the Supreme Court Act could serve as an alternative ground for 
review.1012 The section states that 'the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and 
High Courts have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process and to 
develop the common law, taking into account the interests of justice.'1013 Yekiso J pointed 
out that 'the approach suggested in s 173 of the Constitution is indeed comprehensive, for 
it allows the exercise of the Courts' inherent power, taking into account the interests of 
justice, without being subjected to any form of statutory constraint.’1014 In the case 
however, Yekiso J concluded: that the magistrate at the court of first instance followed the 
prescribed procedure by the time that the plea and sentence agreement were disclosed, 
that the accused was adequately legally represented and that the record did not reveal any 
irregularities in the proceedings.1015 Thus, in Yekiso J’s eyes no irregularity had occurred 
and fair trial rights were not violated.1016 
Another case that deals with review is S v Salie.1017 In that case, the accused was 
convicted based on a plea and sentence agreement and sentenced for robbery with 
aggravating circumstances.1018 The accomplices were convicted in a separate trial, the S v 
Isaacs & another case,1019 and received on appeal a conviction of robbery simpliciter. The 
magistrate, presiding officer at the trial of the three accomplices, sought to initiate a review 
of the trial of the accused.1020 He justified this step with the fact that the conviction and 
sentence of the accused was based on the same facts and circumstances.1021 Thus, he 
held that consequently the accused was also entitled to claim the benefit of a less serious 
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conviction and sentence.1022 Yekiso J, again engaged in the S v Salie case as the 
reviewing judge, posed three questions: ‘(a) whether the magistrate had locus standi to 
initiate the proposed review; (b) whether the proceedings culminating in the plea and 
sentence agreement were reviewable in principle; and, (c) if so, whether there was any 
basis upon which to interfere with those proceedings’.1023 After answering the first question 
in the affirmative, Yekiso J focused on the subsequent questions. Again, he stated that s 
302 was not applicable due to the fact that the accused was represented at the trial. 
Reviewability under the other statutory provision was negated.1024 A review was however 
considered possible under the general provision of s 173 of the South African 
Constitution.1025 Then Yekiso J pointed out that the accused had pleaded guilty to robbery 
with aggravating circumstances and that he had at all times been represented by an 
experienced attorney.1026 Yekiso J held that 'the fact that uncertainty had arisen regarding 
the presence or otherwise of aggravating circumstances in the trial of his accomplices was 
not a basis upon which to fault the proceedings against the accused' and that 'there was 
accordingly no reason to interfere with the decision of the trial court'.1027 The accused 
himself had admitted to having used a knife as a means to threaten the victim with bodily 
harm.1028 
To sum it up, it can be safely said that reviewability of a formally correct agreement is 
possible based on s 173 of the South African Constitution. There are good reasons for a 
full reviewability of the bargain procedure. This is proven by Bennun’s reservations in that 
s 105A (6) empowers the court to strike down the agreement for reasons other than justice 
or the public interest.1029 The review is only successful if aggravating circumstances have 
not been recognized at first instance. In all other cases s 302 and 304 are applicable. 
d. Waiver of the right to appeal 
Waivers of the right to appeal were common practice in Germany before the statutory 
amendment in 2009.1030 The reason is that waiver of the right to appeal allows the judge 
under the terms of s 267 (4) StPO to write shorter judgements and protects from 
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uncertainty surrounding the further outcome of the trial.1031 One should note that writing a 
full judgment is a very time-consuming task for a German judge.1032 Thus, agreements 
with such waivers provided courts the opportunity to achieve a conviction in a relatively 
short time span while also ensuring that the judge’s conviction and sentence were not 
questioned by a higher court. This was considered a major benefit for the courts of first 
instance to lessen their workload without having to fear remedies. The new law on 
agreements however brought striking changes into this field of law.  
Ever since plea agreements came into existence, the waiver of remedies has always been 
an important but also a controversial issue in Germany.1033 Historic BGH decisions set out 
several requirements that had to be fulfilled before an accused could waive his or her right 
to appeal as part of an agreement.1034 The waiver makes the conviction unappealable, 
which many presiding judges may have considered as a major benefit of the plea 
bargaining procedure. With the new German law on agreements and the advent of s 302 
(1) 2 of the StPO containing such a rule, any waiver of the right to appeal that is related to 
a plea or sentence agreement is now inadmissible. The legislature’s intention was to 
prevent abuse of this instrument. Former case law, however, accepted the waiver of the 
right to appeal as a part of the agreement. BGH’s Grand Criminal Panel in BGH 50, 40 
only made it compulsory for the court to 'instruct qualified', i.e., to inform the accused that 
the agreement upon which conviction is based does not hinder him to appeal against the 
judgment. This instruction was necessary regardless of whether a waiver of the right to 
appeal formed part of the agreement or not. Without a 'qualified instruction' of that sort, the 
waiver would be ineffective. Waivers declared before the statutory amendment on 29 July 
2009 and on basis of the former case law remain admissible and in force.1035 The total 
interdiction of any option to waive the right to appeal subsequent to an agreement 
surprises. To the mind of some scholars, the provisions are too stern. As s 257c (3) 4 sets 
up the requirement that accused and prosecution have to consent to the court’s proposal 
of an agreement, there is no evident reason for forbidding the accused the ability to waive 
his right to appeal.1036 On the contrary, the total banning of the right to waive offers the 
                                            
1031
  Turner/Chodosh, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, p. 105 in footnote 52; compare 
Julius/Gercke/Kurth/Lemke/Pollähne/Rautenberg/Temming/Woynar/Zöller-Julius, StPO, s 267, para 28; 
Pfeiffer, StPO, s 267, para 22. 
1032
  Turner/Chodosh, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, p. 105 in footnote 52. 
1033
  See Dahs (2005) NStZ 580 at 580.  
1034
  Such as BGH 50, 40; see also Meyer-Goßner, StPO, Introduction, para 119g. 
1035
  BGH court order of 29 September 2009 – 1 StR 376/09; BGHSt 54, 167 = (2010) NJW 310. 
1036
  Meyer-Goßner, StPO, s 302, para 26c. 
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advantage that agreements more often will be checked by appeals courts.1037 But still, this 
gives the impression of what Meyer-Goßner calls a 'paradox.'1038 An accused in a 
conventional trial with unpredictable outcome is given the possibility to waive his right to 
appeal while at the same time an accused, who negotiated on a certain amount of 
sentence that he now expects, cannot waive.1039 It has been proposed that a total 
interdiction of any waiver for all kinds of procedures or perhaps a delay of at least one day 
to opt for a waiver would comply better with the current system.1040 As summed up, the 
strict decision of the legislature can only be explained by its intention to stop the pre-2009 
common practice of making a waiver of the right to appeal part of the agreement. 
e. Concluding remark 
It can be summed up that South African law generally regards the right to appeal in cases 
of plea bargaining as a limited one and furthermore that relief can only be granted in 
exceptional cases. German law formally recognizes a full right to appeal that is not 
restricted by the fact that the judgment is based on an agreement. Nevertheless, an 
appeal will be successful only if substantive failures have occurred. A waiver of the right to 
appeal since the advent of the statutory provisions is no longer admissible under German 
law, and thus the new law ends a common practice that had developed in legal practice. 
As the right to appeal was immediately regarded as a very limited right in the context of 
plea bargaining in South Africa, the discussion as to whether the accused may or even 
should be obligated to waive his right to appeal has never been an significant issue. Even 
though German law generally provides for an unrestricted right to appeal, an appeal will – 
following the general rules – only be successful in cases in which a grave failure occurred. 
However, the fact that the German legislature put an end to waivers and formally 
recognizes an unlimited right to appeal reveals a slight mistrust in bargained proceedings. 
Appeal is regarded as a major means to control the bargain and to prevent the courtroom 
from becoming a ‘marketplace.’1041 Even though a remedy against the negotiated terms is 
admissible and leads to a process of winding up the agreement (i.e. the non-use of the 
confession as evidence and a new conviction and sentence), the accused’s trust however 
affords more protective solutions that should be developed against the present case law. 
                                            
1037
  Meyer-Goßner, StPO, s 302, para 26c. 
1038
  Meyer-Goßner, StPO, s 302, para 26d. 
1039
  Meyer-Goßner, StPO, s 302, para 26d. 
1040
  Meyer-Goßner, StPO, s 302, para 26d. 
1041
  Compare Meyer-Goßner who states in Meyer-Goßner, StPO, s 357c, para 32a that there is a risk of a 
too extensive application of the new provisions on plea bargaining in Germany and that he is concerned 
about spreading agreements with inadmissible content what makes control through appeal necessary. 
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12. Comparable summary procedures 
Summary trials have a common basis and are very similar to the plea bargaining 
procedure. Summary trial procedure pushes aside that the commission of the offence has 
to be proved as well as the nemo tenetur principle that contains that no one is obligated to 
testify against him- or herself.1042 Elements of summary procedure might serve as an 
alternative or could be applied in addition to the statutory provisions on plea bargaining. 
This issue shall be presented, mainly focusing on the South African provision of s 112 
dealing with the plea of guilty at summary trials.1043 
a. General application of s 112 
Despite the inserted s 105A, s 112 could have been compatible with the plea bargaining 
procedure.1044 Even today, some jurisdictional divisions prefer to make use of s 112 rather 
than 105A due to the fact that s 112 proceedings are less burdensome and time 
consuming, as will be shown later.1045 Nevertheless, and regardless of s 112, plea 
negotiations and agreements were never given explicit statutory recognition until the 
advent of s 105A.1046 Advocate Schutte stated in a 2006 letter to Steyn that 'the plea 
bargaining concept is still quite new to the prosecution as well as to the defence. The 
impact of plea and sentence agreements is being influenced by various factors, such as: 
Some divisions do not follow the route of s 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act, as they 
rather follow s 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act which is not so time consuming. 
Complainants and investigating officers must be consulted before the prosecutor may 
accept a plea agreement.'1047 Even before the advent of s 105A in 2001, courts have 
thought of s 112 as an alternative to explicit statutory provisions on plea bargaining.1048 
The two mentioned examples show that s 112 was and is seen as a possible alternative to 
statutory plea bargaining. This raises the questions of what kind of proceedings s 112 
regulates and whether bargains based on s 112 can coexist apart from the s 105A 
procedure. 
                                            
1042
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-1. 
1043
  For other potential alternatives to plea bargaining see South African Law Reform Commission, Project 
73 (2001) p. 36 seqq. 
1044
  South African Law Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) at 5.10. 
1045
  Lubbe/Ferreira (2008) SACJ 151 at 163. 
1046
  South African Law Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) at 5.10. 
1047
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 216 with reference to a letter of advocate J Schutte addressed to her, dated 
25 August 2006. 
1048
  Compare North Western Dense Concrete CC and another v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western 
Cape) 1999 (2) SACR 669 (C) at 677b. 
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S 112 provides for a special plea procedure, i.e., a procedure for pleas of guilty in 
summary trials.1049 The provisions of s 112 and s 115 were major procedural innovations 
when inserted into the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. They introduced elements 
which did not comply with the traditional accusatorial trial procedure.1050 Nevertheless, s 
112 (1) (b) and s 115 are not limited to summary trials.1051 The sections are also applicable 
to various other stages of the criminal process.1052 The procedure contemplated in s 112 
breaches with important principles. The first is the requirement that, except for petty 
crimes, matters in which the accused pleads guilty must also be proved by evidence.1053 
The second aspect touched upon is the fact that the inquisitorial plea process is changed 
into an accusatorial system.1054 The principles of that the offence has to be proved, and 
the principle that no one is obligated to testify against him- or herself is set aside.1055 It 
should always be kept in mind that a plea of guilty waives fundamental rights such as the 
presumption of innocence, the right to remain silent and the right not to be compelled to 
give self-incriminating evidence.1056 Against this background, s 112 provides for further 
requirements the court and the parties have to comply with when an accused pleads 
guilty.1057 Generally, s 112 can be seen as a safeguard for constitutional rights.1058 
S 112 (1) (a) for minor offences reads as follows: '(1) Where an accused at a summary trial 
in any court pleads guilty to the offence charged, or to an offence of which he may be 
convicted on the charge and the prosecutor accepts that plea− (a) the presiding judge, 
regional magistrate or magistrate may, if he or she is of the opinion that the offence does 
not merit punishment of imprisonment or any other form of detention without the option of 
a fine or of a fine exceeding the amount determined by the Minister from time to time by 
notice in the Gazette [R 1,5001059], convict the accused in respect of the offence to which 
he or she has pleaded guilty on his or her plea of guilty only and- (i) impose any competent 
sentence, other than imprisonment or any other form of detention without the option of a 
fine or a fine exceeding the amount determined by the Minister from time to time by notice 
                                            
1049
  Compare Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-1. 
1050
  van der Merwe/Barton/Kemp, Plea Procedures in Summary Criminal Trials, p. V (preface). 
1051
  van der Merwe/Barton/Kemp, Plea Procedures in Summary Criminal Trials, p. 9. 
1052
  van der Merwe/Barton/Kemp, Plea Procedures in Summary Criminal Trials, p. 9. 
1053
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-1. 
1054
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-1; S v Ntlakoe 1995 (1) SACR 629 (O) at 633b-d. 
1055
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-1. 
1056
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-1. 
1057
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-1. 
1058
  Compare Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-1. 
1059
  GN R239 in GG 24393 of 14 February 2003. 
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in the Gazette [R 1,5001060]; or (ii) deal with the accused otherwise in accordance with law.' 
Thus, s 112 (1) (a) allows the judge to convict on the mere plea of guilty and leaves out the 
taking of evidence. Due to the fact that evidence is not considered, it is obvious that the 
procedure is only applicable to lower levels of conviction, i.e., to convictions that at present 
include a fine of R 1,500 and no sentence of imprisonment.1061 S 112 (1) (b) states for 
more serious offences that 'the presiding judge, regional magistrate or magistrate shall, if 
he or she is of the opinion that the offence merits punishment of imprisonment or any other 
form of detention without the option of a fine or of a fine exceeding the amount determined 
by the Minister from time to time by notice in the Gazette [R 1,5001062], or if requested 
thereto by the prosecutor, question the accused with reference to the alleged facts of the 
case in order to ascertain whether he or she admits the allegations in the charge to which 
he or she has pleaded guilty, and may, if satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence 
to which he or she has pleaded guilty, convict the accused on his or her plea of guilty of 
that offence and impose any competent sentence.' Thus, s 112 (1) (b) adds for cases of 
more serious offences, i.e. where a fine of more than R 1,500 or a sentence of 
imprisonment is justified or alternatively the prosecutor directs a request to the court, that 
the court has to question the accused about alleged facts.1063 By that means, S 112 (1) (b) 
inserts inquisitorial elements into the criminal procedure.1064 This is regarded as a safety 
measure against injustice caused by an unjustified plea of guilty.1065 As the questioning is 
pointed to the accsused’s guilt and to a lesser extent to the question of whether the 
offence was committed, the procedure is time-saving manoeuvre.1066 The purpose of the 
procedure for the court is to approve whether the accused admits the allegations brought 
against him or her and to convince itself that the accused is factually guilty.1067 The 
questioning might not be necessary in any case, e.g., where the court is convinced of the 
guilt, it appears superfluous.1068 
b. Plea bargain potential of s 112 
Two aspects, aside the functions shown above, draw attention to s 112. The first is the fact 
                                            
1060
  GN R239 in GG 24393 of 14 February 2003. 
1061
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-2. 
1062
  GN R239 in GG 24393 of 14 February 2003. 
1063
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-3. 
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  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 17-1; S v Ntlakoe 1995 (1) SACR 629 (O) 
633b-c; S v Williams 2008 (1) SACR 65 (C) at [20]. 
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  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-3. 
1066
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-3. 
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that subsection (2) provides for a written statement. The second, which shall be referred to 
later, is that the accused will oftentimes achieve leniency in sentencing if s 112 is applied. 
If the legal representative takes action, a written form is required due to the fact that the 
accused's legal representative cannot make an oral statement on behalf of his client.1069 
The main purpose of the written statement is to set out the admissions of the accused and 
the facts his or her plea of guilty is based upon.1070 In S v Sellars and Six Other Cases’s 
case,1071 the court discussed the formal requirements of such a written statement as 
contemplated in s 112 (2) and even drafted a standard form making provision for a series 
of admissions.1072 This approach of a written formalised statement comes very close to the 
well known plea and sentence agreements. The provision of s 112 (2) states that ‘if an 
accused or his legal adviser hands a written statement by the accused into court, in which 
the accused sets out the facts which he admits and on which he has pleaded guilty, the 
court may, in lieu of questioning the accused under subsection (1) (b), convict the accused 
on the strength of such statement and sentence him as provided in the said subsection if 
the court is satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence to which he has pleaded 
guilty: Provided that the court may in its discretion put any question to the accused in order 
to clarify any matter raised in the statement’. The provision of s 112 (1) (b) contains that 
‘the presiding judge, regional magistrate or magistrate shall, if he or she is of the opinion 
that the offence merits punishment of imprisonment or any other form of detention without 
the option of a fine or of a fine exceeding the amount determined by the Minister from time 
to time by notice in the Gazette [R 1,5001073], or if requested thereto by the prosecutor, 
question the accused with reference to the alleged facts of the case in order to ascertain 
whether he or she admits the allegations in the charge to which he or she has pleaded 
guilty, and may, if satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence to which he or she has 
pleaded guilty, convict the accused on his or her plea of guilty of that offence and impose 
any competent sentence’. To emphasise it again: if there is no written statement, the 
accused may still by him- or herself bring this fact to the court's attention.1074 The written 
statement is only required if the legal representative makes admissions or state facts on 
behalf of the accused. 
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The second aspect that suggests the application of s 112 for plea bargaining is that the 
provision offers the possibility to achieve a lenient sentence. The usual manner of conduct 
in terms of s 112 is that the accused pleads guilty to the charge brought against him. In 
accusatorial terms, in this case there arises no dispute over the guilt of the accused.1075 A 
‘voluntary’ guilty plea may motivate the presiding officer to see this as a mitigating factor 
and thus lessen the sentence. However, the case of greater interest is the one in which the 
accused pleads guilty to another offence and the prosecutor accepts such plea.1076 The 
prosecutor’s acceptance in this case has the consequence that the main charge falls away 
and the accused cannot be convicted of it.1077 This can also occur in the following manner: 
an accused pleads guilty to a charge but then makes admissions during his questioning 
which only can be brought in accordance with a lesser offence1078 upon which a conviction 
on the charge cannot be based.1079 This is because the situation leads either to the 
recording of a plea of not guilty under s 113 or the court asking the accused whether his 
admissions could be taken as a plea of guilty to a lesser offence, which the prosecutor has 
to accept as well.1080  
Further focus on the mentioned aspect of the prosecutor acceptance to the plea of guilty to 
a lesser offence, which can also be considered as a leniency in the sentence, will enrich 
this discussion. In the case of S v Ngubane, the court held that such acceptance was a sui 
generis act by which the prosecutor limited the ambit of the lis between the state and the 
accused in accordance with the accused's plea.1081 It further has to be distinguished at 
which stage the plea is accepted by the prosecutor, i.e., before or after the beginning of 
the trial.1082 Before the beginning of the trial, at the stage of the plea, the prosecutor is 
dominus litis and has the power to accept the plea of the accused and thereby to limit the 
lis between prosecution and accused.1083 With the beginning of the trial, the court takes on 
the function of adjudicator. Thus, the limitation of the charge, declared and accepted by 
way of the prosecutor’s consent to the guilty plea, also requires the court’s consent.1084 
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  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-12; S v Ngubane 1985 (3) SA 677 (A) at 683e. 
1082
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-12; Compare S v Sethoga and Others 1990 (1) SA 270 (A) at 
274i-275g. 
1083
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-12. 
1084
  Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure, p. 17-12. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
154 
 
The court may declare its consent either expressly or implicitly.1085 It should finally be 
noted that ceasing prosecution by the terms of s 6 (b) requires the authorization of the 
DPP.1086 The provision of 6 (b), regulating the power to stop prosecution, states that 'an 
attorney-general or any person conducting a prosecution at the instance of the State or 
any body or person conducting a prosecution under section 8, may (...) at any time after an 
accused has pleaded, but before conviction, stop the prosecution in respect of that charge, 
in which event the court trying the accused shall acquit the accused in respect of that 
charge: Provided that where a prosecution is conducted by a person other than an 
attorney-general or a body or person referred to in section 8, the prosecution shall not be 
stopped unless the attorney general or any person authorized thereto by the attorney-
general, whether in general or in any particular case, has consented thereto'. 
Thus, s 112 provides for a procedure in which a conviction is based on a written statement 
and a plea of guilty. The accused will oftentimes state facts that may contribute to a lenient 
sentence.1087 The prosecution possibly will not dispute against this unilateral presentation 
of facts due to preceding plea negotiations.1088 The section does not explicitly provide for a 
mutual agreement. But the pleading based upon on a specific factual basis – if accepted – 
binds the prosecutor regarding the facts and terms upon which the ‘agreement’ has been 
reached.1089 Even the court is limited to convict and sentence the accused on the basis of 
those facts.1090 It can be said that s 112 (2) procedure involves a compromise between 
various conflicting interests.1091 The benefit of the s 112 (2) statement is that it presents ‘a 
mild and unemotive version of the facts without disclosing unnecessary incriminating 
facts.’1092 Nevertheless, the prosecution has to be convinced that the presented facts are 
not inaccurate.1093 There are no formal requirements contained in s 112 (2) despite the 
necessity of a written statement, which is only required if the accused does not by him- or 
herself, without a legal representative, bring facts to the court's attention.1094  
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The mentioned facts reveal the dimension and potential of s 112 as an alternative plea and 
sentence agreement procedure. A written statement in terms of s 112 (2), which will set 
out facts upon which the accused pleads guilty to a lesser charge that is accepted and 
therefore become binding, has the full shape of a plea and sentence agreement. In 
contrast to s 105A, the provision of s 112 (2) does not require any formalities which the 
statement needs to satisfy other than that is must be in writing if the statement is given by 
the legal representative.1095 S 112 is a time-saving mechanism as it does not place an 
obligation on the prosecutor to consult with victims. On the contrary, s 105A requires such 
a consultation where it is reasonable to do so.1096 Thus, s 112 could be regarded as an 
‘easier way’ of plea bargaining. 
c. Legislature’s decision against the use of s 112 
It can be said that in practice s 112 does in fact provide for agreements, as the defence is 
able to ensure that the sentence does not exceed a certain amount and the prosecutor is 
able to recommend to the court to apply the section.1097 Some have held, for instance Ujis 
AJ in North Western Dense Concrete CC case, that the provision of s 112 was virtually 
tailormade for plea negotiations.1098 Uijs AJ reports that in 1999, courts almost interpreted 
the provisions of the section as if they related directly to the plea bargaining procedure.1099 
Opposed to others, Uijs AJ held that legislation on plea bargaining was not necessary as 
the institute could be governed by the existing s 112.1100 The later advent of s 105A proved 
that the legislature did not share this opinion. Consequently, s 112 should be inapplicable 
as a plea bargain procedure. Directive 1 issued by the NDPP clarifies that ‘the procedure 
enacted in s 105A does not supplant the standard procedure for pleas of guilty under the 
terms of s 112 of the Act’. 
d. Applicability after advent of s 105A 
There could remain a field of application for s 112-procedure as a bargain procedure. If the 
accused is not legally represented, for instance because he cannot afford an attorney, s 
105A is not applicable. S 105A (1) (a) clearly limits the procedure to the ‘accused who is 
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legally represented’. Nevertheless, the unrepresented accused might favour to profit from 
bargain features rather than to go through the conventional trial procedure. Even courts 
and prosecutor may have an interest to plea bargain a case although the accused is not 
legally represented. Clearly there is always the possibility of a public defender and legal 
aid. But in cases of less serious offences or an obvious factual basis this might be 
regarded as exaggerated, too time-consuming and, regarding the case numbers before 
courts, too cost-intensive. In fact, it can be assumed that s 112 is used as an alternative 
means to plea bargaining in terms of s 105A or at least fills the gap that is left for 
unrepresented accused.1101 As shown, s 112 provides for a procedure that to a great 
extent is comparable to the usual plea bargaining procedure as contained in s 105A. The 
use as a plea bargain alternative raises the question of in what way does the bargain-
related conduct of s 112 differ from the plea and sentence agreement of s 105A. The 
major aspect will be the lack of a binding effect. Furthermore, generally it can be said that 
as strictly interpreted s 112 does not provide for elements of mutual consent. The accused 
is free to plead to a lesser offence and the prosecutor − and after the beginning of the trial 
also the court − might consent to it or not. If the parties however mutually consent to a 
specific application of s 112, i.e., if they negotiate and agree upfront that the accused will 
plead guilty to a lesser charge, s 112-procedure is accompanied by an agreement. As it is 
not an agreement in terms of s 105A, it can be regarded as an informal agreement with all 
its legal consequences. As already has been said, in South Africa informal agreements 
remain admissible even in light of the advent of s 105A. To sum it up, plea bargaining 
under application of s 112 is a usual s 112 procedure combined with informal plea and 
sentence bargaining. Even if a s 112 plea of guilty might not be accompanied by an 
informal agreement, the accused might benefit from a leniency in the sentence: if the 
accused pleads to the charge an unqualified guilty plea, i.e., a plea of guilty without the 
negotiated reduction in the sentence, this may also be understood as a sign of remorse 
which saves the state time and the expense of a lengthy trial, which the presiding officer 
may take into account as a mitigating factor and thus sentence less severely.1102 Given 
that, the question arises whether this is a circumvention of the requirements of s 105A. At 
this point, almost all legal questions surrounding plea bargaining, and especially the 
question of compliance with constitutional rights, arise as well. The issue has apparently 
not been discussed so far in South Africa. To answer, it can be generally referred to the 
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admissibility of informal agreements.1103 The fact that an informal agreement is combined 
with admissible legal procedural measures such as s 112 does not change the nature of 
the informal agreement. Finally, it should be annotated that the agreement whereby the 
prosecutor undertakes to recommend a specific sentence or agrees not to oppose the 
proposal of the defence – other than the agreement that the accused plead guilty on the 
condition that an agreed sentence is in fact proposed by the court – generally is made 
possible by s 112 (3) in combination with an informal agreement.1104 It can be assumed 
that this procedure was not regulated by s 105A, as the prosecution only consents to 
propose or else not offend a specific sentence. Nevertheless, that implies the idea of a 
bargain. 
e. German provisions on summary procedure 
There are no provisions in German law that could be directly compared to s 112, as the 
German criminal procedure does not know a formal plea. Comparable to a plea only is a 
procedural option of the accused in which he confesses his guilt at the very beginning of 
the trial and signals that he is willing to cooperate. A confession shortens the need for 
further evidence-taking. Nevertheless, a confession does not modify the conduct of the 
conventional trial procedure in essence. German law, however, despite its inquisitorial 
tradition with the fundamental principle of a full investigation of the facts in terms of s 244 
(2), contains a summary procedure. It is contained in the s 407 seqq. regulating the penal 
order. The provision of s 407 (1) provides that, in proceedings before the criminal court 
judge and in proceedings within the jurisdiction of a court with lay judges, the legal 
consequences of the offence may, in the case of misdemeanours, be imposed, upon 
written application by the public prosecution office, in a written penal order without a main 
hearing. By the terms of s 407 (2), the legal consequences of a penal order are limited to 
the following: fine, warning with sentence reserved, driving ban, forfeiture, confiscation, 
destruction, making something unusable, announcement of the decision, and imposition of 
a regulatory fine against a legal person or an association, withdrawal of permission to drive 
where the bar does not exceed two years, as well as dispensing with punishment. The 
judge is obligated to scrutinize the penal order regarding if there are sufficient grounds for 
suspecting the indicted accused. It has to be emphasized that the court only examines 
whether the accused is suspicious, not whether he is guilty.1105 In practice, even this 
                                            
1103
  See above. 
1104
  Rodgers (2010) SACJ 239 at 244; South African Law Reform Commission, Project 73 (2001) para 4.15. 
1105
  Meyer-Goßner, StPO, Introduction to s 407, para 1. 
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scrutiny of the question on suspicion however almost never takes place. The prosecution 
fully prepares the penal order, which the judge only has to sign. The legal consequences 
of a penal order are nevertheless severe. If the accused does not make objections to the 
penal order in time, the order in terms of s 410 (3) of the StPO becomes equivalent to a 
judgment that has entered into force. The penal order is the ideal means to circumvent a 
public trial that causes attention and to rapidly achieve a conviction. That is why the 
procedure is popular with cases in which for instance celebrities are involved. The penal 
order can be applied without any consensual elements. It is upon the public prosecution 
office to decide whether to impose a penal order which the court might confirm. If the 
accused does not react at all to this procedure, the order becomes enforceable and is 
equal to a judgment, as mentioned. However, the penal order might alternatively also be 
used as a procedure to be followed after the parties have entered into an agreement.1106 
The penal order can be applied as a bargain instrument as s 257c does not prohibit the 
initiation of the bargain by the prosecution.1107 As the penal order replaces the trial, the 
bargain can be qualified as pre-trial negotiations in terms of 160b. 1108 The rules on 
documentation duties have to be applied.1109 The penal order contains a specific sentence. 
The prosecution is allowed to promise to apply for such a specific sentence; the court 
however is only entitled to indicate an upper sentence limit.1110 General rules, such as s 
257c (4) 1 warranting that the verdict of guilt is not violated, have to be complied with. The 
accused cannot agree to waive his right to make objections under the terms of s 410 
(1).1111 
If one takes a closer look at the form of the penal order, an interesting parallel can be 
drawn to South African law on plea bargaining. By the terms of s 407 (1), the penal order 
is written. S 409 (1) describes the content of a penal order; which is the following: ‘1. the 
personal identification data of the defendant and of any other persons involved; 2. the 
name of the defence counsel; 3. the designation of the offence the defendant is charged 
with, time and place of commission and designation of the statutory elements of the 
criminal offence; 4. the applicable provisions by section, subsection, number, letter and 
designation of the statute; 5. the evidence; 6. the legal consequences imposed; 7. 
                                            
1106
  Generally Kleinknecht/Müller/Reitberger-Metzger, StPO, Introduction to s 407, para 28 seqq. 
1107
  Kleinknecht/Müller/Reitberger-Metzger, StPO, Introduction to s 407, para 31. 
1108
  Kleinknecht/Müller/Reitberger-Metzger, StPO, Introduction to s 407, para 31. 
1109
  Kleinknecht/Müller/Reitberger-Metzger, StPO, Introduction to s 407, para 31; Meyer-Goßner, StPO, s 
160b, para 8; Kleinknecht/Müller/Reitberger-Metzger, StPO, s 160b, para 6. 
1110
  Kleinknecht/Müller/Reitberger-Metzger, StPO, Introduction to s 407, para 31. 
1111
  Compare s 302 (1) 2 of the StPO. 
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information on the possibility of filing an objection and the relevant time limit and form of 
objection, as well as an indication that the penal order shall become effective and 
executable unless an objection is lodged against it pursuant to s 410.’ Thus, the penal 
order can be compared with the written agreement in terms of s 105A. However it has to 
be kept in mind that the penal order is issued by the court and not signed by the parties. 
The agreement that might accompany the penal order is concluded in a bargain procedure 
by the terms of s 160b, and its content is documented in the prosecution file. It is 
surprising that the German legislature did not implement a written agreement into the 
provisions on plea bargaining since such procedure is already used by the penal order 
procedure. This can only be explained with the intention of the German legislature to avoid 
giving plea bargaining a contractual appearance. As will be presented later, there are 
however good reasons for a written agreement in Germany. 
f. Concluding remark 
It can be summarized that in both South Africa and Germany summary procedure exists 
that can be applied as an alternative to the statutory bargain procedure. However, it must 
be pointed out that the South African legislature’s aim was to maintain the standard 
procedure of guilty pleas which can – despite not being binding – comprehend consensual 
elements. These consensual elements, that might even form an agreement comprising 
mutual consent, are conducted informally and accompany the application of the statutory 
procedure under the terms of s 112. However, in German law the penal order under the 
terms of s 407 might be applied as a means to fulfil bargained terms. However, the 
bargaining has to be strictly different from the penal order procedure. The penal order is 
solely issued by the court. Nevertheless, there might have been formal pre-trial bargaining 
according to the terms of s 160b that prepared for the penal order. The bargain in these 
cases also has to comply with certain rules of s 257c. The South African plea of guilty 
under the terms of s 112 and the German penal order under the terms of s 407 might 
nevertheless be used to circumvent statutory rules, as the bargain accompanying the use 
of these instruments is frequently not obvious and might even be veiled by the parties. 
Consequently, the duty to fulfil prerequisites, such as for instance mandatory legal 
representation, can be avoided. In addition, both procedures naturally imply a smaller 
material basis and widely suppress judicial approval, which makes them tailormade for 
‘efficient’ bargaining. 
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13. Type of crimes 
There is no statutory provision in Germany that limits plea bargaining to particular 
offenses,1112 nor does such a rule exist in South Africa. Thus, the matter of which type of 
crimes are most likely dealt with by way of plea bargaining is of interest in regard to its 
impact on legal practice. Therefore the empirical data shall be cited and analysed. In 
Germany, there are several inquiries available.1113 In South Africa though, empirical data is 
rather rare. 
a. Scope of statutory provisions 
In both legal systems plea bargaining is not limited to certain type of crimes.1114 Formerly, 
plea bargaining in Germany had been mostly used for white collar crime and drug 
trafficking offences.1115 Today the scope is wider.1116 South African plea bargain procedure 
is not limited to a certain type of crimes either. For instance, the provision of s 105A of the 
Criminal Procedure Act is even applicable for criminal offences like rape and murder.1117 
Interestingly, in other countries plea bargaining is not permitted in cases that carry a 
severe penalty.1118 For instance in Chile it is only permitted for crimes carrying a penalty of 
less than 5 years of imprisonment.1119 In Italy only crimes carrying a sentence less than 7 
½ years imprisonment can be negotiated.1120 
b. Statistics 
A closer look on the percentage of offences that plea bargaining is used for will show that 
there are crimes that are more often subject to plea bargaining than others. Compared to 
the discussion that surrounds plea bargaining, and even though there are several inquiries 
available in Germany, it can be held that comprehensive empirical examinations are 
surprisingly rare.1121 The majority of earlier inquiries were focused on business crime.1122 
                                            
1112
  Turner/Chodosh, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, p. 105. 
1113
  Hassemer/Hippler (1986) StV 360 seqq.; Schünemann, Gutachten B; Lüdemann/Bußmann (1989) 
KrimJ 54; Siolek, Verständigung in der Hauptverhandlung, p. 31 seqq.; Altenhain/Hagemeier/Haimerl 
(2007) NStZ 71 seqq.; Schöch, Urteilsabsprachen in der Strafrechtspraxis, p. 127 seqq.; Pankiewicz, 
Absprachen im Jugendstrafrecht, p. 293 seqq.; Niemz, Urteilsabsprachen und Opferinteressen, p. 96 
seqq.; Heller, Das Gesetz zur Regelung der Verständigung, p. 295 seqq. 
1114
  See for South Africa Directive 12 issued by the NDPP and for Germany Meyer-Goßner, StPO, 
Introduction, para 119g. 
1115
  Turner/Chodosh, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, p. 105. 
1116
  Turner/Chodosh, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, p. 105. 
1117
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 207. 
1118
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 209. 
1119
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 209 in footnote 15. 
1120
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 209 in footnote 15. 
1121
  Niemz, Urteilsabsprachen und Opferinteressen, p. 39. 
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Recent studies have improved this situation.1123  
The comparison of the type of offences that plea bargaining is used for is based on the 
following three inquiries, amongst which two deal with the situation in Germany and one 
with the situation in South Africa. Schöch’s study of 2007 examines the reality of plea 
bargaining in German courts and therefore Schöch surveyed every different type of crime. 
Her method was to arrange interview sessions with practitioners from Munich. The table 
below shows the percentage of cases that have been plea bargained out of a total 100% 
of all cases of a particular type of offence.1124 Heller's inquiry of 2012 took place after the 
amendment of the statutory provisions in 2009, between August and December 2010.1125 
Heller sent questionnaires to judges and prosecutors in the city of Hamburg and the 
Federal State of Schleswig-Holstein.1126 South African scholar Steyn publicised statistics 
of the National Prosecuting Services of the years 2005/2006.1127 
The following statistics show the share of each field of offence of a total 100% of all 
bargain cases. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
1122
  Niemz, Urteilsabsprachen und Opferinteressen, p. 39 for example: 
Altenhain/Hagemeier/Haimerl/Stammen, Die Praxis der Absprachen in Wirtschaftsstafsachen, p. 53 
seqq. 
1123
  Schöch, Urteilsabsprachen in der Strafrechtspraxis, p.127 seqq.; Niemz, Urteilsabsprachen und 
Opferinteressen, p. 96 seqq.; Heller, Das Gesetz zur Regelung der Verständigung, p. 295 seqq. 
1124
  Schöch, Urteilsabsprachen in der Strafrechtspraxis, p. 130; important note: the original data of Schöch 
showed (from top to bottom): 17,9 % / 48, 7 % / 23,1 % / 15,4 % / 35,9 % / 10,3 % which makes a total 
sum of 151,3 % (due to the fact that multiple choice had been possible); the author converted the data 
into proportional parts out of a total sum of 100%. 
1125
  Heller, Das Gesetz zur Regelung der Verständigung, p. 295. 
1126
  Heller, Das Gesetz zur Regelung der Verständigung, p. 295. 
1127
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 215; in footnote 34 it is stated that the statistics are kept by the Prosecution 
Service in all oft he jurisdictional divisons and that these documents could only be viewed due tot he 
help of a prosecutor. 
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 Germany South Africa 
Statistics: 
Year:1128 
Schöch
1129 
 (2007) 
Heller1130 
(2012) 
= Ø1131 1132 Steyn1133 
(2005/2006) 
Sexual 12 % 15 % 13 % 13 % 5 % 
Economica
l 
32 % 24 % 28 % 
44 % 55 % 
Property 
and assets 
15 % 16 % 16 % 
Violent 10 % 8 % 9 % 9 % 33 % 
Narcotics 24 % 26 % 25 % 25 % 4 % 
Others 7 % 11 % 9 % 9 % 3 % 
 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1128
  Year of publication. 
1129
  Schöch, Urteilsabsprachen in der Strafrechtspraxis, p. 130; also see the importan note in op cit 1124. 
1130
  Heller, Das Gesetz zur Regelung der Verständigung, p. 300; it hast to be annotated that is it not quite 
clear if Heller’s numbers represent the % of bargains out of the total of cases within one crime group or 
if the represent their share out of a total of all bargained cases; the author assumed that the figure 
shows the latter interpretation. 
1131
  Shows the average of Schöch’s and Heller’s statistics. 
1132
  Merges the group of ‘economical‘ with ‘Property and assets‘ in order to better compare it to Steyn’s data 
who did not distinguish these two groups but rather grouped them in one ‘econonmical‘ array. 
1133
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 216. 
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c. Analysis 
The data shows that in both countries agreements are mostly conducted in cases of 
economic or property related crimes. The percentage in both countries is very similar and 
lies around 50 %. The statistics reveal three major divergences in the field of sexual 
offences and cases of violence and narcotics. 
The divergences in the field of narcotics might exist due to the differing total number of 
offences. A number of 150,673 drug-related crimes in one year in South Africa1134 is 
opposed by 236,478 cases in Germany.1135 However, it has to be noted that the total 
number of crimes also differs.1136 The German State generally tends to pursue narcotics 
very strictly. In addition, cases involving drug offences have become a major field of 
application of the plea bargain procedure over the last decade in Germany, and it might 
have become routine to bargain these cases. Many bargains will also be motivated by 
achieving the accused’s consent to become a state witness against drug dealers. 
Furthermore, the difference concerning violence is significant. It can be assumed that, as 
                                            
1134
  South African Police Service Annual Report 2010/2011, Annexure A, p.4 (www.saps.gov.za). 
1135
  Statistics of German Police of 2011, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik PKS 2011, summary 
(www.bmi.bund.de); Drug crime have a share of 3,9 % of all crime. 
1136
  Germany: ~ 6 Million (op cit 1135); South Africa: ~ 2,1 Million (op cit 1134 on p. 2.) 
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is typical for a European country, violence in Germany is a lesser problem than in South 
Africa. Murder cases alone, numbering 2,174 in Germany,1137 have to be compared to 
15,940 cases in South Africa.1138 Also, the share of bargain cases in the field of violent 
offences differs from 9 % in Germany to 33 % in South Africa amongst all bargained 
cases. 
In Germany plea bargaining is used surprisingly often in rape cases, which shall be 
examined in more detail. For cases of sexual offence, 13 % are plea bargained in 
Germany as compared with 5 % in South Africa. The total number of rape and sexual 
assault cases in South Africa is drastically higher than in Germany. According to 2011 
statistics, 7,539 cases of rape and sexual offence in Germany1139 face a number of 66,196 
in South Africa.1140 Thus, the number in South Africa is almost ten times higher.1141 The 
differing numbers of plea bargained cases in the field of sexual offences might be the only 
area in which one can clearly state that there is an obvious difference. There is no reason 
that comes immediately to mind that might explain this difference in the practice of plea 
bargaining. In fact, South Africa could have a greater need to plea bargain sexual offences 
considering the massive case load, which puts into question even more why the bargain 
procedure is not applied more widely. A possible explanation might be a special 
conscience of German legal practice to protect victims. In Germany, the bargain is often 
used in rape cases on the theory that it can spare the victim the trauma of having to testify 
to details of the crime.1142 This shall be further explained.  
Sexual offences are characterized by the fact that the victim is heavily affected by the 
crime.1143 In more than 90% of all cases, the victim is female.1144 The initial victimization is 
followed by the subsequent victimization that occurs through the participation of the victim 
in the process.1145 A German study further examined the role of the victim, especially in 
cases of sexual offences.1146 Victims of sexual offences encounter their testimony as a 
                                            
1137
  Statistics of German Police of 2011, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik PKS 2011, summary 
(www.bmi.bund.de). 
1138
  South African Police Service Annual Report 2010/2011, Annexure A, p.4 (www.saps.gov.za). 
1139
  Statistics of German Police of 2011, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik PKS 2011, summary 
(www.bmi.bund.de). 
1140
  South African Police Service Annual Report 2010/2011, Annexure A, p.3, (www.saps.gov.za). 
1141
  Not even taken into account that the population in South Africa is around 49 Million and Germany’s 
aroung 82 Million (www.wikipedia.org). 
1142
  Turner/Chodosh, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, p. 105. 
1143
  Compare Niemz, Urteilsabsprachen und Opferinteressen, p. 67. 
1144
  Niemz, Urteilsabsprachen und Opferinteressen, p. 70; Goedelt, Vergewaltigung und sexuelle Nötigung, 
p. 24 seqq.; it can be assumed that the satistics for South Africa are similar. 
1145
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 212. 
1146
  Richter, Opfer krimineller Gewalttaten, p. 1 seqq. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
165 
 
witness negatively.1147 They almost never experience the proceeding in a positive way.1148 
Although 49 % of the victims stated that they were satisfied by the way the process was 
conducted, only 35 % were satisfied with the outcome thereof.1149 Two thirds of the victims 
stated that the process negatively affected their feelings; the other one third stated that 
their lives taken as a whole were negatively affected.1150 82 % are of the opinion that the 
victimization was the worst thing that had happened to them in life.1151 60.4 % of the 
victims see their belief in justice diminished.1152 It can be safely stated against the shown 
figures that the victim’s interest and personality is heavily affected in a rape or sexual 
assault process.  
It has to be asked, however, why German courts make relatively more often use of the 
bargain procedure. One reason might be that German criminal procedure traditionally is 
very focused and concerned about victim protection, i.e., the individual rights of the victim. 
Plea bargaining in Germany is commonly seen as a means of sparing a witness from 
having to testify and appear before the bench. These factors might motivate a more 
extensive use of the bargain procedure. Furthermore, especially concerning the offence of 
rape, German legal practitioners might not regard such an offence as a common offence 
due to the relatively low case numbers. Thus, they might more likely than South African 
legal practice tend to consider a bargain procedure, even though the prosecutor holds 
good evidence, just in the interest of protecting the victim. Another factor might be that s 
177 (2) of the StGB, the material provision on rape, allows a two year minimum sentence 
for rape. At the same time, that is exactly the length of sentence that still allows a 
suspension of the sentence in terms of s 56 (2) of the StGB. This motivates many 
representatives to initiate a bargain procedure with the aim of ensuring that their client still 
receives a suspended prison sentence. Finally, an explanation might be given by the 
German procedure in terms of s 257c. As presented, the German court formally initiates 
the bargain procedure and thus also might consider where plea bargaining might 
contribute. Victim protection usually is not an aim of the accused and his representative. 
                                            
1147
  Niemz, Urteilsabsprachen und Opferinteressen, p. 68; Richter, Opfer krimineller Gewalttaten, p. 142 
seqq. 
1148
  Niemz, Urteilsabsprachen und Opferinteressen, p. 68; Richter, Opfer krimineller Gewalttaten, p. 142 
seqq. 
1149
  Niemz, Urteilsabsprachen und Opferinteressen, p. 68; Richter, Opfer krimineller Gewalttaten, p. 149 
seq., 223. 
1150
  Niemz, Urteilsabsprachen und Opferinteressen, p. 68 seq.; Richter, Opfer krimineller Gewalttaten, p. 
156 seq., 224. 
1151
  Niemz, Urteilsabsprachen und Opferinteressen, p. 69; Richter, Opfer krimineller Gewalttaten, p. 175. 
1152
  Niemz, Urteilsabsprachen und Opferinteressen, p. 69; Richter, Opfer krimineller Gewalttaten, p. 152 
seq.. 
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Prosecutors might regard it as important but will not be motivated if the evidence they hold 
is strong. However, the court might initiate the bargain in order to ensure that the victim is 
spared from having to testify, which he cannot achieve in the conventional trial as all 
substantial evidence has to be heard. This may serve as an example of where inquisitorial 
traditions make plea bargaining more likely to succeed. 
d. Concluding remark 
Statistics show that plea bargaining is mostly used in cases of economic crime. In South 
Africa, offences of violence are second. In Germany, however, second place is drug-
related crimes and sexual offences. Especially the latter fact surprises. The share of 
bargains dealing with sexual assaults and rape in South Africa is very low, whereas in 
Germany it is relatively high. A possible explanation is that the German legal practice’s 
attention might be tuned particulary to the issue of victim protection. 
14. Prevention from abuse 
Plea bargaining offers various benefits.1153 However, the procedure might offer so many of 
them to each and every participant that the demands of justice are possibly undercut by 
the extensive use of the instrument. Regarding the strong implications on fundamental 
principles of criminal procedure, one has to ask by what means the procedure is prevented 
from being abused. 
a. False motivation of the actors 
Plea bargaining is an ideal means for speeding up the criminal justice process. Each 
participant may favour an agreement due to different motivations. It is commonly agreed 
upon that an agreement should not be the product of improper influence and instead 
should be based on the accused’s free and voluntary decision.1154 There may however 
exist driving forces that are inappropriate. All the participating actors of the negotiation 
process have their own interest in forcing a usual proceeding to enter into a bargaining 
procedure.1155 This results in a mutual interest to enter into negotiations. In one sentence 
the benefits can be summed up as follows: ‘the practical effects of a plea bargain flow 
fairly equally on four directions: to the defendant, a reduction in sentence; to the 
prosecution, the certainty of a conviction; to the court, an immense saving of time, and to 
                                            
1153
  Compare Chapter II.4. 
1154
  Du Toit et al, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act, 15-17. 
1155
  Compare Chapter II.4. 
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the public purse, the cost of a trial.’1156 If all parties have a mutual interest to enter into an 
agreement, the question is how the application of plea bargaining is controlled and 
regulated. It is a commonly accepted principle that whether an offence is prosecuted and 
punished cannot entirely rely on the will of the actors involved already due to the general 
prevention of crime. 
b. Coercion of the accused 
Commonly the accused’s participation in the bargain procedure is considered to be based 
on his free will. However, the spread of the practice might also have some disadvantages 
to the accused and might diminish his liberty to choose whether to enter into negations 
toward an agreement. It has been held that there is no choice whether to plead guilty and 
that the element of coercion is implicit in the plea bargain itself.1157 South African scholars 
Lubbe and Ferreira raised the objection that an accused, even if innocent, might plead 
guilty and accept a lesser sentence for fear of taking the risk of being convicted and 
sentenced harshly.1158 Such a legal development may conflict with fundamental principles 
such as the right to remain silent and the principle of nemo tenetur. The title of a U.S.-
American dissertation reads as follows: 'Pleading guilty for life: an exploration of plea 
bargaining in the face of death.'1159 Already the title is impressive and strikes upon the key 
issue. The example of a threatening death penalty might be extreme, but there are cases 
imaginable in which the legal consequences are grave enough that an accused will do 
anything, or at least will have a strong tendency, to avoid them. In the usual case an 
accused will always consider entering into a bargain procedure if it appears to him to be 
the less threatening option. The safeguard against improper pressure on the accused can 
only be achieved by substantial judicial scrutiny, which will be referred to once again. 
Another solution might be excluding cases of heavy offences, such as murder, from plea 
bargaining or limiting the procedure to a certain upper sentence. This would for instance 
help to prevent from the situation that innocent accused consent to agreements just to 
avoid grave sentences. 
c. Prosecutional discretion 
A case that illustrates the significance of the so called demands of justice and how they 
infect the plea bargaining procedure is S v Esterhuizen. In that case, Els J held that the 
                                            
1156
  Trichardt/Krull (1987) THRHR 428 at 443. 
1157
  Erhard, Pleading guilty for life, p. 25 with reference to Litrell. 
1158
  Lubbe/Ferreira (2008) SACJ 151 at 163. 
1159
  Erhard, Pleading guilty for life. 
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judge 'must be satisfied that the sentence agreed upon is just.’1160 Els J furthermore stated 
that there were some factors that the Court must bear in mind. 1161 It was clear ‘that in the 
give and take of negotiations with regard to a guilty plea and in an appropriate sentence 
there is substantial room left open in the negotiation process for both the State and the 
defence to achieve a settled result, nevertheless negotiating with each other as 
adversaries under an adversarial system.’ 1162 He further stated that is was ‘clear that in 
order to contemplate a plea and sentence agreement in the first place it is envisaged that 
there will not always be simply an abject pleading of guilty by the accused to all the counts 
put forward by the State coupled with imposition by a court of such a sentence as it deems 
appropriate’.1163 To the mind of Els J ‘it must be so that the court, in considering the 
“justness” or “unjustness” of a sentence agreement cannot simply decide for itself in vacuo 
what sentence it would have imposed for crimes to which the accused is pleading 
guilty.’1164 In the case, Els J reports that was not be able to find that the sentence as 
agreed on in this matter is 'just' nor could he state that he would have probably imposed a 
much heavier sentence under the circumstances.1165 In addition, Els J said the following: 
‘In return for the concession of a plea of guilty to a charge difficult to prove, it must be so 
that the Legislature has envisaged that the bargaining mechanism would bring home a 
result which satisfies the interests of justice. These would be that where a crime has been 
committed a conviction has been achieved. The price may be that the sentence which 
would normally flow from the commission of such a crime is lower than might otherwise 
have been imposed.’1166 Els J pointed out that ‘this does not mean that justice has not 
been achieved.’1167 
Els J is right with his words regarding the sentencing itself, i.e., his statement is true that a 
lenient sentence does not necessarily violate the justness of the sentence. What was 
accidently ignored by Els J is a substantial feature of what can be regarded – as 
Bennun1168 calls it – as the ethics of plea bargaining: the fact that the charge has been 
regarded as ‘difficult to prove.’1169 This is an aspect of highest interest. Bennun made it 
clear that this implies that the decision was taken to continue on s 105A procedure even 
                                            
1160
  S v Esterhuizen & others 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 493g. 
1161
  S v Esterhuizen & others 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 493g. 
1162
  S v Esterhuizen & others 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 493i. 
1163
  S v Esterhuizen & others 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 494ab. 
1164
  S v Esterhuizen & others 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 494b. 
1165
  S v Esterhuizen & others 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 494c. 
1166
  S v Esterhuizen & others 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 494g-h. 
1167
  S v Esterhuizen & others 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 494h. 
1168
  Compare Bennun (2007) SACJ 17 at 31. 
1169
  S v Esterhuizen & others 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 494g. 
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though the prosecutor obviously did not consider that there was a realistic prospect of 
success.1170 He also sees a collision with the principle that prosecutors should be of the 
opinion that a suspect is guilty before charging him.1171 Bennun considers it to be a 
‘disturbing effect (...) that accused who insist on claiming their full rights to a fair trial may 
be penalised by incurring heavier sentences if they are convicted, than they otherwise 
might have done if they had come to the aid of the prosecution by negotiating their 
guilt’.1172 He finally comes to the conclusion that ‘it cannot be right that the smell of the 
marketplace should permeate the criminal court’ and that ‘it cannot be right for the 
prosecution to rely on the accused’s cooperation in order to secure a conviction at all.’1173 
It can be learned from that case that in South African Law de lege lata, no provision 
successfully holds back the prosecution from plea bargaining cases that otherwise would 
not lead to a conviction. As a consequence, benefits for the prosecution, as implied by a s 
105A procedure, do not encounter an adequate means to prevent abuse. Bennun states 
that it cannot be right to use s 105A as a strategy to conceal or to repair weaknesses in 
the prosecution’s case.1174 He criticises Du Toit et al, who regard practical aspects as 
sufficient in order to initiate the plea bargain procedure.1175 They state that ‘in practice 
much will depend on each party’s assessment of the probable outcome of the case and 
the bargaining power available to him or her.’1176 Bennun considers the ethical duties of 
the prosecution to be violated. It was not the function of the prosecution in an accusatorial 
system to obtain a conviction at all costs and in every case; rather it was to present that 
what it must submit is sufficient admissible and incriminating evidence to satisfy the trial 
court that the accused is guilty beyond all reasonable doubt.1177 It must however be 
admitted with Lubbe and Ferreira that it is not reasonable to generalise toward those who 
act in good faith.1178 Furthermore, they argue that there may also be cases in which the 
accused pleads guilty to a charge of which he is indeed guilty but which would have been 
difficult to prove and to achieve a conviction for the state.1179 This is correct from the point 
of view that there are indeed many bargains, especially in large-scale white collar crimes 
which are very difficult to fully prove and in which the accused is more or less obviously 
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guilty. These cases may even represent the vast majority. However, it has to be held that 
the strong possibility of abuse cannot be justified by the argument that in most cases the 
conviction appears just solely due to the fact that the accused is actually guilty. In 
Germany, the problem is the same. The prosecution will also tend to bargain cases which 
are difficult to prove and in practice oftentimes will not intensively scrutinize the chances 
that the accused is in fact guilty. To sum it up, one can state that in both legal systems the 
‘autonomy’ of the prosecution to determine the conduct of the process in view of the 
agreement procedure is not valuably restricted. 
Control may be granted internally, i.e., the prosecutorial actions have to be authorised and 
need to be controlled. Under s 105A (1) (a), the prosecutor must have a written 
authorisation issued by the National Director of Public Prosecutions in order to enter into a 
plea and sentence agreement. Furthermore, Directive 6 issued by the NDPP states that 
the prosecutor in addition depends on a specific authorisation in the case that the relevant 
Office of the NDPP has instructed that the accused is prosecuted. If these requirements 
are not fulfilled, the agreement is null and void.1180 With respect to these provisions, 
agreements usually contain the sentence that ‘the prosecutor is duly authorized to conduct 
proceedings in court on behalf of the state in connection with this agreement, after it has 
been duly entered into.’1181 It is not clear whether the written authorisation issued by the 
NDPP is an essential prerequisite. Some have held that the authorisation functions as a 
proof of the prosecutor’s authorisation and thus is essential.1182 Others have opposed this 
view. The requirement that the prosecutor be authorised to negotiate and enter into a plea 
agreement should in their eyes not be handled unnecessarily strictly.1183Although the 
wording of s 105A (1) (a) clearly states the requirement of a written authorisation, Watney 
states that ‘it is submitted that the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta donec 
probetur in contrarium (presumption of regularity) will operate in favour of the 
prosecution.’1184 As a consequence it is regarded as unnecessary to prove for example a 
delegated authority on the part of the judge as a prerequisite for the prosecutor to take part 
in the agreement.1185 Under German law, the prosecution does not require any official 
authorisation in writing. According to s 146 of the GVG, the officials of the public 
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prosecution office must comply with the official instructions of their superiors. The 
prosecutor involved in a plea bargaining procedure hence is bound by instruction. 
Nevertheless, he shall be deemed to be authorised to enter into an agreement. Unless a 
higher-ranked official of the public prosecution does not instruct the prosecutor in a certain 
way, he is free to choose whether to participate in the plea bargaining procedure. 
It can be assumed that the rules on the prosecutor’s authorisation in South Africa are 
stricter due to the fact that, on the basis of adversarial tradition, the prosecutor to a greater 
degree can influence and determine the further conduct of the trial and especially which 
facts and evidence are to be placed before the court. In Germany, on the other hand, the 
single prosecutor can decide whether to enter into an agreement without the need for a 
special permit. Nevertheless the prosecutor has to justify his actions internally in the 
Prosecutional Department. 
Another safeguard against abuse by the prosecution, who may file charges and enter into 
plea bargain procedure even though the case is difficult or even impossible to prove, is the 
judicial scrutiny of substantial facts. This already discussed topic will be referred to once 
again in the subsequent chapter. 
d. Role of the judge 
In the conventional trial, the judge is the safeguard for just and appropriate convictions. 
The plea bargaining system, however, may undermine this system. The judge’s role is 
transformed. As the opposing parties enter into a mutual bargain instead of attending the 
court and following the conventional trial procedure, the position of the presiding officer is 
affected. Within the South African system, due to its adversarial tradition, it seems more 
usual than in the German system that parties have at their disposal what evidence and 
facts are to be placed before the court. However, there might nevertheless be a certain 
need to guarantee judicial control in the plea bargain procedure.  
German law gives the judge a more active role and provides the judge with more 
comprehensive information on the case than South African law does.1186 It has been 
presented already that the German court has substantial control over the process. German 
judges are provided with efficient tools to fulfil their duty to investigate the evidence.1187 
The file they hold is more complete than the one South African judges have in their 
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possession.1188 This is also the case because the police and prosecution by the terms of s 
160 (2) have the duty to investigate and gather both incriminating and exonerating 
evidence. The judge holds the entire file before meeting with the parties for 
negotiations.1189 As is typical for a continental law system, a significant feature of the 
German criminal procedure is the judicial inquiry.1190 This role is emphasised in the plea 
bargain procedure through the fact that the court already initiates the bargain and takes 
part in the negotiations. In contrast to the plea bargaining procedure in South Africa – and 
as well the United States and many other jurisdictions –plea bargaining in Germany 
generally involves the court and not just accused, the legal representative and the 
prosecutor.1191 S 257c provides for such participation from the court. German law tries to 
avoid the situation of inappropriate intentions leading towards negotiations by letting the 
court be the one to initiate the agreement and by limiting to the participants the opportunity 
to make submissions. Under German law, by the terms of s 257c (1) 1 of the StPO, the 
court has the role of judging whether negotiations toward an agreement have been 
initiated.1192 The prosecution formally is limited to the function of agreeing to the proposed 
agreement, as stated in s 257c (3) 4 StPO. This could prevent the prosecution from acting 
‘selfish’ in a way that only its own benefits are relevant to the decision to plea bargain. In 
practice, however, the defence may negotiate solely with the prosecution and later simply 
seek the court’s approval of the negotiated agreement.1193  
Nevertheless, the court’s strong position, which is enshrined in the law, has its effect on 
the negotiating parties. What could appear as a protection against abuse might also raise 
concerns. The notion of a consensual agreement practice has already, prior to the 
statutory amendment in 2009, been long seen to conflict with the judge’s role in the 
German proceedings.1194 South Africa, however, strictly prohibits the judge’s participation 
in the process of negotiations, as explicitly contained in s 105A (3) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. Underscoring the rationale behind the prohibition of judicial participation in 
the plea bargain is the concern that otherwise the judges may compromise impartiality.1195 
Thus, the South African system limits the judge to reviewing the validity of the agreement. 
In Germany, the participation of the judge is seen as a major means of ensuring a fair and 
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just outcome of the bargain procedure. South African law, however, opposes the 
participation of the judge in the bargain with similar arguments. Interestingly, South African 
scholar Bennun states that the accused’s rights demand the implicit assumption within s 
105A that the prosecution should not initiate negotiations, which is very close to the 
presumptions of the German legislature.1196 It cannot be judged which view is the proper 
one. These different positions mainly can be referred to the differing inquisitorial and 
accusatorial understanding of the trial. Thus, there is no right or wrong. It however has to 
be admitted that the objection that the judge might be negatively affected by his 
participation has a true core − especially regarding the widespread tendency of courts in 
civil-law cases to favour settlements rather than to conduct trials in order to lessen their 
workload. If this mentality spreads to the criminal trial, there are good reasons to limit the 
court to a scrutiny of agreements rather than to let the judge participate, initiate or even 
steer the bargain. The more the judge is empowered to influence the bargain’s success, 
the more he might be frustrated if the conclusion of the agreement fails. Thus, as ‘judges 
are the ultimate arbiters of the punishment the defendant will receive, their participation in 
the negotiations would raise concerns about coercion of the defendant's plea decision.’1197 
The accused would have to fear the court’s disappointment if he does not participate in a 
bargain led or even proposed by the court. 
German law might also imply some structural safeguards against judicial abuse. Plea 
negotiations so far have not occurred in extensively high numbers, although the number of 
bargained cases is increasing.1198 It is still around 50 %, which is significantly lower than 
the for instance 90 % bargained cases in the U.S.A. On the other hand, these structural 
features are simulated by the judges’ right to initiate and participate in the bargain.1199 A 
reason for a lower level of coerciveness caused by the judge in Germany might be the 
relative mildness of the expected sentence and the smaller discounts given to accused 
who confess in comparison to other jurisdictions.1200 However, the possible suspension of 
a sentence that possibly contains imprisonment can be a substantial discount achieved by 
way of plea bargaining.1201 Another safeguard against judicial abuse of the procedure may 
be the participation of lay judges. However, although BGH has stated that lay judges must 
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be involved in the bargain procedure, this rarely occurs in practice.1202 Usually lay judges 
are absent when negotiations are initiated.1203 For that reason their role in the trial is too 
weak to effectively control the professional judges.1204  
Another point of interest is the field of application in which plea bargaining is admissible. 
South African law tries to limit the use of s 105A procedure through Directive 2.1205 It reads 
as follows: ‘Section 105A is to be utilized for those matters of some substance, the 
disposal of which will actually serve the purpose of decongesting or reducing the court rolls 
without sacrificing the demands of justice and/or the public interest.’ German law also 
recognizes the restriction in s 257 (1) 1, which states that plea bargaining shall only be 
applied in ‘suitable cases.’ The terms ‘some substance’ and ‘suitable’ do not however 
imply clear restrictions. Therefore, they cannot serve as an effective means of limiting the 
scope of plea bargaining. Generally, there is a high potential for judicial abuse where the 
court bargains on an informal basis and denies the existence of agreed terms. This 
problem can only be solved by the use of remedies and a scrutiny if the acting judge has 
violated fair trial principles.1206  
The court’s scrutiny of substantial facts – whether as a part of the bargain process as in 
Germany or subsequent to the agreement as in South Africa – might be a safeguard to 
ensure just and appropriate convictions and sentences. South African s 105A (6) and (7) 
provide for a scrutiny. So does s 257c (1) 2, stating that the obligation to establish the truth 
remains unaffected by the plea bargain procedure. S 261of the StGB moreover contains 
the principle of free evaluation of evidence. It states that the court shall decide on the 
result of the evidence taken and according to its free conviction gained from the hearing as 
a whole. The question strongly correlates to the judge’s independence, enshrined in Article 
97 of the German Constitution and the oft mentioned s 244 (2) containing the obligation to 
establish the truth. It is the judge’s duty to convict the accused based on his personal view. 
It seems lost out of sight that the court is not bypassed by the agreement procedure but 
rather is in the position of ultimately proving the content of the agreement.1207 However, 
there remains the the question of how intensive the court’s scrutiny is. It has been 
presented earlier that the court’s approval of the agreement is rather limited. The scrutiny 
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of formal requirements may still be warranted. The factual basis, however, is not 
scrutinized in depth.1208 Thus, the conventional role of the judge is modified in essence by 
the bargain procedure. 
e. Solutions de lege ferenda 
The presentations above show that the present statutory law raises concerns regarding a 
possible abuse of the plea bargain procedure. Although a very small number of bargains 
will be affected by inappropriate motives, there may however be means to further improve 
the law on plea bargaining in both countries to diminish the possibility of abuse. The main 
concerns in both countries are very similar.1209 
A solution de lege ferenda in both countries could be to formally limit cases that can be 
plea bargained or alternatively to limit admissible sentences. Such restrictions are already 
known in other procedures such as the penal order in German law.1210 Restrictions would 
have the advantage that the accused is relieved from pressure. If the court is formally 
restricted to accept the bargain on certain offences or on certain sentences, the accused in 
the excluded cases of heavy guilt did not have to fear suffering disadvantages simply due 
to his refusal to bargain. However, there might be a problem that the benefit of plea 
bargaining to solving large-scale, difficult cases may wane. It can be stated however that 
the main scope of plea bargaining would not be lost out of sight. The ‘flood’ of usual cases 
with offences of light to medium severity still could be bargained. Both presented aspects 
could be served by a general and unlimited permit to bargain economic crime (which is the 
vast majority of all plea bargain cases1211) while at the same time limiting the admissible 
height of sentence to a certain degree, for instance five years of imprisonment. It has to be 
remarked that any restriction on the sentence would exclude murder cases from being 
bargained. However this might be the price for a modification of the present procedure on 
plea bargaining. The accused’s substantial rights would be better warranted. The 
proposed restrictions would form a compromise between the need for an effective 
functioning criminal justice system and the threat of coercion of the accused into the 
bargain procedure. Lastly, the proposal might not be effective due to the fact that 
participants in cases that could not be bargained anymore would take refuge with the 
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informal bargain procedure. Informal bargaining however serves the rule of law even less. 
Nonetheless, it has to be annotated that the improvement of statutory law cannot be 
denied by the possibility of its circumvention. 
Concerning victim protection, it is surprising that the present legal position of complainants 
is very weak.1212 It could be held that it is anyhow not stronger in the conventional trial. 
However especially in rape cases, which involve the gravest bodily and psychological 
harm, it appears unjust and unreasonable not to give the victim a strong position. Plea 
bargaining in cases of rape could be limited by a victim’s right to veto. This would not 
erode the benefit of plea bargaining in these cases. It has to be recalled that the 
significance of a bargained rape case is – other than the usual case in other cases – not 
primarily a lack of evidence. Rather it is the motive to spare the victim from having to 
testify as a witness. Thus, if the victim vetoes the bargain of the case, the main motive of 
the bargain is not violated. The victim would waive the opportunity of being spared from 
having to testify due to his willingness to make a testimony in order to secure in his eyes a 
‘just’ conviction. This especially gives rise to criticism in Germany, where the material law 
on rape with s 177 (2) of the StGB allows the accused to bargain to a minimum sentence 
of two years’ imprisonment. Two years of imprisonment is at the same time the maximum 
that still allows to suspend the sentence in terms of s 56 (2) of the StGB. By that means, 
plea bargaining offers the possibility to achieve a suspension in cases in which usually 
there is no such possibility as judges – where there are no exceptional mitigating 
circumstances given – do not sentence to the minimum. Consequentely, there are good 
reasons to allow the victim to demand a judicial decision on the sentence rather than 
having the parties negotiate on the leniency of the sentence. The accused’s willingness to 
bargain and to admit the offence is not entirely ignored. The court still can judge the plea 
of guilty or the confession of the accused as a mitigating factor. 
Another possible means for the improvement of the provisions on plea bargaining in both 
countries would be the insertion of an enforceable requirement to minimum investigations 
of the court. South African law with s 105A (7) only provides for a scrutiny of evidence and 
facts if the facts that have been placed before the judge by the parties give raise to doubt. 
The scrutiny is moreover only undertaken to be able to consider the negotiated sentence. 
The conviction is only proven based on the statements of the accused, as according to s 
105A (6). German law provides for a scrutiny by fully standing by the obligation to 
establish the truth, as with s 257c (1) 1 and s 244 (2). However, in practice judicial 
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approval where the substantial facts are complete and can be proven is as poor as in 
South Africa.1213 Thus, it is impossible for the court to consider whether there might be 
other motives for an agreement and whether public interest might rather favour a trial.1214 
Bennun suggests, as a simple solution de lege ferenda to the problem of lacking control 
through the court, setting up a minimum requirement for the statements of the witnesses 
on whom the prosecution would have relied or other evidence to be laid before the court to 
form the basis on which it can satisfy itself that the agreement is a proper one.1215 This 
proposal would improve the law on plea bargaining without having to fear that the benefits 
are diminished. The duty must be to present at least one striking piece of evidence 
besides the statements of the accused in order to prove the factual basis of the conviction. 
This should not be a problem: the prosecution usually holds other evidence. The problem 
that motivates plea bargaining is only that it is uncertain whether the case can be fully 
proven. The formal prerequisite of having to present minimum evidence and the court’s 
duty to its scrutiny would prevent cases of heavy abuse. At the same time the public will 
more likely accept that justice is done. 
Finally, it can be discussed whether German law should adopt the requirement of a written 
form of the agreement. The legislature might not have thought of such a rule because he 
tried to avoid the impression that the prosecution and accused enter into a ‘contract,’ 
which is foreign to the criminal procedure. However, S 273 (1a) does provide for a 
documentation of the bargain. It contains that the record must also indicate, in essence, 
the course and content as well as the outcome of a negotiated agreement in terms of s 
105A. In practice however the documentation oftentimes is done very briefly or not even at 
all.1216 In the inquiry of Schöch, half of the professional participants asked admitted to 
either not documenting or else not exactly fulfiling the requirement.1217 
f. Concluding remark 
Most of the discussed issues might appear as ‘academic problems.’ What can problematic 
in theory possibly only has a limited effect in practice.1218 However, statutory law should 
always be improved. Especially the situation of coercion of the accused to participate in 
the bargain should be avoided. As presented, for instance a formal limitation of the 
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offences or sentences that are negotiable would help to prevent abuse. A veto right of 
complainants that are victims of sexual offences might help to ensure that the mutuality of 
the benefits to all the other participants does not lead towards a circumvention of victim 
interests. Finally, the requirement of a written form of the agreement in German law would 
improve the transparency of the process. 
15. Procedural nature of the bargain 
A major question deals with the question of whether statutory law on agreements as 
regulated in ss 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act and 257c of the StPO still provides a 
procedure that complies with the criminal procedure or whether it implies a new procedure 
of its own that could be marked as consensual or negotiated justice.1219 Tracing back the 
history of the criminal procedure, it is also important to distinguish the two basic models of 
procedure: the inquisitorial and the accusatorial.1220 Especially the inquisitorial tradition 
implies conflicts concerning the implementation of a bargain procedure, as such elements 
are substantially foreign to its principles. Generally, it can be asked whether plea 
bargaining can be used to improve the efficiency of the contemporary criminal justice 
system while at the same time maintaining established legal principles.1221 It has to be 
kept in mind that consensual elements always offer a possibility for abuse and that plea 
bargaining might be used as such a tactic.1222 
a. Concepts of plea bargaining 
There are general model concepts which can describe a bargain process before a criminal 
court. The first is the general idea of a compromise. Thereafter plea bargaining in its pure 
form places the criminal proceeding, fact-finding, legal consequences and even legal 
judgment at the party’s disposal.1223 The parties conclude a contract that is placed before 
the court for approval. The accused’s bargaining power, regardless of whether he decides 
to demand for a lengthy trial, opposes the prosecution’s discretion and the sentencing 
discretion of the court.1224  
Second and alternatively, plea bargaining could be seen as an impetus to cooperation. 
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The process of negotiations and agreements might undermine the opposing positions of 
power that the criminal procedure assigns to the participants.1225 The accused is given the 
opportunity and power to participate in the proceedings.1226 One has to bear in mind that 
the accused is not obligated to take an active part in the process.1227 There is no duty to 
the accused to cooperate.1228 As opposed to the inquisitorial system, the accused is not 
forced to assist in and to support the proceedings.1229 One of the fundamental principles of 
modern criminal procedure is the accused’s right to remain silent. The court’s right to 
advise the accused to confess in order to thereby receive, for example, a reduction of 
sentence remains unaffected.1230 Participation and cooperation in modern criminal 
procedure is thus only an obligation and never a duty of the accused.1231 The shown 
model is turned upside-down in the concept of plea bargaining if the procedure is 
understood as a cooperation of the accused with the other participants of the trial.1232 
Another aspect that stands out is the danger of false confessions.1233 Empiric studies in an 
experiment revealed that the percentage of false confessions amounted to 7 % in regular 
trials to 43 % in simulated cases of plea bargaining.1234  
Third, plea bargaining could be described as consent to a new summary procedure. The 
bargain is seen as a shortening of the proceedings by seeking undisputed facts of the 
case.1235 All other facts upon which the parties cannot agree lead to the regular trial 
proceedings.1236 The agreed facts lead to the new procedure of plea bargaining.1237 The 
court’s obligation to establish the truth is reduced.1238 Instead, the judge checks the 
plausibility of the substantial facts.1239 If there are no hints for a false confession, no more 
evidence is taken.1240 The procedure is consensual. Part of the responsibility for the 
accuracy of the judgment is put on the accused and the prosecution. 1241  
The fourth idea of plea bargaining is the aim of de-escalation and the removal of 
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uncertainty. It is the most restrictive concept of plea bargaining. Negotiations towards an 
agreement only serve the function of revealing the necessity of defence and the extent to 
which the accused has to parry the charges. 1242 The aim of the accused is thereafter to 
remove uncertainty about the court’s findings and later judgment.1243 Oftentimes the 
procedural conduct of the defence does not correspond to the inner attitude of the judge 
towards the case which can result in tactical disadvantages.1244 The procedure contributes 
to de-escalation, because the accused gains more certainty as to the procedural conduct 
of the court.1245 Threat-potential is reduced and excessive defence measures therefore are 
no longer necessary, which in the procedure of bargaining might also generate mutual 
trust.1246 The binding effect of plea and sentence agreements is not based on the principle 
pacta sunt servanda. Rather, the agreement binds because of mutual consent to a certain 
form of communication and mutual respect.1247 The procedure should prevent a tactical 
outwitting of the opponent.1248 The different presented conceps help to form a guideline to 
examine which concept the present statutory provisions on plea bargaining in both 
countries represent. 
b. Procedural term ‘truth’ 
Another annotation shall be made regarding a general approach to the term ‘truth’. Plea 
bargaining is often criticized for circumventing the finding of facts and the material truth. 
However, it has to be carefully weighed what the truth-seeking function of the criminal 
procedure really comprehends. One cannot doubt that there is not only society's 
understanding of the term 'truth' but also a juridical one.1249 For example, in a taking of 
evidence the judge can only rely on the plausibility of testimonies − despite scientific 
provable facts such as blood alcohol concentration.1250 Plausibility is a strong indicator for 
truth. Also, plausibility generates a truth in the criminal procedure. If the judge decides that 
the conduct of the actions follows a realistic plot, then the single set of facts becomes 
official 'truth'.1251 The Anglo-American juridical system distinguishes 'fact-finding' from 
                                            
1242
  Compare SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 6. 
1243
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 6. 
1244
  Compare SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 6. 
1245
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 6. 
1246
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 6. 
1247
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 6. 
1248
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 6. 
1249
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 415; compare generally Turner/Chodosh, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, p. 
118. 
1250
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 415. 
1251
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 415. 
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'decision-making.’1252 German scholar Volk points out, that in this context it does not 
matter if the procedure to be followed was adversarial or inquisitorial;1253 the shown 
distinction is a fundamental principle that fits to all kinds of procedures.1254 Volk thinks that 
the trial has to be prevented from becoming a marketplace in which justice can be 
traded.1255 German scholars widely regard truth to be the fundamental principle of 
justice.1256 To their minds, the main proceeding guarantees to uncover the truth and to 
generate a just judgment.1257 The Anglo-American justice system follows a totally different 
approach. Scholars there presume that the inquisitorial system solely serves the 
establishment of truth, whereas the adversarial system more likely establishes justice 
rather than truth.1258 Thus, in plea bargaining procedure, the stage of fact-finding is 
skipped.1259 The decision-making can be based exclusively on the bargain of the parties, 
which ensures a just outcome. The conviction is solely based on the plea of guilty and the 
other bargained terms. This does not comply with the German justice system that regards 
truth as a substantial step towards justice.1260 The bargain between prosecutor and 
accused without judicial participation is consequently only regarded to form a formal truth 
that is less worthy.1261 Volk speaks of a false understanding that German scholars had and 
argues that there was no reason to consider the outcome of a bargained case to be less 
just.1262 He further argues that truth in a trial is always something different than truth is in 
the eyes of society.1263 Procedural truth depends on the quality of the process,1264 even if 
in a conventional trial truth is modified due to procedural requirements and limitations.1265 
Volk finally states that German scholars overrate truth as a guarantee for justice.1266 In the 
end, it would not matter if the judge bases his judgment on factual or formal truth: both 
outcomes of a process can be regarded as just.1267 Weßlau supports this view. He recently 
                                            
1252
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 415. 
1253
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 415. 
1254
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 416. 
1255
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 416. 
1256
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 416. 
1257
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 416. 
1258
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 416. 
1259
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 416; German system is different at that point; so this can only be said about 
the South African System of plea bargaining. 
1260
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 416. 
1261
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 416. 
1262
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 416. 
1263
  Compare Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 417. 
1264
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 417. 
1265
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 417. 
1266
  Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 417. 
1267
  Compare Volk in Salger-FS, 411 at 417. 
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stated that plea bargaining complies with the principle of material truth.1268 The judge may 
also be able to convince himself of the relevant facts solely on the basis of a 
confession.1269 There was no reason to assume a violation of the principle of material 
truth. Agreements were no threat to the criminal justice system.1270 In fact, German 
scholars so far may have been too solid in their opinion on what is just. On the other hand 
– as Bennun states – there could be seen ‘a great deal to be uneasy about concerning 
plea bargaining generally in an accusatorial system, for it involves bypassing the finder of 
fact (whether judge alone or with assessors or the jury).’1271 It can be summed up that the 
questions of how ‘truth’ has to be defined and to what extent plea bargaining possibly has 
to be accepted as an alternative approach to the truth-finding have not yet been part of the 
controversy in Germany. This will also be presented in the following chapter. 
c. Conflicts with the German inquisitorial system 
The principle that the court has to establish the truth as contained in s 244 (2) of the StPO 
is a major inquisitorial principle of the German law on criminal procedure. That is why the 
legislature intended not to breach with this principle while implementing plea bargaining 
into the Code. The German legislature decided to use the term ‘Verständigung,’ which 
means, as explained before, ‘agreement’ in the sense of a convergence of minds.1272 The 
appearance of a contract is thus avoided. Some German scholars already before the 
advent of s 257c however argued that the implementation of agreements into the statutory 
law was not possible without the creation of a new consensual procedure that should have 
been implemented instead of s 257c StPO.1273 The legislature instead decided to 
implement the law on agreements into the existing conventional criminal system.1274 It was 
said that a new and then-unknown consensual procedure was not desirable.1275 This was 
justified with the argument that otherwise the role of the court and especially the obligation 
to establish the truth would have been diminished.1276 To clarify, it was further stated that 
                                            
1268
  Weßlau in Müller-FS, 779 at 781. 
1269
  Weßlau in Müller-FS, 779 at 781. 
1270
  Weßlau in Müller-FS, 779 at 781. 
1271
  Bennun (2007) SACJ 17 at 44. 
1272
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 2. 
1273
  Altenhain/Haimerl (2010) JZ 239 at 337; Wohlers (2010) NJW, 2470 at 2473.  
1274
  Weßlau in Müller-FS, 779 at 788; Compare RefE p. 12 seq. 
(www.brak.de/seiten/pdf/Stellungnahmen/2005/Stn25_05.pdf). 
1275
  Weßlau in Müller-FS, 779 at 788; Compare RefE p. 12 seq. 
(www.brak.de/seiten/pdf/Stellungnahmen/2005/Stn25_05.pdf). 
1276
  Weßlau in Müller-FS, 779 at 788; Compare RefE p. 12 seq. 
(www.brak.de/seiten/pdf/Stellungnahmen/2005/Stn25_05.pdf). 
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all principles of criminal procedure do persist.1277  
As mentioned before, the goal has clearly not been achieved. The drafters of the German 
statutory law verbally wanted to conform to the basic principles of the criminal procedure, 
such as the obligation to establish the truth and other principles on the taking of evidence. 
In fact, the statutory provisions suspend these principles.1278 The present system of plea 
bargaining does not provide for a full inquisitorial inquiry. Rather, it can be held with Velten 
that the new provisions, such as s 257 (1) 2 stating that the obligation to establish the truth 
in terms of s 244 (2) remains unaffected, do solely need to be considered as instruction or 
guidance for the court practice. The complete fulfilment of these inquisitorial rules would 
anyhow be impossible in a bargain case. Consequently, Velten rather regards them as a 
means to control in that the obligation to establish the truth still plays a significant role, for 
instance if an appeal court searches for substantial failures in the court’s analysis of the 
case.1279 Nevertheless, it has to be stated that s 257c’s statement that s 244 (2), the core 
of all inquisitorial scrutiny, remains unaffected is not accurate. In fact, s 257c installs 
consensual elements and limits inquisitorial elements to a procedure of approval. The 
factual state of the provisions and the application thereof supports the legal opinion of 
those who already prior to the advent of s 257c held that a consensual procedure had to 
be established.1280 The legislature consequently would first have had to modify all the 
provisions that contain basic principles and make them facilitative instead of keeping them 
compulsory.1281 Weßlau even considers the establishment of a consensual procedure as 
impossible.1282 The German legislature did not come up with a clear decision that would 
have erased the controversy that already had been around for a long time before the 
advent of s 257c of the StPO in 2009. He did not take the side of one of the opponents that 
clash about the question of which procedural nature agreements have. To use an uncouth 
term, the German legislature installed a ‘hybrid’ that tends to adapt to both the long-known 
fundamental principles of criminal procedure and the practical need for rapid and simplified 
procedures.1283 The ‘hybrid system’ however does − as the term might successfully 
suggest − fuse both aspects. The picture of a fusion to a hybrid might however be 
euphemistic. The implementation of agreements in the German criminal procedure implies 
                                            
1277
  Weßlau in Müller-FS, 779 at 788; Compare RefE p. 12seq. 
(www.brak.de/seiten/pdf/Stellungnahmen/2005/Stn25_05.pdf). 
1278
  Weßlau in Müller-FS, 779 at 789. 
1279
  SK-Velten, StPO, s 257c, para 1. 
1280
  Weßlau in Müller-FS, 779 at 789. 
1281
  Weßlau in Müller-FS, 779 at 789. 
1282
  Weßlau in Müller-FS, 779 at 789. 
1283
  Compare Chapter II.6.c. 
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a constant breach with fundamental principles. One could demand a ‘second StPO’ which 
explicitly provides for consensual procedure.1284 It has even been proposed that German 
law should adopt the guilty plea system.1285 No matter which opinion may be right, one 
also has to consider that the present StPO already contains elements that serve the 
function of effective and short trials, as did the penal order (Strafbefehl) prior to the advent 
of s 257c. The ideal of ‘material truth’ as a guarantee for justice is rated highly in Germany. 
Thus, the tendency is to preserve the established principles. As it is commonly accepted 
that plea bargaining needs to be controlled, the procedure is neither strictly accusatorial 
nor is it dominated by inquisitorial principles. Thus, no matter if regulated in an inquisitorial 
law system or ruled by a ‘second’ and entirely new procedure, the agreement procedure 
will always imply elements of both legal traditions. The solution of the legislature to 
formally preserve the inquisitorial principles while at the same time modifying the StPO by 
the implementation of new elements could be a reasonable solution. Furthermore, it has to 
be considered that no matter how plea bargaining is regulated, parties mutually willing to 
enter into an agreement will always find a way to achieve their common aim.1286 
Consequently, the preservation of inquisitorial guidelines has its advantages. Thus, the 
present system of plea bargaining in Germany can be seen as a hybrid, a formally 
inquisitorial system which accepts consensual elements but formally does not recognize 
them. The present system of a hybrid – having accepted the implementation of plea 
bargaining into the StPO without establishing an entirely new consensual procedure of its 
own − nevertheless might be open to improvements, as will be presented immediately 
after having taken a view at the nature of plea bargaining in South African law.1287 
d. Implementation into South African law 
Plea bargaining in South Africa as in other common law systems is a special procedure 
within the plea system. The mechanisms of s 105A, right behind the general provisions on 
the plea, document the role of plea bargaining. The South African law on criminal 
procedure is basically accusatorial, although it contains certain inquisitorial elements as for 
instance the procedure of questioning that may take place under s 115 or as part of s 
112.1288 Plea bargaining is descended from adversarial legal systems and thus the 
                                            
1284
  Zschockelt in Salger-FS, 435 at 436. 
1285
  Meyer-Goßner (1992) NStZ 167 seqq. 
1286
  Weigend (1999) NStZ 57 at 63. 
1287
  See Chapter V.15.e 
1288
  Geldenhuys/Joubert/Swanepoel/Terblanche/van der Merwe, Criminal Procedure Handbook, p. 22 
(Chapter 1, 4); van der Merwe/Barton/Kemp, Plea Procedures in Summary Criminal Trials, p. 15; also 
compare Chapter II.6.b. 
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adoption of a bargain procedure into the South African law generally is less problematic 
than in Germany. Nevertheless the question could be raised whether an alternative 
procedure has been established through the advent of s 105A. Considering the South 
African provision of s 105A, Steyn states that plea bargaining could be seen as a type of 
alternative dispute resolution.1289 In contrast to Steyn’s statement, Els J said in the S v 
Esterhuizen & others case that regardless of how much room was left open in the 
negotiation process to achieve a settled result, state and defence were still negotiating 
with each other as adversaries under an adversarial system.1290 Bennun again declares 
plea bargaining to be exceptional and not the normal procedure.1291 Against the 
background of these statements, it can be said that there does not exist a clear common 
academic opinion on how plea bargaining should be judged. Directive No. 1 issued by the 
NDPP however reads as follows: ‘the procedure enacted in s 105A does not supplant the 
standard procedure for pleas of guilty in terms of s 112 of the Act. The established practice 
of accepting initial pleas of guilty on the basis of bona fide consensus reached, remains 
applicable. Section 105A is a complementary disposal mechanism.’ It can be interpreted 
that s 105A contains a procedure of its own that is related to the guilty plea. 
The content and procedure of the bargain can be marked as mostly consensual. In the 
accusatorial tradition it is widely up to the parties upon which terms and conditions they 
agree and which facts and evidence are to be placed before the court. The court does not 
participate in the bargain as contemplated in s 105A (3). Instead, the judge is limited to the 
scrutiny of the agreement in terms of s 105A (6) and (7) that the parties had entered into 
before. These are inquisitorial elements however.1292 It can be summed up that the 
bargain procedure in South Africa is a basically consensual procedure which is 
accompanied by inquisitorial duties of scrutiny. It is not a great effort for the parties to 
mutually work towards the formal fulfilment of the requirements of subsection (6) and 
(7).1293 Thus, the inquisitorial scrutiny is a very limited one.  
e. Future prospects 
It is a general tendency in the criminal procedure over the last decades to make use of 
consensual elements in order to enhance the effectiveness of criminal trials. It can be 
assumed that the procedure in South Africa will not substantially change over the next 
                                            
1289
  Steyn (2007) SACJ 206 at 208. 
1290
  S v Esterhuizen & others 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 493i. 
1291
  Bennun (2007) SACJ 17 at 45. 
1292
  See Chapter V.6.b. 
1293
  Compare Chapter V.6. 
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years. In Germany the situation is unpredictable as plea bargaining might be an even more 
controversial issue due to the inquisitorial implications. As already shown, German 
scholars have suggested and suggest again to officially adopt a consensual procedure.1294 
They imagine the conduct of the bargain to be as following: after the decision to open the 
main proceedings and the accused having admitted the offence the taking of evidence 
could be omitted. The range of sentence would be diminished.1295 The acceptance of the 
charge against him on points of guilt by the accused corresponds to the existing special 
procedure of a penal order by the terms of s 407 seqq. StPO. In the procedure of a penal 
order the accused in addition accepts a specific sentence.1296 To my mind, the consensual 
procedure would have to form part of Part Six of the StPO that contains several other 
special types of procedure. Instead, the legislature chose to implement the bargain 
process into the conventional trial procedure. There is no clear explanation for this 
decision. The judicial investigation and truth-seeking that the present system seeks to 
warrant could also be observed by another type of procedure. The regulation of bargaining 
as a formally exceptional procedure would also have the advantage of a more detailed 
regulation on the procedure. For instance, the comparable penal order is regulated in eight 
provisions reaching from s 407 to s 412 of the StPO.1297 Plea bargaining during the main 
proceedings in essence only is regulated in the single provision of s 257c. To sum it up, 
the half-hearted formal acknowledgement of plea bargaining as in its core a consensual 
procedure in Germany could provide an impetus to further reforms of the German 
provisions. 
f. Concluding remark 
The procedural natures of plea bargaining in South Africa and Germany slightly differ. In 
Germany, plea bargaining is implemented into the conventional trial system, whereas in 
South Africa the bargain procedure is attached to the plea system and implemented as a 
special procedure. The material content also differs. German bargain procedure can be 
marked as a summary procedure under the court’s inquisitorial regime. In South Africa, the 
procedure can be marked as consensual. Certain inquisitorial prerequisites are weak as 
the court is mainly limited to a formal approval of what the parties have negotiated before. 
The statutory regulation of the procedure in South Africa seems to stand firm, whereas in 
                                            
1294
  Meyer-Goßner, StPO, Introduction, para 119k; Meyer-Goßner (1992) NStZ 167; Meyer-Goßner (2007) 
425 at 431. 
1295
  Compare Meyer-Goßner, StPO, Introduction, para 119k with further references.  
1296
  Meyer-Goßner, StPO, Introduction, para 119k. 
1297
  Compare Meyer-Goßner (2007) NStZ 425 at 430. 
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Germany one could imagine that further regulations might follow. The present regulation of 
plea bargaining is not conclusive regarding the fact that it in the legislature’s eyes 
obviously was supposed to leave basic inquisitorial principles untouched, which it in fact 
cannot grant. 
VI. Conclusion 
South African law with s 105A established a consensual procedure that limits the court to 
the approval of an agreement that had been concluded before in between prosecution and 
accused. Plea bargaining fits relatively easily with the existing legal framework, as it is 
based on accusatorial common law traditions. The scope of statutory bargains is limited to 
plea and sentence agreements regarding the main proceedings. For the rest, informal 
bargaining remains applicable. Plea bargaining replaces the conventional trial procedure 
with a written agreement. 
German law with s 160b, 202a, 212, 257c contains provisions for all stages of bargaining. 
Informal bargaining is inadmissible. The scope of possible subjects is unlimited. In 
accordance with the inquisitorial law tradition of German criminal procedure, agreements 
do not replace a conventional trial. Nevertheless, they greatly shorten it. The law provides 
for a greater authority of the judge, who initiates the bargain procedure and is involved in 
the negotiations. Also, the judge’s obligation for truth-seeking is emphasised and is aimed 
at warranting a strong factual basis. Parties enter into the agreement after a stage of 
mutual discussion which implies at the same the court’s scrutiny. Throughout the bargain 
procedure the judge has a comprehensive knowledge of the file and has the power to 
further investigate the case. Subsequently, the court builds his conventional conviction and 
sentence upon the outcome of the bargain. Although the procedure differs and implies 
characteristics of an inquisitorial trial procedure, in essence the pressure for greater 
efficiency lets inquisitorial elements step back. Nevertheless, the more active role of the 
judge remains a significant feature of bargaining in Germany. 
It has to be obeyed that plea bargaining bypasses the fundamental function of the criminal 
trial in both legal systems. The court’s function, either limited to the function of approval or 
to moderating the bargain, is drastically modified. The parallel interests of both the court 
and the prosecution to lessen their workload can result in coercion. Accused who refuse to 
bargain might fear suffering disadvantages. This problem can only be solved by 
transparency of the bargain process and a serious application of the principle of a fair trial. 
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South African law seems to have achieved a higher transparency through the requirement 
of an agreement in writing. However, this is opposed by almost no judicial approval of the 
substantial facts. The main focus of the judge’s scrutiny lies upon whether formal 
prerequisites have been fulfilled and whether the accused has entered into the agreement 
voluntarily. The basis of this practice is the accusatorial law tradition. In comparison, plea 
bargaining in Germany appears as a ‘hybrid’ of accusatorial and inquisitorial principles. 
The German law on agreements is the regulation of a procedure that informally developed 
in an inquisitorial system. The German legislature, however, did not ever make up its mind 
whether to establish a consensual procedure of bargaining. The consensual elements 
have been implemented into the criminal procedure half-heartedly. The future will show if 
the legislature will decide to emancipate agreements as a consensual procedure of its 
own. The factual state however suffers enormous implications within the inquisitorial 
framework of the criminal procedure which cannot be bypassed. The regulation of 
bargains as a special procedure, as it has been done with the penal order in Part Six of the 
German Code of Criminal Procedure, would add to the transparency and credibility of the 
procedure. 
Generally both legal systems suffer a fundamental problem. Once one decides to allow, or 
even to simply not strictly suppress, consensual procedures in the criminal justice system, 
the mutual interests of the participants generates momentum. The dynamic of bargains will 
circumvent almost every attempt to formally limit or regulate the procedure. The prevention 
of abuse through legislation due to the very nature and essence of bargaining cannot be 
fully achieved. However bargaining has become a worldwide reality, and it seems 
impossible to turn the clock back. Consequently, fundamental principles such as the 
transparency of the criminal trial, prevention of crime through the deterrence of penalty 
and the accused’s right to a fair trial can only be warranted through severe control of the 
public participants in the bargain, i.e., the court and the prosecution office. 
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ANNEX 
German Provisions on Plea Bargaining 
GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Strafprozessordnung (StPO) 1298 
 
PART TWO: PROCEEDINGS AT FIRST INSTANCE 1299 
 
CHAPTER II 
PREPARATION OF THE PUBLIC CHARGES 
 
Section 160b 
[Discussion of the Status of Proceedings] 
 
1The public prosecution office may discuss the status of the proceedings with the 
participants, insofar as this appears suitable to expedite the proceedings. 2The essential 
content of this discussion shall be documented. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
DECISION CONCERNING THE OPENING OF THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS 
 
Section 202a 
[Discussion of the Status of Proceedings] 
 
1Where the court is considering the opening of main proceedings, it may discuss the 
status of the proceedings with the participants, insofar as this appears suitable to expedite 
the proceedings. 2The essential content of this discussion shall be documented. 
 
CHAPTER V 
PREPARATION OF THE MAIN HEARING 
                                            
1298
  Translated by German Federal Ministry of Justice in cooperation with juris GmbH, author: Kathleen 
Müller-Rostin, 2011. 
1299
  All following sections form part of Part Two of the German Criminal Code of Criminal Procedure and are 
cited with their specific chapter-heading. 
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Section 212 
[Applicability of Section 202a] 
 
Section 202a shall apply mutatis mutandis after the opening of the main proceedings. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
MAIN HEARING 
 
Section 257b 
[Discussion of the Status of Proceedings] 
 
At the main hearing the court may discuss the status of the proceedings with the 
participants, insofar as this appears suitable to expedite the proceedings. 
 
Section 257c 
[Negotiated Agreement]  
 
(1) 1In suitable cases the court may, in accordance with the following subsections, reach 
an agreement with the participants on the further course and outcome of the proceedings. 
2Section 244 subsection (2) shall remain unaffected. 
 
(2) 1The subject matter of this agreement may only comprise the legal consequences that 
could be the content of the judgment and of the associated rulings, other procedural 
measures relating to the course of the underlying adjudication proceedings, and the 
conduct of the participants during the trial. 2A confession shall be an integral part of any 
negotiated agreement. 3The verdict of guilt, as well as measures of reform and prevention, 
may not be the subject of a negotiated agreement. 
 
(3) 1 The court shall announce what content the negotiated1300 agreement could have. 2It 
may, on free evaluation of all the circumstances of the case as well as general sentencing 
considerations, also indicate an upper and lower sentence limit. 3The participants shall be 
                                            
1300
  To the mind of the author the presented translation at that point is not precise; the orginial text only uses 
the term ‘Verständigung’ and does not add that is already had been negotiated; it is a significant feature 
of the German law that the agreement is concluded not until the end of the bargain procedure. 
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given the opportunity to make submissions. 4The negotiated agreement shall come into 
existence if the defendant and the public prosecution office agree to the court’s proposal. 
 
(4) 1The court shall cease to be bound by a negotiated agreement if legal or factually 
significant circumstances have been overlooked or have arisen and the court therefore 
becomes convinced that the prospective sentencing range is no longer appropriate to the 
gravity of the offence or the degree of guilt. 2The same shall apply if the further conduct of 
the defendant at the trial does not correspond to that upon which the court’s prediction 
was based. 3The defendant’s confession may not be used in such cases. 4The court shall 
notify any deviation without delay. 
  
(5) The defendant shall be instructed as to the prerequisites for and consequences of a 
deviation by the court from the prospective outcome pursuant to subsection (4) 
South African Provisions on Plea Bargaining 
Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977 
 
CHAPTER 15 
THE PLEA 
 
Section 105A 
Plea and sentence agreements 
 
(1) (a) A prosecutor authorised thereto in writing by the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and an accused who is legally represented may, before the accused pleads 
to the charge brought against him or her, negotiate and enter into an agreement in respect 
of— 
(i) a plea of guilty by the accused to the offence charged or to an offence of which 
he or she may be convicted on the charge; and 
(ii)  if the accused is convicted of the offence to which he or she has agreed to plead 
guilty— 
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(aa) a just sentence to be imposed by the court; or 
(bb) the postponement of the passing of sentence in terms of section 297 (1) (a); 
or 
(cc) a just sentence to be imposed by the court, of which the operation of the 
whole or any part thereof is to be suspended in terms of section 297 (1) (b); 
and 
(dd) if applicable, an award for compensation as contemplated in section 300. 
(b) The prosecutor may enter into an agreement contemplated in paragraph (a)— 
(i) after consultation with the person charged with the investigation of the case; 
(ii) with due regard to, at least, the— 
(aa) nature of and circumstances relating to the offence; 
(bb) personal circumstances of the accused; 
(cc) previous convictions of the accused, if any; and 
(dd) interests of the community, and 
(iii) after affording the complainant or his or her representative, where it is reasonable 
to do so and taking into account the nature of and circumstances relating to the 
offence and the interests of the complainant, the opportunity to make 
representations to the prosecutor regarding— 
(aa) the contents of the agreement; and 
(bb) the inclusion in the agreement of a condition relating to compensation or the 
rendering to the complainant of some specific benefit or service in lieu of 
compensation for damage or pecuniary loss. 
(c) The requirements of paragraph (b) (i) may be dispensed with if the prosecutor is 
satisfied that consultation with the person charged with the investigation of the case will 
delay the proceedings to such an extent that it could— 
(i) cause substantial prejudice to the prosecution, the accused, the complainant or his 
or her representative; and 
(ii) affect the administration of justice adversely. 
(2) An agreement contemplated in subsection (1) shall be in writing and shall at least— 
(a) state that the accused, before entering into the agreement, has been informed that he 
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or 
she has the right— 
(i) to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt; 
(ii) to remain silent and not to testify during the proceedings; and 
(iii) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence; 
(b) state fully the terms of the agreement, the substantial facts of the matter, all other facts 
relevant to the sentence agreement and any admissions made by the accused; 
(c) be signed by the prosecutor, the accused and his or her legal representative; and 
(d) if the accused has negotiated with the prosecutor through an interpreter, contain a 
certificate by the interpreter to the effect that he or she interpreted accurately during the 
negotiations and in respect of the contents of the agreement. 
(3) The court shall not participate in the negotiations contemplated in subsection (1). 
(4) (a) The prosecutor shall, before the accused is required to plead, inform the court that 
an agreement contemplated in subsection (1) has been entered into and the court shall 
then— 
(i) require the accused to confirm that such an agreement has been entered into; and 
(ii) satisfy itself that the requirements of subsection (1) (b) (i) and (iii) have been 
complied with. 
(b) If the court is not satisfied that the agreement complies with the requirements of 
subsection (1) (b) (i) and (iii), the court shall— 
(i) inform the prosecutor and the accused of the reasons for noncompliance; and 
(ii) afford the prosecutor and the accused the opportunity to comply with the 
requirements concerned. 
(5) If the court is satisfied that the agreement complies with the requirements of subsection 
(1) (b) (i) and (iii), the court shall require the accused to plead to the charge and order that 
the contents of the agreement be disclosed in court. 
(6) (a) After the contents of the agreement have been disclosed, the court shall question 
the accused to ascertain whether— 
(i) he or she confirms the terms of the agreement and the admissions made by him or 
her in the agreement; 
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(ii) with reference to the alleged facts of the case, he or she admits the allegations in 
the charge to which he or she has agreed to plead guilty; and 
(iii) the agreement was entered into freely and voluntarily in his or her sound and 
sober senses and without having been unduly influenced. 
(b) After an inquiry has been conducted in terms of paragraph (a), the court shall, if— 
(i) the court is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence in respect of 
which the agreement was entered into; or 
(ii) it appears to the court that the accused does not admit an allegation in the charge 
or that the accused has incorrectly admitted any such allegation or that the 
accused has a valid defence to the charge; or 
(iii) for any other reason, the court is of the opinion that the plea of guilty by the 
accused should not stand, record a plea of not guilty and inform the prosecutor 
and the accused of the reasons therefor. 
(c) If the court has recorded a plea of not guilty, the trial shall start de novo before another 
presiding officer: Provided that the accused may waive his or her right to be tried before 
another presiding officer. 
(7) (a) If the court is satisfied that the accused admits the allegations in the charge and 
that he or she is guilty of the offence in respect of which the agreement was entered into, 
the court shall proceed to consider the sentence agreement. 
(b) For purposes of paragraph (a), the court— 
(i) may— 
(aa) direct relevant questions, including questions about the previous convictions 
of the accused, to the prosecutor and the accused; and 
(bb) hear evidence, including evidence or a statement by or on behalf of the 
accused or the complainant; and 
(ii) must, if the offence concerned is an offence— 
(aa) referred to in the Schedule to the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (Act 
No. 105 of 1997); or 
(bb) for which a minimum penalty is prescribed in the law creating the offence, 
have due regard to the provisions of that Act or law. 
(8) If the court is satisfied that the sentence agreement is just, the court shall inform the 
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prosecutor and the accused that the court is so satisfied, whereupon the court shall convict 
the accused of the offence charged and sentence the accused in accordance with the 
sentence agreement. 
(9) (a) If the court is of the opinion that the sentence agreement is unjust, the court shall 
inform the prosecutor and the accused of the sentence which it considers just. 
(b) Upon being informed of the sentence which the court considers just, the prosecutor 
and the accused may— 
(i) abide by the agreement with reference to the charge and inform the court that, 
subject to the right to lead evidence and to present argument relevant to 
sentencing, the court may proceed with the imposition of sentence; or 
(ii) withdraw from the agreement. 
(c) If the prosecutor and the accused abide by the agreement as contemplated in 
paragraph 
(b) (i), the court shall convict the accused of the offence charged and impose the sentence 
which it considers just. 
(d) If the prosecutor or the accused withdraws from the agreement as contemplated in 
paragraph (b) (ii), the trial shall start de novo before another presiding officer: Provided 
that the accused may waive his or her right to be tried before another presiding officer. 
(10) Where a trial starts de novo as contemplated in subsection (6) (c) or (9) (d)— 
(a) the agreement shall be null and void and no regard shall be had or reference made 
to— 
(i) any negotiations which preceded the entering into the agreement; 
(ii) the agreement; or 
(iii) any record of the agreement in any proceedings relating thereto, unless the 
accused consents to the recording of all or certain admissions made by him or 
her in the agreement or during any proceedings relating thereto and any 
admission so recorded shall stand as proof of such admission; 
(b) the prosecutor and the accused may not enter into a plea and sentence agreement in 
respect of a charge arising out of the same facts; and 
(c) the prosecutor may proceed on any charge. 
(11) (a) The National Director of Public Prosecutions, in consultation with the Minister, 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
196 
 
shall issue Directives regarding all matters which are reasonably necessary or expedient 
to be prescribed in order to achieve the objects of this section and any Directive so issued 
shall be observed in the application of this section. 
(b) The Directives contemplated in paragraph (a)— 
(i) must prescribe the procedures to be followed in the application of this section 
relating to— 
(aa) any offence referred to in the Schedule to the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 
1997, or any other offence for which a minimum penalty is prescribed in the 
law creating the offence; 
(bb) any offence in respect of which a court has the power or is required to 
conduct a specific enquiry, whether before or after convicting or sentencing 
the accused; and 
(cc) any offence in respect of which a court has the power or is required to make 
a specific order upon conviction of the accused; 
(ii) may prescribe the procedures to be followed in the application of this section 
relating to any other offence in respect of which the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions deems it necessary or expedient to prescribe specific procedures; 
(iii) must ensure that adequate disciplinary steps shall be taken against a prosecutor 
who fails to comply with any Directive; and 
(iv) must ensure that comprehensive records and statistics relating to the 
implementation and application of this section are kept by the prosecuting 
authority. 
(c) The National Director of Public Prosecutions shall submit Directives issued under this 
subsection to Parliament before those Directives take effect, and the first Directives so 
issued, must be submitted to Parliament within four months of the commencement of this 
section. 
(d) Any Directive issued under this subsection may be amended or withdrawn in like 
manner. 
(12) The National Director of Public Prosecutions shall at least once every year submit the 
records and statistics referred to in subsection (11) (b) (iv) to Parliament. 
(13) In this section “sentence agreement” means an agreement contemplated in 
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subsection 
(1) (a) (ii). 
Typical content of an agreement in South Africa 
According to Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure a typical agreement will include the following 
headings: 
‘A. Parties to the agreement (state and accused). 
B. Authority (of the prosecutor to be attached). 
C. Legal representation (of accused). 
D. Investigating officer (stating that he or she has been consulted). 
E. The complainant’s attitude. 
F. The accused’s rights (stating that the accused has been informed of his or her 
fundamental rights – including the right to be presumed innocent, the right to silence, the 
right against self-incrimination – and that the accused is aware that the court is not obliged 
to accept the agreement). 
G. The charges (per the charge sheet). 
H Proposed plea of the accused on all charges (guilty, not guilty, or withdrawn). 
I. Factual background to charges and plea, referring to events, the actions of the accused, 
the victim’s role, the offence. 
J. Aggravating circumstances. 
K. Mitigating circumstances. 
L. Sentence agreement (setting out the sentence of the accused).’1301 
Original example of a South African agreement in terms of s 105A 
**************************ORIGINAL TEXT************************* 
IN THE REGIONAL COURT FOR THE REGIONAL DIVISION OF THE WESTERN CAPE, 
HELD AT WYNBERG 
 
                                            
1301
  As shown in Hiemstra’s, Criminal Procedure 15-8. 
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       Case No: CAS NO HID 
 
In the matter between  
 
The State 
 
And 
 
ACCUSEDS  NAME HIDE        THE ACCUSED 
 
__________________________________________________ 
 
AGREEMENT IN TERMS OF SECTION 105A OF ACT 51 OF 1977 (AS AMENDED) 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
A PREAMBLE 
 
 WHEREAS 
 
1 The accused is charged with  
 
1.1 MURDER 
1.2 ATTEMPTED MURDER 
1.3 POSSESSION of FIREARM 
1.4 POSSESSION of AMMUNITION 
 
2 The Senior Public Prosecutor, Mr PUB LIC PROSECUTOR, has been duly 
authorized in writing by the National Director of Public Prosecutions, as required by 
Section 105A of Act 51/77, to negotiate and enter into an agreement with the 
accused.  
 
3 The prosecutor is duly authorized to conduct proceedings in court on behalf of the 
State in connection with this agreement, after it has been duly entered into. 
 
4 The Senior Public Prosecutor and the accused, who is represented herein by Ms 
ATTORNEY have negotiated and entered into the agreement in respect of a plea of 
guilty by the accused to the offences of which he may be convicted on the charges 
as well as a sentence to be imposed by this Honorable Court. 
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5 The accused has been informed of the following of his rights referred to in Section 
105 A (2)(a) of Act 51 of 1977: 
 
(a) To be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 
(b)  To remain silent and not to testify during the proceedings and 
(c) Not to be compelled to give self incriminating evidence. 
 
6 The Senior Public Prosecutor has duly complied with the requirements of Section 
105A (1) (b) of Act 51 of 1977;  
 
(a) The investigating officer, Inspector INSPECTOR, has been consulted.  He is 
satisfied with the terms of the agreement, including the sentence. 
(b) Due regard has been had to the circumstances prescribed in Section 105 A 
(b) (ii) of Act 51 of 1977. 
(c) The prosecutor has consulted with SISTER OF DEC, the sister of the 
deceased. She has been given reasonable means to make representations 
to the prosecutor regarding the contents of the agreement and is satisfied 
with the agreement and sentence. 
 
7 The accused admits guilt in respect of the charges, as mentioned above, and 
pleads guilty thereto on the basis set out below. 
 
8 The Senior Public Prosecutor is prepared to accept such plea of guilty. 
 
NOW THEREFORE the Senior Public Prosecutor and the accused agree as follows in 
respect of  
 
B PLEA OF GUILTY AND ADMISSIONS 
 
1. The accused pleads guilty to the following charges and makes the following 
admissions. 
  
2. That he understands the charges against him as set out in the charge sheet and 
freely, voluntarily and without any influence pleads guilty to the charges as follows:  
 
 
Count 1 
2.1 The accused pleads guilty to the offence of murder in that upon or about 18/10/09 
and at or near PLACE OF OFF in the Regional Division of the Western Cape, he 
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did wrongfully and intentionally shot WNAME WNAME a female person by shooting 
her with a firearm and did thereby inflict certain mortal injuries as a result of which 
the said Winifred Williams died on DA/TU/MMMM at PLACE OF OFF in the 
Regional Division of the Western Cape and thus the accused did intentionally kill 
and murder the deceased. 
 
2.2      Count 2 
The accused pleads guilty to the offence of Attempted Murder in that upon or about 
DA/TU/UMDA and at or near PLACE OF OFF, in the Regional Division of the 
Western Cape, he did unlawfully and intentionally attempt to kill VIC NNAME a male 
person by shooting him on the upper leg. 
 
2.3      Count 3 
The accused pleads guilty to the offence of contravening the provisions of Section 3 
read with Sections 1, 103, 117, 120(1)(a), Section 121 read with Schedule 4 and 
Section 151 of the Firearms  Control Act, 60 of 2000, and further read with Section 
250 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 – Possession of a firearm. 
 
In that on or about DA/TU/UMDA and at or near PLACE OF OFF in the Regional 
Division of the Western Cape I unlawfully had in my possession a .38 Special 
revolver without holding a license, permit or authorization issued in term of the Act 
to possess that firearm.  
 
2.4 Count 4 
The accused pleads guilty to the offence of contravening the provisions of Section 
90 read with Sections 1,103,117,120(1)(a), Section 121 read with Schedule 4 and 
Section 151 of the Firearms Control Act, 60 of 2000 and further read with Section 
250 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 – Possession of ammunition. 
 
In that on or about DA/TU/UMDA and at or near PLACE OF OFF in the Regional 
Division of the Western Cape, I did unlawfully have in my possession ammunition, 
to wit 2 x live .38 Special caliber rounds of ammunition without being (a) the holder 
of a license in respect of a firearm capable of discharging that ammunition; (b) a 
permit to possess ammunition; (c) a dealer’s license manufacturer’s license, 
gunsmith’s license, import, export or in-transit permit or transporter’s permit issued 
in terms of this Act; (d) or is otherwise authorized to do so. 
   
   
3 In amplification of the accused’s plea of guilty to these charges the  following 
facts are admitted by him: 
Admissions re counts 1 to 4 
3.1    I admit that on the DA/TU/UMDA, I was at NO STREETN, PLACE OF OFF 
within the jurisdiction of this honorable court. 
3.2 I admit that I was with the deceased and friends drinking alcohol. 
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3.3      I admit that there was an argument between me and the deceased, Winifred 
Williams. 
3.4    I admit that I took out a firearm that was in the fridge, and pointed the 
deceased with it.  
3.5     I admit that I pulled the trigger of the firearm and shots went off hitting the 
deceased and a child, VIC NNAME, that the deceased held in her arms .  
 
3.6 I admit that I shot the deceased in the chest and the child in the leg. 
 
Admissions re count 1 
3.7      I admit that the deceased died on the scene. 
 
3.8 I admit that the deceased sustained no further injuries after the shooting. 
 
3.9 I admit that the content of the post mortem report is correct. 
 
3.10      I admit the identity of the deceased as WNAME WNAME. 
 
3.11 I admit that I intentionally and unlawfully shot the deceased whereby the 
deceased sustained injuries resulting in her death. 
 
3.12 I admit that I had no right or permission to shoot the deceased. 
 
3.13 At all material times I foresaw that the assault on the deceased could lead to 
the death of the deceased. I reconciled myself with the possible outcome. 
 
 
Admissions re count 2 
3.14  I admit  that I did foresee the possibility that the complainant, VIC NNAME, 
could sustain serious injuries due to my actions which could lead to her 
death and I reconciled myself with this. 
3.15 I admit that the complainant sustained serious injuries on her leg which 
resulted in her being disabled.   
3.16 I admit that the complainant was held in the arms of the deceased when I 
shot at the deceased. 
3.17 I admit that I had no right or permission to act in this manner; 
 
Admissions re count 3 and 4 
3.18    I admit that I was in possession of the firearm, to wit 38 Special revolver 
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whilst not in possession of a license, permit or authorization issued in terms 
of the Act to possess the firearm; 
3.19 I admit that I was in possession of 2 x live 38 Special revolver caliber rounds 
of ammunition without being the holder of the mentioned authorization in 
terms of this Act; 
3.20 The ballistic report has been explained to me by my legal representative and 
I understand and admit the contents thereof. 
3.21 I admit that I believed at all material times that it a firearm and ammunition 
that was in working order;  
3.22   I admit that I had no right or permission to have the firearm in my possession 
without a valid license. 
3.23 I admit that I had no right or permission to have ammunition in my 
possession without the valid authorization; 
Admissions re counts 1 to 4 
3.24 I admit that at all material times I knew that my actions, as per counts one to 
four, were wrongful and unlawful and that I could be punished by a court of 
law;  
 
NOW THEREFORE the accused admits that he is guilty of the charges as mentioned in 
the charge sheet. 
 
C AGREEMENT IN RESPECT OF A JUST SENTENCE 
 
It is agreed that the following is a just sentence in the circumstances of the charges 
mentioned above. 
 
The agreed sentence: 
 
COUNT 1 
15 (Fifteen) years imprisonment of which 3 (Three) years imprisonment is suspended for 5 
(Five) years on following conditions: 
That the accused is not found guilty of murder, attempted murder, assault or assault with 
intentions to do grievous bodily harm committed during the period of suspension.   
 
Count 2 
7 (Seven) years imprisonment of which 3 (Three) years imprisonment is suspended for 5 
(Five) years on following conditions: 
That the accused is not found guilty of attempted murder, assault or assault with intentions 
to do grievous bodily harm committed during the period of suspension.   
 
Count 3  
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5 (Five) years imprisonment wholly suspended for a period of 5(Five) years on the 
following condition. 
That the accused is not convicted of contravening Section 3 of Act 60 of 2000 committed 
during the period of suspension. 
 
Count 4 
3 (Three) years imprisonment wholly suspended for a period of 5 (Five) years on the 
following condition: 
That the accused is not convicted of contravening Section 90 of Act 60 of 2000 committed 
during the period of suspension. 
 
No order is made in terms of section 103 of Act 60 of 2000. The accused is therefore unfit 
to possess a fire-arm. 
 
In terms of section 120(4)(a) of the Children’s Act, Act 38 of 2005, the accused is found 
unsuitable to work with children 
D SUBSTANTIAL AND OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS 
 
The gravity of the offences, the interest of the community and the personal 
circumstances of the accused have duly been considered and taken into account by 
both parties. 
 
1. The aggravating factors are as follows: 
1.1 The actions of the accused caused the death of another human being; 
1.2 The incidence of offences such as the present is increasing in our community 
and has grave consequences; 
1.3 The offence committed is of serious nature. 
1.4 The accused has previous convictions. 
1.5 The minor child has been disabled by the shooting. 
 
2. The mitigating factors are as follows: 
2.1 The accused is 24 years old. 
2.2 The accused is single. 
2.3      The accused has one child. 
2.4  The accused resides at NO NAME Road, PLACE OF OFF;  
       
3. The substantial and compelling circumstances in terms of Section 51(3) (a) of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act No105 of 1997, which justify a sentence less than the 
prescribed minimum sentence are as follows: 
3.1      The accused pleaded guilty. 
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3.2 The conclusion of this matter by way of section 105A of Act 51 of 1977 has 
spared the state the expense and inconvenience of a Trial. 
 
 
SIGNED AND DATED AT WYNBERG ON THIS Nst DAY OF MONTH YEAR. 
 
___________     _______________ 
Mr NAM PROSECUTOR    ACCUSEDS  NAME HIDE 
Senior Public Prosecutor    Accused 
 
_______________ 
Ms ATTORNEY 
Attorney of the Accused   
*********************ANNEXURE********************* 
       S v ACCUSEDS  NAME HIDE 
ANNEXURE “     ” 
Case no: CAS NO HID 
 
COUNT 1 
15 (Fifteen) years imprisonment of which 3 (Three) years imprisonment is suspended for 5 
(Five) years on following conditions: 
That the accused is not found guilty of murder, attempted murder, assault or assault with 
intentions to do grievous bodily harm committed during the period of suspension.   
 
Count 2 
7 (Seven) years imprisonment of which 3 (Three) years imprisonment is suspended for 5 
(Five) years on following conditions: 
That the accused is not found guilty of attempted murder, assault or assault with intentions 
to do grievous bodily harm committed during the period of suspension. 
 
Count 3  
5 (Five) years imprisonment wholly suspended for a period of 5(Five) years on the 
following condition. 
That the accused is not convicted of contravening Section 3 of Act 60 of 2000 committed 
during the period of suspension. 
 
Count 4 
3 (Three) years imprisonment wholly suspended for a period of 5 (Five) years on the 
following condition: 
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That the accused is not convicted of contravening Section 90 of Act 60 of 2000 committed 
during the period of suspension. 
 
 
No order is made in terms of section 103 of Act 60 of 2000. The accused is therefore unfit 
to possess a fire-arm. 
 
In terms of section 120(4)(a) of the Children’s Act, Act 38 of 2005, the accused is found 
unsuitable to work with children 
 
_____________________    _____________________ 
Regional Magistrate    Date 
***********************END OF ORIGINAL TEXT********************* 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
=  citation can also be found in 
AJ  Acting Judge 
All SA  All South African Law Reports (1996-present) 
BayObLG Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht (Bavarian Supreme Court) 
BCLR  British Columbian Law Reports 
BeckRS Beck-Rechtsprechung (journal) 
BGBl. Bundesgesetzblatt (German Federal Law Gazette) 
BGH  Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court for civil and criminal 
cases) 
BGHSt Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen (Decisions by the 
German Federal Supreme Court in criminal cases) 
BR-Drucks. Bundesrat Drucksachen (German Federal Council Journal) 
BT-Drucks. Bundestag Drucksachen (German Federal Parliament Journal) 
BVerfG Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) 
BVerfGE Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht (decisions of the Federal 
Consitutional Court) 
CC  Court Case 
CILSA Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
DRiZ  Deutsche Richterzeitung (journal) 
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights 
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EMRK Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention (German for ECHR) 
Einl.  Einleitung (introduction) 
FS  Festschrift (commemorative publication) 
GG  Grundgesetz (Basic Law, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany) 
GSSt Großer Senat in Strafsachen BGH (Grand Criminal Panel of the BGH) 
GVG Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (Courts Constitution Act) 
HanseLR Hanse Law Review (journal) 
HRRS Online-Zeitschrift für Höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung im Strafrecht 
(journal) 
JR  Juristische Rundschau (journal) 
JZ  Juristische Zeitung (journal) 
KG  Kammergericht (Regional Court Berlin) 
KrimJ  Kriminologisches Journal (journal) 
MDR  Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht (journal) 
NDPP  National Director of Public Prosecutions 
NJW  Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (journal) 
NStZ  Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (journal) 
NStZ-RR Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht – Rechtsprechungsreport (journal) 
p.  page 
para  paragraph 
R  Sount Afican rand, currency 
RefE  Referentenentwurf (ministerial draft bill) 
RiStBV Richtlinien für das Strafverfahren und das Bußgeldverfahren (Directives for 
Criminal Procedure and Fine Procedure) 
s  section 
ss  sections 
SA  South African Law Reports (1947-present) 
SACC  South African Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology (continued by SACJ) 
SACJ  South African Journal of Criminal Justice 
SACR  South African Criminal Law Reports (1990-present) 
seq.  sequens (following page) 
seqq.  sequentes (following pages) 
StPO  Strafprozessordnung (German Code of Criminal Procedure) 
StrafFo Strafverteidiger Forum (journal) 
StV  Strafverteidiger (journal) 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
207 
 
U.S.  United States (of America) 
THRHR Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (journal) 
TRW  Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap 
TSAR  Tydskrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg 
Vol.  Volume 
ZIS  Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (journal) 
ZRP  Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (journal) 
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